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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction 
 
The Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak of 2001 began and ended 
in the North East of England.  It proved to be the most serious animal 
epidemic in the UK in modern times and the worst Foot and Mouth 
outbreak to be tackled that the world has seen. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impacts of FMD on the 
rural economy of the North East, to provide a basis from which to 
consider the long-term consequences and to inform and guide the process 
of rural recovery. The research was conducted between September and 
December 2001 when the disease outbreak was tailing off, but when 
widespread restrictions were still in force.  The study was funded by ONE 
North East (the Regional Development Agency) and forms part of a 
wider research initiative funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council exploring the business, consumer and institutional response to 
FMD. 
 
The North East Rural Economy 
 
By the late 1990s the rural workforce accounted for 13% of total 
employment in the North East.  The major sectors are manufacturing with 
19% of the rural workforce; health and social work (13%); and wholesale, 
retail and repair (12%).  Agriculture and fishing account for just 9% of 
rural employees.  The most rapidly growing sectors of rural employment 
in recent years have all been in services. 
 v 
 
Income levels in the North East are the lowest of any region in Great 
Britain and are generally even lower in the rural areas.  Northumberland 
has the second lowest wage levels amongst English counties.  GDP per 
head for the rural workforce is also low: roughly half of the national 
average and less than two-thirds the North East average. 
 
The rural economy of the North East has a small scale business structure.  
Some 92% of rural firms are micro-businesses (i.e. with fewer than 10 
employees). Formation and turnover rates of businesses (per head of 
population) match national standards in the Northumberland districts of 
Alnwick, Castle Morpeth and Tynedale, but the other rural local authority 
districts in the North East perform worse than the UK average. 
 
The farming industry was in serious economic difficulty even before the 
effects of FMD. In 2001, the value of agricultural output nationally fell, 
for the fifth successive year, by 4.5%.  Incomes overall are as low in real 
terms as at any time since the depression of the late 1930s. 
 
The main farming activities in the North East are lowland arable, lowland 
beef and sheep and upland beef and sheep.  In the 3-4 years prior to the 
outbreak of FMD grazing farms in both the lowlands and uplands had 
experienced negative profitability.   
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The Conduct of the Foot and Mouth Crisis 
 
The outbreak of FMD in the UK was confirmed on February 20th 2001 
following diagnosis of cattle and pigs with the disease at an abattoir in 
Essex.  The source was traced to a pig unit at Heddon on the Wall in 
Northumberland which, it was discovered, had also infected several farms 
in the area. 
 
The number of confirmed cases accelerated rapidly reaching a peak in 
late March/early April and then subsiding.  The region appeared to be 
free of the disease through June and July, but in August there was a 
further outbreak in the South Tyne/Allendale area of Northumberland. 
The last confirmed case occurred on September 29th. By then the number 
of infected premises in the North East had reached 190. On an additional 
1,018 holdings the animals were also culled. In total 317,000 sheep and 
54,000 cattle were destroyed in the region. 
 
On February 21st, the day after the first FMD case was confirmed 
nationally, a ban on meat and live animal exports was imposed.  Two 
days later a complete ban on the movement of livestock was introduced. 
From early March the transport of some animals to slaughter was 
permitted under licence. Livestock markets were closed and remained so 
for the rest of the year. Towards the latter stages of the epidemic so-called 
“Blue Box” zones were defined with strict bio-security and movement 
regimes imposed to contain the outbreak to particular geographical areas. 
Livestock movement restrictions, however, remained in place throughout 
counties affected by FMD. 
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On February 27th, one week into the crisis, the Government gave powers 
to County Councils to close all rights of way in livestock areas. The 
Northumberland National Park Authority had acted even earlier, on the 
first day of the outbreak, by closing its car parks and visitor facilities and 
erecting “Keep Out” notices on paths. The National Trust reacted in a 
similar manner with its properties. 
 
The closure of the countryside had a widespread impact on non-farming 
businesses.  Three weeks into the outbreak a Rural Task Force was set up 
by the Government to consider the implications of the outbreak of FMD 
for the rural economy, and to advise on remedial measures. The short-
term measures introduced to assist affected rural businesses and 
communities included: deferral of VAT, tax and National Insurance 
payments; hardship relief and deferral of domestic rates; free consultancy 
advice to farms; and assistance to voluntary bodies offering support 
services for rural communities.  Additional resources were allocated to 
the Regional Development Agencies to create and administer a Business 
Recovery Fund. 
 
In addition, in the light of revised veterinary assessments of the risk 
posed by public access, Government guidance was issued to local 
authorities on May 23rd which encouraged the re-opening of paths where 
it was considered safe to do so. The process gathered pace only in late 
July, following Government intervention. However, the re-emergence of 
the disease in the North East in late August was a major setback. 
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The Impact on Farm Businesses 
 
To gauge the impacts of FMD on agriculture and farming households a 
survey of 78 farm businesses was conducted, representative of the types 
of farming found in the North East.  Fifteen of the farms had had 
livestock culled, losing an average of 710 animals each. 
 
The financial impact of the FMD crisis on farm households varied 
considerably. Livestock farms lost revenue from animal sales and faced 
additional costs where animals had to be kept on the farm. Furthermore, 
some diversified enterprises and off-farm employment were also 
adversely affected. 
 
On farms that were culled out, households incomes and revenues faced an 
average shortfall of £61,000 in 2001-2. These farms, though, had received 
compensation with estimates averaging £74,000 - £111,000 per culled out 
farm. 
 
On livestock farms not culled out, household income and revenues faced 
an average shortfall of £18,000 in 2001-2. Farms on which livestock were 
not culled did not receive any compensation.  
 
On predominantly arable farms with no livestock culled, household 
incomes were expected to rise by an average of £2,700 in 2001-2.  
 
The total net loss of revenue to the farming economy of the North East is 
estimated at £98 million for 2001-2.  
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Diversified activities, particularly on culled farms, were especially 
vulnerable to the disruptions of FMD. For the farm sample as a whole 
income from existing diversified sources fell in 2001-2 by an average of 
26% per farm. Farm contracting activities and renting out of buildings 
were strongly hit. 
 
Some farmers gained income through working on disease control 
activities, often on their own holding, and this income more than offset 
shortfalls in their normal sources of diversified income. 
 
At some point during the crisis, one third of those in the sample with off-
farm jobs were unable to go to work as a result of FMD. Average income 
for those households with off-farm employment fell by 8%. 
 
The FMD crisis was a fraught period for most farming households, 
whether or not their animals were culled out.  They had all felt isolated at 
some point because of the movement restrictions. Most had restricted 
both their own off-farm movements and the access of others onto their 
farm. 
 
The usual channels of informal support available to individuals also 
became closed as the social life of communities shut down. The marts 
were closed and many farmers stopped going to the local pub for fear of 
spreading the disease and bringing it back home. Furthermore, 86% of 
farming households surveyed did not visit friends and 72% were unable 
to see relatives. 
 
 x 
The main source of support for farm businesses during the crisis was 
their own households.  Some 60% of the sample reported that their 
immediate family helped them to cope with the crisis. Inevitably, though, 
with household members largely confined to the holding in such difficult 
and fraught circumstances, there were increased tensions which did put a 
considerable strain on relationships in some households. 
 
There was also friction between culled and non-culled farms.  Members 
of households on culled farms were anxious about the reactions of other 
farming households to them. Moreover, the fact that farmers who had had 
livestock culled received compensation and others did not was a source 
of resentment and bitterness. 
 
All the surveyed farmers intended to remain in farming. Some 60% of the 
farmers said that they would definitely maintain their existing level of 
farming activity after FMD. Most of the rest were thinking of expanding, 
and a few were looking to scale down the area they farmed. 
 
Some were considering alternative cropping and income generating 
strategies.  Just one in ten intended to increase their forestry area or grow 
new crops and few were interested in converting to organic farming.  
However, some 17% of farmers intended to increase their participation in 
agri-environment schemes, and a further 59% wanted to explore the 
possibility.  In addition,  some 15% of farmers intended to increase their 
diversification activities and 41% were possibly interested, but there was 
comparatively little active interest in pursuing any more off-farm 
employment. 
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Some 21% had sought or intended to seek advice on the farm business; 
14% on diversified enterprises; and just 1% on off-farm income 
possibilities. Most of the farmers, though, were not taking external advice 
regarding future strategies. 
 
The Impact on Rural (Non-Farming) Businesses 
 
To gauge the impact of the FMD crisis on non-farming businesses, 
telephone interviews were conducted with 180 firms in early April 2001, 
using as a sampling frame CRE’s database of 2000 rural micro-
businesses.  There was then a follow-up telephone survey of the same 
firms in late November 2001. A majority of the rural micro-businesses 
were affected in some way by the Foot and Mouth outbreak, but with 
variations between sectors. 
 
In certain sectors reliant on tourists, visitors or access to land - 
hospitality, land-based and recreation and culture - the large majority of 
firms were affected.  In another grouping of sectors -  retail, transport, 
business services and manufacturing sectors - roughly half of the firms 
were affected, often the result of knock-on effects within the business 
chain (for example, suppliers to farming or tourism businesses).  
 
Half of impacted firms were classified (on the basis of their percentage 
loss of turnover) as medium or high negative impact. Such firms were 
found in all sectors, including sectors which were generally little affected 
(such as personal services, construction, education and training and 
health and social).  Conversely, although hospitality was the most 
extensively affected sector, the largest grouping of hospitality businesses 
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fell into the low impact category (i.e. had suffered considerable 
disruption but with little or no change in annual revenue). 
 
The impacts of the crisis displayed a complex geography within the 
region. Though firms in all rural areas were affected to some degree, the 
worst impacts were concentrated in the more rural parts of the region, 
especially in Tynedale, Wear Valley and Teesdale. A number of spatial 
factors influenced this pattern, including the specific geographical 
incidence of disease cases and the consequent ‘Blue Box’ restrictions; the 
local structure of the economy (particularly regarding the concentration 
of businesses dependent on tourists and visitors); and the displacement of 
visitors and customers to coastal locations, larger settlements and urban 
fringe sites. 
 
Most firms were affected throughout the outbreak. A third of impacted 
firms were subject to a lag effect, being hit only several weeks into the 
outbreak, particularly as access restrictions and a fall in orders began to 
affect those in the manufacturing, business services and land-based 
sectors that supplied agriculture or tourism.  The majority of firms 
experienced signs of impact abatement and recovery in the autumn of 
2001. However, by late November, two fifths were experiencing no signs 
of recovery, particularly including firms hit indirectly and later on in the 
crisis. 
 
Foot and Mouth severely disturbed the usual trade cycles of many firms, 
introducing often severe fluctuations. A third of impacted firms 
experienced both unexpected troughs and peaks. These were mainly 
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firms that, on the one hand, lost established custom but, on the other 
hand, benefited from the displacement of local and passing trade or 
tourism to more accessible places.   
 
For a small minority - 3% of all the firms - FMD led to a net gain in 
annual revenue. These were firms that benefited considerably from 
displacement effects or obtained additional business from the control and 
clean-up campaign. 
 
The employment impacts of the crisis were widespread but diffuse, as 
some firms responded to the loss of business by reducing their staffing or 
not taking on seasonal workers.  The impacted firms in July 2001 
employed on average 11% fewer full-time, 6% fewer part-time and 36% 
fewer casual employees.  That equates to a loss per hundred rural firms 
(impacted and non-impacted) in the North East of 10 full-time, 4 part-
time and 3 casual jobs.  The employment impact was most pronounced in 
the early months of the crisis and during the summer. Initially, the job 
losses were mainly in the hospitality sector but subsequently also spread 
to business services, recreation and culture and manufacturing.  
 
There was a tendency as the crisis progressed for a ‘casualisation’ of the 
workforce with, for example, part-time jobs substituting for full-time 
employment. Many of the employment impacts though were low profile 
ones - such as the non-reengagement of seasonal labour, losses of casual 
employees and the reduction of staff working hours - and were not 
reflected in the unemployment register.  
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Finally, turnover changes were common among impacted firms and this 
often had a profound effect on their end of year profit status. For the year 
as a whole impacted firms in the survey were experiencing a mean 
revenue reduction of £16,000 or 17%.  This equates to a reduction for the 
year per firm (impacted and unimpacted) in the rural districts of the 
North East of £5,000.  Individual losses varied considerably. Three 
quarters of impacted firms were expecting poorer profits; and for half of 
these, a change from profit to break even or loss.  A crucial factor in this 
change was the duration of the impact. 
 
The total net loss of revenue to (non-farming) rural micro-businesses in 
the North East is estimated to be in the order of £80 million for 2001-2. 
This is not the full loss to the (non-farming) rural economy as it does not 
include the revenue losses suffered by the larger organisations. 
 
The Coping Responses of Rural Businesses 
 
Foot and Mouth disease revealed much about the nature of rural micro-
businesses and their coping responses during crisis.   
 
Responses varied over time and with the severity of impact, but most 
firms had to go beyond simple belt-tightening, such as cutting back on 
restocking or advertising, or postponing expenditure on upkeep and 
repair.  Typical early responses were for household members to work 
longer hours, the cancellation or postponement of business plans or 
investment, a reduction in staff working hours and making layoffs or 
redundancies.  
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As FMD progressed and the crisis became prolonged, firms broadened 
their coping responses to include such steps as the owner taking a smaller 
wage from the business and spending business reserves.  Finally, high 
impact firms were forced to take more drastic measures, such as the 
renegotiation or taking out of loans, the spending of personal savings, cut 
backs in household spending, and a household member looking for a job.  
For 8% of impacted firms, such measures had not been enough and 
owners had had to resort to temporary closure or were attempting to sell 
or close the business.  
 
Recourse to external help and advice was also important. A shift in the 
balance from informal to more formal forms of support occurred as the 
crisis progressed, with local authorities and Business Link being the most 
commonly utilised formal sources of help. Larger and more heavily 
impacted micro-businesses were more likely to have sought external 
support. There was also a distinct divide between impacted firms who 
were proactive in trying a range of support avenues and coping responses 
and firms whose owners were inclined to muddle through on their own. 
 
Business Link was cast to the forefront in the FMD crisis in delivering 
emergency advice and recovery schemes that were widely publicised.  It 
thus extended its client base, reaching sectors such as hospitality, where 
previously it had been little engaged. Even so, the large majority of 
impacted firms - including the high impact ones - did not approach 
Business Link.  Small firms face practical constraints in accessing 
support and their owners are often sceptical about the value and relevance 
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of external support. Other major sources of advice were the banks, 
accountants and financial advisors. 
 
Some 29% of affected firms, including 50% of high impact ones, 
received advice from other business owners.  The FMD crisis was a 
common experience for many firms, and in some cases this had helped to 
strengthen local business networks.   
 
Take-up of business relief recovery measures varied with individual 
schemes. Rate relief, business recovery grants (from the region’s 
Business Recovery Fund) and the deferral of tax payments were more 
popular than business rate deferral, business rate appeal and the Small 
Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme. Most of the firms that had applied for 
support under the Business Recovery Fund were successful, and 
beneficiaries spoke highly of the scheme.  However, most impacted firms 
turned instead to conventional forms of financial support. Some firms 
found they were ineligible for support from the Fund; or that the Fund 
could not simply provide compensation for losses or emergency aid.  
Some firms had been put off from applying by the effort they perceived 
would be needed.  Finally, some latecomers to the scheme found that the 
funding had run out. 
 
For those micro-businesses with employees, employment oriented coping 
responses were important. Some employment responses (such as layoffs 
and the decision not to take on casual or seasonal staff) were adopted 
surprisingly early in the outbreak. As businesses were progressively 
squeezed over time more and more firms reduced staff working hours. 
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Businesses were commonly reluctant to lay off core staff and in many 
cases employees were carried by their firms or employed on a more 
flexible basis. Such employees were regarded as a critical resource and 
were often socially embedded within the business. This contrasted with 
the attitude towards casual employees who were perceived to be a very 
flexible labour resource to be used as and when necessary.  
 
Most of the micro-businesses drew on family and household resources to 
cope with the crisis and its aftermath, further demonstrating the 
importance of households in providing small firm resilience. Households 
acted as a buffer to the businesses, absorbing revenue and employment 
effects. They commonly acted as a flexible labour reserve with household 
members either being underemployed or over-stretched depending on 
circumstances. Household coping responses were most pronounced in 
high impact firms, including household members working longer hours, 
cut backs in household spend, business owners taking a smaller wage 
from the business, the spending of personal savings and household 
members looking for another job. Through providing shock absorption 
capacity many households were exposed to considerable pressures.  One 
in five impacted business owners referred to personal stress.  Others 
alluded to family tensions and strained marital relations.  Many spoke of 
sheer physical and emotional exhaustion.  
 
It is also the case that some impacted businesses were better placed than 
others to cope during the outbreak. The existence of employees, the level 
of fixed costs, access to support networks and flexible labour and the age 
and experience of the business and its owner(s) were important in 
opening up or limiting access to coping responses. There is evidence that 
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some businesses had also been more proactive prior to FMD in 
developing asset accumulation and risk aversion strategies which proved 
significant in helping them to weather the crisis. Some for example had 
developed a loyal local customer base and good and trustful inter-firm 
relations.  
 
Comparing the coping responses of impacted farms and firms, it is 
striking how much more resilient were the farms. They were able to cope 
in a much more routine manner than the firms many of which exhibited 
financial distress and had to take crisis actions. Arguably, farm families 
have well developed asset accumulation strategies and have more 
experience of coping with crisis and can be assured of government 
assistance in doing so. 
 
Finally, the impacts of FMD extended late into 2001 for many of the 
impacted businesses. Although for a significant proportion impact had 
declined or was declining by the end of the year, for two fifths it 
remained persistent, in part as a result of a late flair up of the disease in 
the region. The research would suggest, moreover, that the issue of 
business recovery remains an important consideration through 2002 and 
beyond. Many of the impacted businesses have additional debt, reduced 
reserves, disrupted trade and investment cycles and delayed growth and 
investment plans. Although most impacted firms consider that they will 
have recovered from the economic effects of FMD by the end of 2002, 
provided it is a good trading year, for the heavily impacted firms that 
survive, the recovery period is expected to take several years. A fifth of 
impacted firms thought it would take between 1 and 2 years to recover, a 
tenth much longer. 
 xix 
The Consumer Response  
 
The consumer study set out to explore in depth North East consumers’ 
perceptions and concerns relating to food, and to examine the extent to 
which perceptions and habits may have changed in the light of the FMD 
crisis.  Four focus groups were held.  The profiles of the groups were 
determined according to the key variables of age, socio-economic status 
and geographic residency (urban vs. rural).  
 
Value for money and quality were expressed most commonly as priorities 
when shopping for food, followed by other concerns such as freshness, 
nutritional content, pesticides and additives. Discussion of (particularly 
red) meat products gave rise to slightly altered priorities, with safety and 
origin issues taking on more importance, whilst participants with children 
spoke of the problems of balancing health concerns with time and 
budgetary restraints.   
 
A number of differences were noted between the perceptions and 
concerns of urban and rural consumers.  Amongst the former, it was well-
known brands which were associated with trust and quality, and 
confidence was placed in pre-packed, clearly labelled packaging formats 
for meat for reasons of hygiene, safety and cooking instructions.  Rural 
consumers by comparison seemed to make more product-by-product 
comparisons in order to judge quality, and seemed more comfortable 
buying, handling and preparing unprocessed meat.  Rural consumers also 
mentioned a wider range of concerns related to foods, including local 
supply, the environment and animal welfare.  Although a few participants 
in both urban and rural groups spoke positively of the benefits of welfare-
 xx 
friendly items and organic foods, the majority view tended to be one of 
scepticism over inflated prices and lack of ability to verify differences.  
 
Supermarkets dominated as the main outlet for food shopping amongst 
both urban and rural participants, for reasons of convenience, flexibility 
and price.  However the usage patterns for both groups differed, as rural 
participants tended to undertake major bulk buys in perceived best-value 
urban supermarkets, whilst urban participants, especially young 
professionals, made more regular use of supermarkets’ flexible opening 
hours to fit in with their lifestyles.  
 
Farmers’ markets were not commonly used; urban participants were 
generally unaware of them and not receptive to the concept when 
explained; whilst rural participants, although agreeing with the concept in 
principle, perceived them as somewhat expensive and inconvenient. 
 
In relation to FMD, there were some spontaneous expressions of meat 
purchases being altered during the crisis by both urban and rural 
participants, although the majority view was that no major, sustained, 
food-related changes had occurred.  Instead, discussion of FMD focused 
on criticism of Government handling of the crisis and debate about the 
impact on farming and rural communities.  In these discussions, some 
differences were apparent between urban and rural participants; the latter 
being more informed and actively engaged in the issues than the former, 
some of whom expressed indifference towards what was perceived as a 
farming and rural problem. On the issue of vaccinated meat, most 
participants reported that they would not object to eating it provided that 
clear labelling and safety reassurances were given.  
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Finally, on the potential of marketing initiatives to encourage a greater 
uptake of local products to help rural recovery, it emerged that the rural 
participants were receptive to the proposition, agreeing quite strongly 
with the principle and giving the impression of willingness to respond 
actively.  In contrast, urban participants demonstrated degrees of 
negativity and scepticism, or simply did not perceive such an initiative to 
be ‘for them’.  Where participants in all groups did agree, however, was 
the need for such initiatives to address the price and accessibility 
concerns of consumers. In this regard they could only foresee an effective 
impact via the use of supermarkets.  
 
Conclusions 
 
FMD had dramatic financial and psychological effects for the farming 
community and the wider rural economy and rural communities with 
lasting implications that need to be addressed if recovery is to be 
achieved.  
 
The income from sales and subsidies of farms that were culled was 
substantially reduced. Incomes for the livestock farms not culled showed 
a lower reduction but this group may have been worse affected in 
receiving no compensation.  
 
All the surveyed farmers intended to remain in farming.  Moreover, many 
more were expecting to expand than scale down their activities. There 
was an expectation among farmers of future reductions in sheep flocks. A 
significant proportion of farmers would therefore appear to be potentially 
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receptive to the Government purchasing some of their quota for livestock 
premia.  This would enable stocking densities to be lowered and could be 
the basis of expanding agri-environment schemes or greening of existing 
LFA supports. Three-quarters of the farmers want to explore the 
possibility of new or greater involvement in agri-environmental schemes.  
Many of these therefore should be responsive to a reorientation of 
payments for production in favour of environmental outputs.  There is 
also some, but lesser, interest in forestry and new crops, but little interest 
in going organic. 
 
Approaches to diversification need to be reviewed in the light of FMD. 
Farms with diversified activities were no less vulnerable to the effects of 
the outbreak. Nevertheless, more than half of the farmers expressed an 
interest in more diversification.  
 
Off-farm employment proved much less vulnerable to disruption, and a 
quarter of the farmers expressed an interest in increasing their 
household’s income from off-farm employment.  This ought to be given 
greater attention and emphasis by farm advisory services which should 
embrace other members of the household than the farmer and should 
include training and employment as well as business advice. More 
farmers will need advice and encouragement in considering their future 
options and it is important to strengthen links between farm and generic 
business advice services. 
 
Farmers will increasingly be urged to cooperate more, understand the 
needs of their customers better and become more innovative in their 
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marketing practices. New and shorter supply chains are envisaged and 
more value-added products. Amongst the farming sample there was as yet 
little evidence of processing or of direct sales activity. This suggests a 
need for generic and technical business support and encouragement.  
Leadership and ownership must come from within the farming sector 
itself.  Practical collaboration between farmers has been notoriously 
difficult to achieve and some facilitation of the process would seem to be 
necessary. 
 
The marketing of livestock is exclusively tied to the traditional live 
auction marts. However, the FMD crisis has caused great upset and 
uncertainty for the marts. Their potential demise would be a blow to local 
economies but would also entail the loss of important social functions. 
The prospects and future role of auction marts are a pressing topic for 
research and policy. 
 
There is justification for promoting awareness and higher consumption of 
regionally distinctive and local foods and more traditional and value-
added niche products. But there is a lack of awareness concerning the 
presence of existing initiatives, such as farmers’ markets, which needs to 
be remedied. Strategies must take account of consumers’ practical 
concerns over price, convenience and access.  Aside from meat, there is 
only a modest degree of interest in the provenance and means of 
production of food, with rural consumers more aware and more 
concerned than urban consumers. Multiple retailers will continue to 
exercise a powerful influence and it is important that they adopt a more 
favourable attitude to regional sourcing. 
 xxiv 
 
The FMD outbreak has had very serious economic impacts that extended 
well beyond farming to a diverse range of business sectors. FMD has thus 
demonstrated the diverse yet interdependent and often vulnerable nature 
of the rural economy. Business recovery remains an important 
consideration in 2002, requiring supportive and sympathetic approaches 
from public authorities and the banks.   
 
Future rural development initiatives should be broad based and less farm-
centred.  This will itself be increasingly important for the farming sector 
as farmers are encouraged to develop non-farm based businesses and as 
farm families become increasingly reliant on income sources located off-
farm.  FMD has therefore accelerated the need for robust approaches to 
rural development and effective implementation of rural policies such as 
the Rural White Paper. 
 
FMD has revealed important interdependencies within the rural economy, 
between tourism, farming and other sectors, and the need for more 
integrated approaches to rural development.  This calls for better 
integration of programmes and funding streams intended to assist rural 
regeneration and close coordination of business support services.  
 
This is particularly the case for the more peripheral rural areas in the 
North East whose economies are heavily dependent on a combination of 
primary industries and tourism.  Here diversification remains a 
challenging rural development goal.  More attention is required to 
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understanding and reducing the vulnerability of such local economies and 
to improving their robustness.  
 
Many businesses hit by the Foot and Mouth crisis did not utilise formal 
business support.  Further attention should be given to the means of 
facilitating uptake among small businesses, improving the 
communication and profile of support and further tailoring support to the 
nature and needs of micro-businesses.  
 
Several factors influenced the coping capability of impacted firms.  
Businesses that had had the opportunity in the past to build up their 
financial, human or physical assets were better able to weather the crisis.  
Business advice and support should seek to encourage the build-up of 
such assets. Most of the firms drew on family and household resources to 
cope with the crisis and its aftermath which reinforces the view that 
business support organisations should take more fully into account the 
range of ‘soft business’ issues that are integral to the operation of micro-
businesses. 
 
FMD revealed crucial characteristics of the rural labour process. While 
core employees were often treated like family and sheltered by 
businesses, others formed part of a flexible rural labour reserve and had 
to bear the impacts of the crisis. This highlights a need for greater 
attention to the security of rural livelihoods.  
 
In conclusion, FMD and the way it was handled induced a crisis for 
farming and the rural economy. The crisis exposed the complexity and 
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diversity of the contemporary rural economy and tested and revealed 
specific interdependencies and vulnerabilities. The implication is that 
measures for rural recovery should be appropriately differentiated.  An 
emphasis on tourism promotion and farming recovery would not be 
sufficient to overcome the immediate legacy of the crisis across a range 
of other sectors in the rural North East. 
 
The FMD epidemic triggered a rural economy crisis extending far beyond 
farming and tourism. The lessons are far reaching and must go beyond 
those posed specifically for the future of farming or the institutional 
handling of crises - themes which have dominated the official inquiry 
process. The FMD crisis draws attention to a series of fundamental 
challenges facing the future of rural areas and rural development policies.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 Terry Carroll, Philip Lowe and Jeremy Phillipson 
 
The Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak of 2001 began and ended 
in the North East of England.  It proved to be the most serious animal 
epidemic in the UK in modern times and the worst Foot and Mouth 
outbreak to be tackled that the world has seen. 
 
The loss to the nation’s economy attributed to the FMD epidemic has 
been estimated to be in the order of £2 billion, equivalent to 0.2% of 
GDP. The costs to the public sector have been calculated to be over £3 
billion and the cost to the private sector is estimated at £5 billion2.  
 
The effects on businesses and communities were felt most severely in 
those parts of the country where the local economy is founded on a 
combination of extensive livestock farming and tourism and leisure 
activities that depend on the landscape which that type of farming 
sustains. What FMD has forcibly demonstrated is the very close inter-
dependence of farm and non-farm rural businesses. The experiences of 
2001 also provide vivid insights into the structure of the contemporary 
rural economy and how small businesses and the local economies they 
constitute react in times of crisis. 
 
The total number of infected premises in the North East region totalled 
190 with an additional 1018 holdings culled (Table 1.1). By the end of 
the epidemic 317,000 sheep and 54,000 cattle had been culled in the 
                                                 
2
 The 2001 Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General. HC 
939 Session 2001-2002: 21 June 2002. London. 
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region. The reputation of the livestock industry, already severely 
damaged by BSE, was further shattered. Perceptions of the region as an 
attractive tourist destination were also tarnished by powerful and 
lingering images of animal slaughter and carcass disposal.  
 
Table 1.1: Farm holdings and livestock culled 
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Northumberland 88 323 199 12 622 226201  
(197006 sheep 
27678 cattle) 
Durham 94 262 172 17 545 149865 
(116562 sheep 
24695 cattle) 
Cleveland 2 12 11 1 26 3228 
(2436 sheep 
 774 cattle) 
Tyne and Wear 6 7 1 1 15 3150 
(1348 sheep  
614 cattle) 
North East 
190 604 383 31 1208 382444 
(317352 sheep 
53761cattle) 
Great Britain 2026 8060 3370 256 13712 4167701 
(3428191 sheep 
 592937 cattle) 
 
There has been a great deal of comment and analysis on the origins of the 
disease, how it was able to spread so rapidly and the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the measures taken to control and then eradicate it. 
The agricultural and rural crisis that was precipitated has triggered much 
debate about the fundamental purposes and prevalent practices of 
livestock farming and about the future direction of rural policy.  It has 
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also acted as the catalyst for significant changes in the Government’s 
administration of rural affairs. 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impacts of FMD on the 
rural economy of the North East, to provide a basis from which to 
consider the long-term consequences of the FMD crisis and to inform and 
guide the measures now being taken in the region to assist the process of 
rural recovery.  The research comprised six main strands of activity: 
 
• A survey of farm businesses  
• A survey of non-farm businesses 
• In-depth case studies of farm and non-farm businesses 
• An analysis of secondary data sources on FMD impacts 
• Consumer focus groups   
• A review of local newspaper coverage of FMD 
 
The research was conducted between September and December 2001 
when the disease outbreak was tailing off, but widespread restrictions 
were still in force and businesses were still experiencing impacts. The 
study was funded by ONE North East (the Regional Development 
Agency) and forms part of a wider research initiative funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council exploring the business, consumer 
and institutional response to FMD. 
 
The research project involved the following staff of the Centre for Rural 
Economy and the Farm Business Survey within the Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Food Marketing and the Department of 
Agriculture, at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne: 
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Johanne Allinson  Peter Bailey   Katy Bennett 
Terry Carroll  Helen Cheeseman   John Cooper  
Andrew Donaldson Jeremy Franks  Derek Kelsall 
Philip Lowe   Jeremy Phillipson  Marian Raley 
Charles Scott  Elliott Taylor  Nicola Thompson  
Angela Tregear  Neil Ward   Charlotte Weatherell 
Geoff Whitman  Ruth Williams 
 
The research was coordinated by Jeremy Phillipson who, together with 
Philip Lowe and Terry Carroll, was responsible for editing the final 
report.  
 
The report begins in Chapter 2 with a short review of the rural economy 
of the North East, a commentary on the progression of the disease in the 
region, and a summary of the institutional response. Chapters 3 and 4 
focus on the impacts of FMD on farming and non-farming businesses 
respectively, whilst Chapter 5 examines the coping strategies adopted by 
non-farming businesses and their recourse to support. Chapter 6 then 
analyses consumer attitudes and responses to FMD based on the 
consumer focus group research. The final chapter presents the key 
conclusions from the research.  
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2 THE NORTH EAST AND FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE 
Terry Carroll, Andrew Donaldson, Charles Scott and Neil 
Ward 
 
2.1 The Rural Economy of the North East 
 
The traditional rural economy of the North East depended largely on 
supplying mineral resources and food to the industrial conurbations of the 
region.  The rural areas have therefore suffered both directly and 
indirectly from the general deindustrialisation of the North East that has 
occurred during the past 30 years.  At the same time, the rural North East 
has benefited from the general urban-rural shift in employment3. 
 
Decline in certain sectors of the regional economy has particularly 
affected rural areas.  Since the early 1970s employment has fallen by over 
80% in the energy and water sector and by about 40% in agriculture and 
fishing.  These losses, though, have been more than offset by the growth 
of rural employment in light industries and services.  In consequence, 
between 1971 and 1996 rural employment grew by 13%, while regional 
employment declined by 5%.  On average, rural districts in the North East 
have lower levels of claimant unemployment and higher economic 
activity rates than the urban areas.4 
 
By the late 1990s the rural workforce accounted for 13% of total 
employment in the North East.  The major sectors are manufacturing with 
19% of the rural workforce; health and social work (13%); and wholesale, 
                                                 
3
 Whitby et al. (1999) The Rural Economy of North East England, Research Report, Centre for Rural 
Economy, University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
4
 Countryside Agency (2001) The State of the Countryside 2001:  The North East  
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retail and repair (12%).  Agriculture and fishing account for just 9% of 
rural employees.  The most rapidly growing sectors of rural employment 
in recent years have all been in services, including wholesale, retailing 
and repair; business services; public administration; health and social 
work; community and personal services; and hotels and catering.  The 
areas that have benefited least from new employment have been the 
former coalfields which have the lowest activity rates amongst English 
rural districts.  
 
Income levels in the North East are low (lowest of any GB region) and 
are generally even lower in the rural areas5.  Northumberland has the 
lowest wage levels amongst English counties apart from Cornwall.  GDP 
per head for the rural workforce is also low: roughly half of the national 
average and less than two-thirds the North East average6.   
 
The rural economy of the North East has a small scale business structure.  
Some 92% of rural firms are micro-businesses (i.e. with fewer than 10 
employees).  Only 0.8% of rural business sites employ 50 or more 
people7. Formation and turnover rates of businesses (per head of 
population) match national standards in the Northumberland districts of 
Alnwick, Castle Morpeth and Tynedale.  All the other rural local 
authority districts in the North East perform worse than the UK average.  
Those that show the weakest business health include traditional mining 
and industrial areas as well as areas where major employers have closed 
or greatly cut back.  Overall, though, the rural districts perform better in 
                                                 
5
 ONE North East (2002) Regional Economic Strategy for the North East: Unlocking our Potential  
Newcastle upon Tyne 
6
 Whitby et al. (1999) op. cit 
7
 Countryside Agency (2001) op. cit. 
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the formation and turnover of businesses than the North East as a whole, 
which is the weakest region in the UK in this regard8. 
 
Agriculture 
 
Agriculture is the main land use outside the urban conurbations with 70% 
of the farmland in Northumberland and Durham under grassland. 
Northumberland has large areas of rough grazing whilst Durham has a 
larger proportion of permanent grass. Arable crops are predominant in 
Tees Valley. 
 
The farming industry was in serious economic difficulty even before the 
effects of FMD. In 2001, the value of agricultural output nationally fell, 
for the fifth successive year, by 4.5%. The decline has been across the 
board, but in certain sectors it has been precipitous. In real terms, for 
example, the total income in the cattle and sheep sector in Less Favoured 
Areas in 2001 was less than one third of that received in 1990. Incomes 
overall are as low in real terms as at any time since the depression of the 
late 1930s9. 
 
Farm incomes in this region have been as badly affected as elsewhere, as 
shown by data from the Farm Business Survey for the North East. Figures 
2.1-2.3 present changes in output, fixed costs (FCs), variable costs (VCs) 
and profitability for the main farming systems over a six-year period. 
Profitability is defined according to two separate measures: 
 
                                                 
8
 Whitby et al. (1999) op. cit. 
9
 Barclay, C. (2002) Farming after Foot and Mouth, House of Commons Research Paper 01/67. July 
2001. 
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• Management and investment income (MII) which is the difference 
between total output and total costs, including an imputed value for 
the manual labour of farmer and spouse; and  
 
• Return on “tenant’s capital” (ROTC) which is the profitability of a 
farm expressed as a percentage of the capital invested, including all 
stock and machinery but excluding land. 
 
Figure 2.1: North East Lowland Grazing Farms 1995-2000 (at 
constant 1995 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: North East LFA Cattle & Sheep Farms 1995-2000 (at 
constant 1995 prices) 
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Figure 2.3: North East Lowland Arable Farms 1995-2000 (at 
constant 1995 prices) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figures show that the value of output from the farms has continued to 
decline. Only in the arable sector has there been some recovery. Other 
sectors show negative returns. In 2000, the average Management 
Investment Income for LFA cattle and sheep farms in the North East was 
minus £17/ha; and for lowland grazing farms it was minus £55/ha. 
 
In line with these trends, most categories of livestock in the North East 
region – dairy and beef cattle, pigs and sheep – have fallen in numbers 
between 1996 and 2000 (Table 2.1). The only exception is sheep whose 
numbers remained fairly static until 2000. Employment levels have also 
continued to fall. 
 
Data from the Farm Business Survey at the University of Newcastle 
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accommodation.  Income from earnings off the farm is of much greater 
significance than diversified enterprises. 
 
Table 2.1: Agricultural changes in the North East (Northumberland and 
Durham*) 1996-2000 
  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
No. of holdings (000) 4.8 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 
Total agricultural area (000 ha) 552.4 536.5 531.8 532.2 526.7 
Average holding size (ha) 116.0 118.8 119.0 115.8 115.7 
Wheat (000 ha) 66.3 64.3 62.7 51.9 63.2 
Barley (000 ha) 42.2 43.1 40.2 38.7 38.8 
Oilseed rape (000 ha) 17.5 20.8 23.7 18.5 14.1 
Stockfeed crops (000 ha) 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.6 5.3 
Potatoes (000 ha) 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.3 2.8 
Grass under 5 years (000 ha) 33.6 31.6 28.8 27.5 30.3 
Grass 5 years & over (exc. RG) (000 ha) 181.3 176.2 177.7 175.2 194.2 
All grassland (inc. Sole rights RG) (000 ha) 331.2 370.2 365.9 366.4 359.0 
      
Stocking (000 head)      
Total cattle & calves 331.2 307.1 304.2 299.0 291.5 
Dairy herd 28.2 24.6 23.3 22.6 21.0 
Beef herd 89.0 87.3 89.3 87.6 85.1 
Total pigs 76.3 65.1 63.5 51.8 44.8 
Total sheep 2310.4 2353.0 2377.3 2420.0 2300.4 
Sheep breeding flock 1030.8 1038.2 1041.4 1066.5 1025.8 
      
Manpower (000)      
Total labour force 11.7 11.1 11.1 10.9 10.1 
Farmers, partners & managers 6.2 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.6 
Regular workers 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 1.7 
Regular workers PT 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 
Casual workers 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.8 
Source: Agricultural Census 
* Excluding Darlington 
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A report by the Centre for Rural Economy10 which examined the 
agricultural industry in Northumberland provides further insights into the 
continuing importance of farming in the rural economy. Whilst full-time 
employment in farming has declined (by 18% over the past decade) the 
trend is less marked than that nationally (28%). Taking into account those 
jobs providing ancillary services to the industry, agriculture remains an 
important source of employment. In Berwick, Alnwick and Tynedale 
Districts it was estimated that, in 1999, 1 in 7 jobs were in agriculture or a 
related sector.  
 
The CRE report11 highlighted a number of weaknesses and deficiencies in 
the region’s agriculture that could be exacerbated by anticipated reforms 
to the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy: 
 
• There is over capacity in the red meat supply chain and primary 
producers appear to gain no specific competitive advantage from 
their distinctive location, quality of stock or traditional farming 
practices. 
 
• Commodity orientated production has not generated the dense 
network of small, localised processing firms that are a feature of 
agro-industrial districts in parts of Europe with high value-added 
regional products. 
 
• There is heavy dependence on subsidy and the shift from headage 
to area-based payments in the LFA would likely drive down 
production and depress overall incomes. 
 
• Arable production is likely to face increased exposure to global 
competition through reduction in price supports, offset in the short 
term by direct payments. 
 
                                                 
10
 Centre for Rural Economy (1999) Agricultural Change and Rural Development in Northumberland. 
Research Report to Northumberland County Council. 
11
 Centre for Rural Economy (1999) op. cit. 
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• Farm tourism is weakly developed and constrained by geographical 
isolation and the high proportion of farm tenancies. 
 
• The total value of agri-environment payments is low relative to the 
high proportion of land designated of conservation value.  
 
Tourism 
 
Tourism employs about 50,000 people in the North East. The great 
majority of visitors to the region’s attractions are UK based rather than 
from overseas (93% compared to a national average of 86%). Indeed, the 
majority of tourists are from within the region or neighbouring areas. The 
total value of tourism spending to the region is estimated to be in excess 
of £800m, and the volume of spend, the number of visitors and the 
number of overnight stays have all increased in recent years. The growth 
has all been in the domestic market – overseas tourism has actually 
declined – and most of the growth is accounted for by city visits. Rural 
tourism has been rather static. 
 
2.2 Progression of FMD in the Region and Media Coverage 
 
The outbreak of FMD in the UK was confirmed on February 20th 2001 
following diagnosis of cattle and pigs with the disease at an abattoir in 
Essex. The source was traced to a pig unit at Heddon on the Wall in 
Northumberland. MAFF (now DEFRA) banned the movement of farm 
animals on February 23rd. On the same day a further case was discovered 
at Ponteland, close to the original source of the infection. The virus had 
apparently spread by airborne plume to several farms in the Heddon area. 
Some 10 days before the outbreak had been diagnosed infected sheep 
from one of these farms had been sent to Hexham market where they 
came into contact with other livestock. These sheep were subsequently 
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transported to Longtown market in Cumbria and then widely dispersed 
across the country. 
 
A number of significant developments in the structure and organisation of 
the livestock industry and its supply chains are believed to have resulted 
in the 2001 outbreak of FMD having a much wider geographic spread 
than the last major outbreak in 1967. Sheep and beef production are now 
more intensive. Farm sizes and stock numbers have grown considerably. 
There are fewer and more centralised livestock markets and 
slaughterhouses. Sheep in particular are traded by dealers, sometimes 
involving several movements between livestock markets in quick 
succession. Sheep movements played a major role in the spread of the 
disease. It has been estimated by DEFRA12 that the overall number of 
sheep movements after the disease entered the country and before the ban 
on livestock movements came into effect exceeded two million. 
 
The FMD epidemic started and ended in the North East. The number of 
confirmed cases accelerated rapidly reaching a peak in late March/early 
April and then subsiding (Figure 2.4). The region appeared to be free of 
the disease through June and July with no new cases, but in August there 
was a further outbreak in the South Tyne/Allendale area of 
Northumberland. The last confirmed case occurred on September 29th. In 
total there were 88 confirmed cases on farms in Northumberland, 94 in 
Durham, 6 in Tyne and Wear and 2 in Cleveland. The regional total of 
190 infected farms represents 9% of the cases nationwide. 
 
                                                 
12
 Comparing the 1967-8 and the 2001 Foot and Mouth Epidemics. MAFF web page. 
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The Government’s policy for control of the disease required the slaughter 
of all animals on infected premises, contiguous premises and farms 
judged to have been in direct contact with those premises. As a result a 
total of 382,000 livestock were culled in the North East (Table 1.1). 
 
Figure 2.4: Number of Cases of Foot and Mouth Over Time in the 
North East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Throughout 2001 FMD had a high profile in the media. The Journal, 
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farming community having to endure the tragedy and grief of the cull or 
the agonising uncertainty of where the disease would strike next. There 
was no questioning of the measures needed to stamp out the disease: 
closure of the countryside was seen as an unavoidable necessity. In this 
early phase there was even praise in the Northumberland Gazette’s March 
1st editorial for Agriculture Minister Nick Brown and his officials. 
 
As the epidemic tightened its grip into March and the public diligently 
stayed away the wider impacts on rural businesses began to bite and FMD 
then became portrayed as a countryside crisis. As well as the problems 
faced by farmers, articles and interviews began to feature the owners of 
hotels and guesthouses hit by cancellations and lack of cash flow. The 
mood was one of gloom and foreboding for the rural economy. 
 
Into April and May 2001 a further dimension was introduced to the 
coverage with growing public concern over carcass disposal, particularly 
amongst the communities adjacent to the major burial sites at 
Widdrington in Northumberland  and Tow Law in County Durham. This 
was accompanied by extensive reporting of the pro and anti-vaccination 
debate. FMD thus became a public health crisis.  
 
At this stage there was much argument about whether the disease was 
truly under control as Government scientists were beginning to claim.  
MAFF’s handling of the disease control and the process of slaughter and 
disposal was being regularly and roundly criticised, with many news 
stories and printed letters reporting apparent blunders.  The Army was 
called in to assist, to much acclaim from the press.  The demise of MAFF 
was flagged in Labour’s Manifesto for the 2001 General Election, which 
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the Prime Minister postponed because of FMD. In these respects, FMD 
was portrayed as something of an institutional crisis. 
 
In the aftermath of the election, the new Department of the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, which replaced MAFF, enjoyed a brief period of 
grace in the local press. Media attention turned instead towards 
calculations of the costs of FMD and considerations of the lessons from 
the crisis. The Journal added its weight to the campaign for a full Public 
Inquiry by organising a readers’ petition.  
 
FMD flared up again in the North East in late August, after a period of 
three months without a case in the region. All elements of the previous 
reporting reappeared in the images and accounts of animal slaughter, 
public fury over disposal, stringency of the “Blue Box” restrictions and 
rage over the damage done to the rural economy. By November the 
Journal Inquiry petition had attracted 25,000 signatures. In the absence of 
a Government response, Northumberland County Council set up its own 
Inquiry.  This took place in January under the Chairmanship of Professor 
Michael Dower and received extensive media coverage. DEFRA was 
roundly rebuked for not taking part. As movement restrictions were 
progressively lifted and assessments of the risk of re-infection were 
downgraded, attention finally began to focus on the prospects for the 
recovery of rural areas after a year of turmoil. 
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2.3 The Institutional Response 
 
Control of the disease 
 
From its outset and to the end of the epidemic the Government pursued a 
policy of slaughter on infected farms and of stock judged to be at risk of 
spreading the disease. An alternative policy option of vaccination 
remained under active consideration but was not used.  
 
A ban on meat and live animal exports was imposed on February 21st, 
immediately after the first diagnosis of FMD was confirmed. A complete 
ban on the movement of livestock was introduced two days later and 
remained in place for ten days. From early March the transport of some 
animals to slaughter was permitted, but only under licence. Livestock 
markets were closed and not permitted to reopen for the remainder of the 
year. Towards the latter stages of the epidemic so-called “Blue Box” 
zones were defined with strict bio-security and movement regimes 
imposed to contain the outbreak to particular geographical areas. 
Livestock movement restrictions, however, remained in place throughout 
counties affected by FMD, the degree of control varying according to the 
level of risk of re-infection. 
 
MAFF was the lead Government Ministry responsible for controlling the 
disease. Under the national contingency plan, operations were conducted 
by the Divisional Veterinary Managers, located in Carlisle for the North 
East. The Veterinary Service was greatly overstretched and unable to 
cope as the number of cases soared. Additional vets were brought in. 
Teams of epidemiologists from Imperial College London, Edinburgh and 
Cambridge Universities and MAFF produced models of the outbreak, 
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which identified the time taken from diagnosis to culling as the critical 
factor in controlling the disease. On March 22nd the Prime Minister took 
personal charge and established a crisis management committee 
(“Cobra”) based in the Cabinet Office with advice provided directly from 
the Government’s Chief Scientist, Professor David King. The Army and 
MAFF established a Joint Co-ordination Centre in London on March 26th, 
and a Regional Operations Director for Newcastle was appointed the 
following day with responsibility for FMD matters subsequently passing 
from Carlisle to a Disease Control Centre at Kenton Bar on the outskirts 
of Newcastle. This became fully operational on April 4th, six weeks after 
the outbreak started. 
 
Access to the countryside 
 
One week into the crisis, on February 27th, the local authorities were 
given additional powers to close public footpaths. County Councils 
immediately closed rights of way in livestock areas and issued ‘path 
closed’ notices to livestock farmers. The Northumberland National Park 
Authority had acted even earlier, on the first day of the outbreak, by 
closing its car parks and visitor facilities and erecting “Keep Out” notices 
on paths. The Park was effectively placed completely out of bounds as a 
result. The National Trust, responding to a request from MAFF, reacted 
in a similar manner with its properties. 
 
In response to the drastic effects of closure on rural businesses and 
revised veterinary assessments of the risk posed by public access, 
Government guidance was issued to local authorities on May 23rd which 
encouraged the re-opening of paths where it was considered safe to do so, 
i.e. outside of 3-km protection zones around infected premises. A process 
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of progressive re-opening of paths then commenced, albeit hampered by a 
reluctance on the part of farmers to remove signs and a lack of accurate 
map based information on holdings remaining under FMD restrictions. 
The process gathered pace only in late July, following Government 
intervention. However, the re-emergence of the disease in the North East 
in late August was a major setback. Parts of the region - such as 
Hadrian’s Wall and the Pennine Dales - which traditionally attract large 
numbers in the summer months, effectively lost a complete visitor season. 
 
Rural economy and business support 
 
Three weeks into the outbreak a Rural Task Force was set up by the 
Government to “consider the implications of the outbreak of FMD for the 
rural economy, both immediately and in the longer term and to report to 
the Prime Minister on appropriate measures.” The Task Force brought 
together relevant government departments and agencies and many other 
organisations with an interest in the rural economy.  
 
The short-term measures introduced to assist rural businesses and 
communities affected by FMD included: 
 
• deferral of VAT, tax and National Insurance payments, 
administered by Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue; 
 
• hardship relief and deferral of domestic rates, administered by local 
authorities, with specific provision of rate relief of 50% for village 
shops, pubs, post offices, garages and diversified enterprises on 
farms; 
 
• free consultancy advice to farms from the Farm Business Advice 
Service administered by DEFRA/Business Link; 
 
 20 
• a Rural Stress Action Plan under which voluntary bodies offering 
support services for rural communities received match funding, 
administered by the Countryside Agency; 
 
• a fund to help get rights of way re-opened operated by the 
Countryside Agency. 
 
Additional resources were allocated to the Regional Development 
Agencies to create a Business Recovery Fund. This was intended to help 
businesses affected by FMD to adapt and refocus their activities. In 
addition to resources secured through the European Regional 
Development Fund and the use of the agency’s own resources, ONE 
North East’s recovery fund amounted to £8.5 million. A core element of 
the fund was a number of business grant schemes. These were delivered 
via the county network of Business Links and by April 2002 over £3.2 
million had been distributed to eligible businesses.  A significant 
proportion of the recovery fund (£2.2m) was allocated to Northumbria 
Tourist Board to support tourism enterprises and for additional marketing 
activity. ONE North East convened the Foot and Mouth Regional Action 
Group which sought to coordinate the response to the crisis of such 
organisations as the Countryside Agency, the Northumberland National 
Park Authority, the Government Office for the North East, the 
Northumbria Tourist Board and the County Councils. 
 
Private and voluntary sector initiatives operated alongside the public 
sector support schemes. For example, the Federation of Small Businesses 
established an emergency hardship fund for its members offering short-
term interest-free loans. The Arthur Rank Centre’s Addington Fund 
provided financial relief for hard-pressed farmers. The Northern Rock 
Foundation made substantial grants to charitable organisations. The Rural 
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Community Council provided additional services under the Rural Stress 
Initiative.         
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3 THE IMPACTS OF FOOT AND MOUTH ON FARMING 
Katy Bennett, Jeremy Franks, Philip Lowe and Charles Scott 
Surveyors: Peter Bailey, Derek Kelsall and Elliot Taylor 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
To gauge the impacts of FMD on agriculture and farming households a 
survey of 78 farm businesses was conducted.  The survey sample was 
chosen to be representative of the types of farming found in the North 
East14. On eight of the farms, household members - mainly farmers’ 
wives - were interviewed in depth to examine not only the financial 
ramifications of FMD but also other consequences of the crisis (see Table 
3.1). The survey was conducted in October 2001 and the interviews took 
place in November and December 2001.  A commentary on the main 
findings of the research is provided here, and a full set of data is 
presented in a series of tables in Appendix 1.    
 
The average farm size (excluding common grazing rights) of the North 
East sample was 208 ha with just 55% of the land in owner occupation.  
Some 47% of the land is within the Less Favoured Area. The main 
farming activities are lowland arable, lowland beef and sheep and upland 
beef and sheep (see Tables A1.1 - A1.3).  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 The farms which participated in the research were Farm Business Survey co-operators. 
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Children 
2 sons (20s/30s) 
(1 lives at home and works on farm) 
Son and daughter (teens) 
(Both live at home and help on farm weekends and 
vacations) 2 sons (20s/30s) 
(Both live away from home, one works on a farm) 
Son and daughter (20s) 
(Son lives at home and is partner in farm business) 
3 sons, 1 daughter (teens/20s) 
(All live at home, one son works FT on farm, one 
son and daughter occasionally help) 2 daughters (20s) 
(Live away from home) 
3 children (under 10) 
(All live at home) 
3 daughters (20s/teens) 
(2 live at home, one lives away) 
Off-farm work? 
PT plus seasonal 
(Catering) 
PT 
(sales) 
No 
No 
PT plus seasonal 
(cleaner) 
No 
No 
FT 
Retail 
Diversified 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Culled out 
in 2001? 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Farm Details 
Tenants (74 ha) 
Sheep, cattle 
No non-family employees Owners (152 ha) 
Sheep, sucklers 
No non-family employees Tenants (100 ha) 
Arable, sheep, sucklers 
No non-family employees 80% Tenants (400 ha) 
Arable, cattle, sheep 
2 FT employees Owners (400 ha) 
Sheep 
No non-family employees Owners (88 ha) 
Sheep, sucklers 
No non-family employees Tenants (95 ha) 
Sheep, cattle 
1 PT employee Owners (125 ha) 
Sheep, cattle 
No non-family employees 
Table 3.1: A profile of the 8 farm households interviewed in depth 
 
Mrs. H 
Mrs. I 
Mrs. D 
Mrs. B 
Mrs. E 
Mrs. J 
Mrs. M 
Mrs. N 
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3.2 The Incidence of FMD  
 
Fifteen of the farms had had livestock culled (three as confirmed cases of 
FMD, the rest as ‘dangerous contacts’, under the contiguous cull or on 
suspicion).  An average of 710 animals had been destroyed per ‘culled-
out’ farm (Tables A1.4 and A1.5). 
 
The FMD crisis was a fraught period for most farming households, 
whether or not their animals were culled out.  They had all felt isolated at 
some point because of the movement restrictions and the precautions they 
had taken to lessen the risk of their stock going down with the disease.  
Most had restricted both their own off-farm movements and the access of 
others onto their farm. This was a period of considerable anxiety for 
farming households as they continually monitored the health of their 
stock, tracked the spread of the disease from information provided by the 
radio, internet, newspapers and other farmers, and worried about the 
consequences of being culled out.  Furthermore, some diversified 
enterprises and off-farm employment were also adversely affected, 
accentuating financial concerns.  
 
Farmers with culled stock have had to cope with the cull and disposal of 
their stock and the clean up process.  Many complained about the 
handling of all of this, particularly regarding the destruction of apparently 
healthy stock as well as the confusion and delays.  The cull itself was 
traumatic for all concerned.  Individuals were upset at the loss of stock 
and were unsettled by the silence that hung over farms in the aftermath of 
the cull.  Decision-making regarding future business strategies has 
sometimes been fraught, especially when household members disagreed.   
For those farms still with stock, the monitoring of animals has continued. 
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These farm holdings have faced problems regarding the management of 
farms and movement restrictions, and have suffered rising costs and 
financial pressures.  They too have faced problems caused by the 
handling of the crisis, particularly in obtaining licences to move stock. 
The consequences of all this have been tensions both within and between 
farming households. 
 
3.3 The Impact of Foot and Mouth on the Finances of Farm 
Businesses 
 
The financial impact of the FMD crisis on farm households has varied 
considerably according to whether their animals were culled or not, and 
by farm type.  On farms that were culled out, total household income and 
revenues are expected to fall on average by £80,60715, and costs to fall by 
£19,310 largely because of reduced expenditure on concentrates (see 
Table 3.2).  The overall impact of the disease and the culling has thus 
been to leave the farm businesses and households facing an average 
shortfall of £61,297 in 2001-2. These farms, though, have received 
compensation with estimates averaging £74,000 - £111,000 per culled 
out farm (Table A1.6 and A1.7)16.  
                                                 
15
 A key element in the reduction in revenues is the projected loss of livestock support payments.  It is 
assumed that a farm on which stock was culled will not be eligible in 2001-2002 to apply for sheep 
annual premium (SAP), suckler cow premium (SCP), beef special premium (BSP) or extensification 
payments.  It is further assumed that SAP quota has no lease value but that suckler cow quota can be 
leased out for £45 each.  It is also assumed that all farmers will remain entitled to hill farm allowance 
(HFA) at the same rate as in the year before Foot and Mouth (i.e. that the need to stock above the 
lower stocking limit to be eligible for HFA is waived).  On this basis it is estimated that livestock 
support payments to the sample will fall by 64%.  However, the assumptions made are conservative 
and may underestimate revenue on farms where livestock have been culled.  A proportion of farms 
may have started restocking before the deadline for submitting claims for SCP and SAP payments has 
elapsed (the deadline for these is early December and early February respectively).  There may also be 
a leasing value for SAP quota. 
16
 DEFRA “Guide to Valuations of cattle and sheep on infected premises where animals require 
immediate slaughter to minimise spread of FMD”. The estimates may differ somewhat from the actual 
compensation farmers received. The valuations given are for livestock categories that do not exactly 
correspond with the categories used to record culled livestock in the survey and in any event are for 
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Table 3.2: Changes in farm business and household income between 
2000-2001 and 2001-2002 by FMD status 
 
On surveyed farms with no stock culled  On surveyed 
farms with stock 
culled 
Predominantly 
livestock farms 
Predominantly 
arable farms 
 £ % £ % £ % 
Number of farms in the 
sample 
(15)  (49)  (14)  
Revenue from 
traditional farming 
enterprises 
-94,616 71 -12,129 -12 +3,485 +2 
Income from 
diversification  
-4,439 -66 -1,029 -21 -911 -8 
Foot and mouth related 
income  
+18,573      
Off farm income of 
household members  
-125 -4 -497 -17 -589 -11 
Total household 
income and revenues 
-80,607 -56 -13,655 -13 +1,985 +1 
       
Farm labour costs -1,565 -8 +683 +3 -409 -1 
Survey recorded non-
labour costs 
-17,745 -29 +3,597 +6 -339 -0.3 
Survey recorded costs -19,310 -23 +4,280 +5 -748 -0.5 
Derived from Table A1.10 
 
On livestock farms not culled out, business and household income is 
expected to fall by £13,655 and costs to increase by £4,280 producing an 
average shortfall of £17,935 in 2001-2.  Most of the higher costs were 
incurred on livestock feed and additional labour. Farms on which 
livestock were not culled did not receive any compensation. Some farm 
types have been little affected.  On predominantly arable farms with no 
livestock culled, business and household incomes are expected to rise by 
an average of £1,985 largely due to increased returns for cereals.  At the 
same time their costs are expected to fall a little, bringing a net average 
increase of £2,733 in 2001-2.  On the basis of the change in incomes and 
revenues for the surveyed farms, it is estimated that the loss of revenue to 
                                                                                                                                           
guidance only.  Moreover, not all farmers received the standard valuations; some would have received 
more, others less. 
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the farming economy of the North East, across all sectors, was £98 
million in 2001-2.17 
 
3.4 Impacts on the Rural Economy 
 
Impacts of lower farm production  
 
On the surveyed farms it is estimated that the value of production from 
traditional farming enterprises will fall by 36% from over £5.1 million to 
£3.2 million between 2000-1 and 2001-2 (Table A1.37).  The largest 
losses in output are projected to be 52% for the dairy sector, 40% for the 
beef sector and 23% for the sheep sector. 
 
The great bulk of livestock sales was made through live auctions (Table 
A1.38). Sales of fat cattle are one of the exceptions where direct sale to 
abattoir is also important. Farmers tend to choose particular markets for 
particular categories of livestock. The largest outlet for fat cattle, for 
example, was Darlington and for suckler beef calves and beef breeding 
stock it was Wooler. In terms of the total value of production sold before 
FMD, Hexham was the most important market reflecting its dominant 
position in sheep trading. 
 
An estimate of the value of produce sold through these markets after 
FMD was arrived at by applying the previous market share to the lower 
value of the livestock projected to be sold post-FMD.  This assumes that 
farmers do not alter their marketing strategies and that all the markets 
                                                 
17
 This raised estimate is based on the average losses for culled and non-culled farms, making no 
allowance for the distribution of farm type or farm size, and disregarding ‘minor’ holdings. 
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available before FMD reopen for business. Given these assumptions, the 
value of output sold off these farms through, say, Hexham is likely to fall 
by 28% from £1.33 to £0.96 million. Darlington is set to lose almost half 
of its traded value from these farms. 
 
Certain outlets may not survive the loss of trade that the crisis and its 
aftermath have brought.  The viability of live auction markets may also 
be in jeopardy if livestock trading and movements are more tightly 
regulated following the FMD crisis. 
 
Changes in input use 
 
There is an expected 4% reduction in expenditure on surveyed inputs 
(excluding labour), from £4.34 million to £4.16 million (Table A1.39). 
The largest percentage decreases are on concentrates (down 12%) and 
veterinary and medicine bills (down 11%). Three quarters of inputs are 
acquired by farmers from supply firms located within 30 miles of their 
farms and it is these firms which will therefore suffer most from the 
reduction of expenditure on agricultural inputs. 
 
Impacts on farm labour 
 
As a whole labour costs per farm are expected to be relatively unaffected 
as a result of FMD (see Table A1.8 and A1.11). There have however been 
some marginal changes in labour strategy. Thus there has been a 
reduction of 6% in paid full-time and casual labour, compensated for by a 
4% increase in labour provided by the farmer and spouse and unpaid 
family labour and a 7% increase in paid part-time labour. If labour 
changes are considered by FMD status (Table A1.10) it is seen that on 
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farms with stock culled there was a 12% reduction in farmer and spouse 
labour and a 16% reduction in paid full time labour. There were 
significant increases however in part-time paid labour and unpaid part-
time family labour.  On farms with no stock culled, there was a combined 
7% increase in farmer and spouse and unpaid family labour and overall a 
5% reduction in paid labour. 
 
3.5 Impacts of FMD on Diversified Activities  
 
Diversified activities, particularly on culled farms, were especially 
vulnerable to the disruptions of FMD.  Before the Foot and Mouth 
outbreak, 81% of the sampled farms had diversified activity, most with 
more than one such activity.  Relatively few of these were what might be 
conventionally thought of as diversification (e.g. tourism, leisure, 
accommodation, processing, etc.).  The most common were renting out 
buildings or land, and contracting (Table A1.14).  The average earned per 
farm was £6,458 (Table A1.8). 
 
For the farm sample as a whole income from existing diversified sources 
will fall in 2001-2 by an estimated average of £1663 (or 26% per farm). 
This is largely because the number of diversification activities is 
expected to fall.  In particular, farm contracting activities and renting out 
buildings have fallen (Tables A1.14 and A1.15) because of restricted 
access to farm holdings as a result of FMD. 
 
Diversified activities that did not require access to the farm holdings (or 
other farms) were better able to ride out the crisis than those that did.  
Mrs. D’s experiences illustrate this well.  She has run a Bed and 
Breakfast for eleven years and this was severely hit by FMD with a 
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decline in turnover of 75% on the previous year.  Her husband, on the 
other hand, runs a business that provides a service that does not rely upon 
access to the farm or to other holdings, and that did not suffer any 
decline.   
 
In 2001-2 some farmers gained income through working on disease 
control activities, often on their own holding.  Only farmers whose 
livestock had been culled were in a position to earn such payments.  For 
this group, Foot and Mouth related income more than offset shortfalls in 
their normal sources of diversified income. 
 
3.6 Impacts on Income from Off-farm Employment 
 
At some point during the crisis, one third of those in the sample with off-
farm jobs were unable to go to work as a result of FMD.  Retail, 
education and secretarial/clerical are the most common areas of 
employment.  Average income for those households with off-farm 
employment stood at £9,137 per annum in the year before Foot and 
Mouth, but is expected to fall to £8,445 in 2001-2 (Table A1.16). 
 
Farms with this income stream that were hardest hit were those whose 
stock in the end were not destroyed but who had to police and restrict 
their movements throughout the outbreak.  Amongst this group, off-farm 
incomes declined by an average of 17%.  Mrs. I lives on a farm that was 
not culled out.  Her job requires long car journeys which placed her at 
risk of bringing FMD back to the farm - a peril she considered too great - 
and so she temporarily stopped working.   
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For some farming households income streams from off-farm work were 
completely slashed, for others not at all, depending upon the location and 
circumstances of their employment and the perceived level of risk 
associated with accessing workplaces.  For some women, though, 
decisions were made for them when they were laid off, or their 
workplaces closed down.  This was the case for Mrs E who cleans part-
time for different enterprises, including a heritage centre. 
 
It is usually women who go off-farm to jobs that are often part-time and 
can be fitted around their domestic and farm work.  Sometimes the work 
is seasonal and concentrated into a few weeks or months.  Mrs. E works 
long hours for a shooting enterprise for ten weeks each year (alongside 
her other jobs), which did not open for business in 2001.  Likewise, Mrs. 
H waitresses in a cafe at a tourist attraction and FMD meant that she was 
laid off at a time when she usually earns the bulk of her off-farm income.   
 
Although, for the most part, off-farm work is largely part-time, relatively 
low skilled and earnings are modest, for the households concerned it 
brings in a sizeable chunk of their steady income which is usually ring 
fenced for key household consumables.  A decline in this stream of 
income therefore adversely affected household budgets, particularly for 
those on farms with no culled stock who faced declines in revenue, rising 
costs and no income from the clean-up process.   
 
3.7 Coping Strategies 
 
Farming is a solitary job with considerable time spent alone with often 
only the animals for company. The main arena for discussing worries, 
problems and decisions is around the kitchen table with household 
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members at mealtimes. Other potential places for discussing problems 
include livestock marts and the local pub.  During the Foot and Mouth 
crisis, marts closed and many farmers stopped going to the local pub for 
fear of spreading the disease and bringing it back home.  One woman 
commented that the closure of the marts was particularly hard on her 
husband because - unlike for her - most of his social contacts were 
through them.  Furthermore, 86% of farming households surveyed did 
not visit friends and 72% were unable to see relatives.  Thus the usual 
channels of informal support available to individuals became closed to 
farming households as the social life of communities shut down.  
 
The immediate action taken by most farming households against the 
imminent threat of FMD was to isolate themselves and their farms as 
much as possible.  Signs at the end of farm drives warned people to keep 
out. For almost every farming household, only essential journeys were 
made and these were punctuated with disinfection procedures and, where 
possible, routes were planned to minimise spreading the infection and 
bringing it home.  Shopping habits changed so that shops furthest away 
from outbreaks were visited at times when people were least likely to 
meet with members of other farming families.   
 
The main source of support for farm businesses during the crisis was 
their own households.  Some 60% of the sample reported that their 
immediate family helped them to cope with the crisis.  At times, though, 
children had to live elsewhere to access school, thus reducing the 
household’s full capacity to help individuals to cope.  Mrs. N’s daughter, 
for example, lived with her aunt during the week returning home at 
weekends, with elaborate procedures regarding meeting points and 
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clothes’ changes along the way.  At the weekends the daughter did help 
the household to cope just by talking about things other than FMD.   
 
Farming households were pivotal in deciding plans of action and 
absorbing the brunt of the crisis, and at their centre were women.  
Illustrating the crucial role of women in helping households to cope is 
Mrs. B who said: 
 
“I was here manning base camp.  People were running in, weeping, 
moaning, generally.  Even the vet, poor girl, the ministry vet we 
had was very young, it was her first full time job really since 
University and I even had her in.  She was tearful because she had 
to inject the lambs.  We’d just started lambing, I mean the sheep 
were lambing even as they were culling them and she had these 
lambs all to inject. So I personally felt as though I was generally 
being back-up emotionally to everyone.  It is very, very hard to 
describe how it feels.  Just awful really, just really awful” (Mrs. B).   
 
Mrs. M said: 
 
“I mean if you lose a dog, if your dog is ill and it dies, you grieve 
for that dog, but [my husband] was grieving a 100 times over, he 
just shut off, I just had to keep supporting him”. 
 
It was households that carried the burden of financial problems, 
especially those not culled out and facing increased costs and lower 
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returns from their farm business.  Some 14% of households reported that 
they had made concerted efforts to cut back on household spending, 18% 
had household members doing additional work on the farm, and 12% of 
households were spending savings or pensions to survive the crisis (Table 
A1.32).  
 
3.8 Tensions Caused by FMD 
 
Within households 
 
Inevitably FMD increased tensions in the household because people were 
largely confined to the holding, with limited opportunities to vent 
emotion elsewhere.  Everyone felt the pressure of being stuck at home 
and unable to escape the pressures and worries caused by FMD.  This 
was particularly so in the seven farming households surveyed where 
children were prevented from going to school because of the crisis. 
 
Tensions mounted where households had to make difficult choices and 
there were differences of opinion.  Mrs H talked about how she and her 
husband had been “driving each other bats” on the issue of whether or 
not to “sell on the welfare”.  Although the tenancy is in her husband’s 
name she is involved in running the farm.  With the high cost of straw 
and animals hitting their weight then running into fat and decreasing in 
value, Mrs. H felt that she and her husband were “literally throwing 
money down the drain”. Whilst she thought they had no alternative but to 
enter animals into the welfare disposal scheme, her husband refused to do 
this.  Mrs H confessed: 
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“You don’t keep yourself to yourself, you can’t help but air 
your views, yes, it’s not very good really ... We tend to finish 
our stock, sell our bulls in the spring but there was no 
movements or sales whatsoever at that stage when we should 
have been selling and we had a tight crush of bulls.  Some 
people were selling on welfare and [Mr H] is proud and 
wouldn’t sell on welfare. In actual fact we would have been 
better off money wise.  It caused a big strain with me going on 
all the time. You try and keep off the subject but I’m afraid I 
can’t” 
 
Frustrations were particularly felt on the part of women with little clout 
in relation to the farm enterprise in which their husband was a partner.  
For their part, men felt caught between the opinions of their wife and the 
attitudes of male relatives with more than just a financial stake in a farm 
business that had been in the family often over several generations.       
 
The utter preoccupation of the farmers with Foot and Mouth, as well as 
the pent-up anger and frustration they felt at the way they had been 
treated, did put a strain on relationships in some households. 
 
“He’d sit there, and his mouth would be moving, he’d be talking to 
himself and I’d be saying “Are you listening to what I’m saying” 
and he’d say “Oh, I’m just thinking about MAFF” and my eldest 
child would say “All daddy talks about is MAFF, MAFF, MAFF, 
MAFF”…It’s put quite a strain on our marriage actually, I’ll be 
honest about it” (Mrs M) 
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Between farming households 
 
Inevitably, there were tensions between culled and non-culled farms.  
Members of households on culled farms were anxious about the reactions 
of other farming households to them. They were uneasy about meeting 
those not culled out and feared being blamed for the spread of the disease 
in any way.  They felt that others considered them to be disease ridden.  
Such anxieties made them obsessive in restricting and policing their own 
movements well beyond the requirements of biosecurity, but this did not 
stop them feeling shunned.  
 
“[My husband] said we were like lepers.  We didn’t want to be seen 
anywhere where we might possibly be passing on infection.  
Although we were taking all the biosecurity precautions, we didn’t 
want to be seen anywhere that might cause people offence, because 
everyone’s been terribly twitchy” (Mrs. B) 
 
These separate experiences divided friends and neighbours. A farm 
family member described how neighbouring farmers had fallen out: 
 
“There is no marts on so none of the farmers saw each other. 
Then the bitching started. Well, this one’s done that and that 
one’s done this. They shouldn’t be moving that and they should 
have stayed in without going to the pub. And it was just all 
sheer frustration … My Dad and his next door neighbour fell 
out. They’d worked with each other for years. And it was just 
because one was doing things by the book and one wasn’t” 
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The fact that farmers who had had livestock culled received 
compensation and others did not was a source of resentment and 
bitterness: 
 
“Most people have been very, very good but there’s been farming 
people who are really jealous of the fact we’ve been culled and got, 
as they see it, all this money.  I’ve only had one experience.  I think 
my husband’s had one or two bits of sniping.  I’ve had quite a lot of 
relatives affected by Foot and Mouth and I know one of them had a 
very unpleasant experience in Bainbridges from another farmer’s 
wife.  Obviously those who haven’t had it can’t really understand, 
but they’ve been very sympathetic and supportive, our real friends” 
(Mrs. B) 
 
“I mean even farmers have started to sort of turn against us, friends 
who are in the same boat as us.  They’re thinking we’re on the 
wrong side of the fence, we’ve got money now. “Oh you can do 
what you like, you’ve got money”. Which is really unfair, because 
of what we’ve been through and they haven’t been through this 
grieving and this trauma … They are just seeing that we’ve got a 
cheque, but they don’t appreciate what we’ve been through and 
how we’ve lost absolutely everything. We can’t say we are farmers 
at the moment, there’s nothing, we’ve got a few hens and the ducks.  
A lot of people are making life quite difficult really.  Friendships 
have been lost, we’ve lost everything that we had in common with 
those people” (Mrs. M) 
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3.9 Future Plans 
  
Farming 
 
All the surveyed farmers intended to remain in farming. Only one was 
unsure, but would probably do so. Some 60% of the farmers said that 
they would definitely maintain their existing level of farming activity 
after FMD.  As Table 3.3 shows, most of the rest were thinking of 
expanding, and a few were looking to scale down the area they farmed. 
Interest in expansion was particularly high amongst the arable farmers. 
 
Table 3.3: Farm business intentions post-FMD of the sample 
 
 Maintain existing 
level of activity 
Scale down Expand 
Yes 60% 6% 15% 
Possibly 12% 3% 24% 
N=78 
 
Given the deep decline in farm incomes prior to FMD, and a potential 
window of opportunity for those culled out to do something different 
with their compensatory payments, plans to maintain existing levels of 
activity, to restock and even to expand may seem surprising.  Farmers, 
however, are not acting only for themselves but are often in partnership 
with fathers, brothers and sons who all influence their decision making.  
For many farmers, their business is something they have inherited, to be 
built up and passed on to the next generation.  
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“I mean over the years obviously as things have got worse we 
have considered what might be the alternatives but we feel that 
farming is what we do, what we know best and so far we are 
managing, so we thought we’d try to carry on.  And we’ve a 
son who’s very keen.  Without him we may have considered a 
different way forward but we decided that that was the best.  
Rightly or wrongly we don’t know.  And we weren’t 
considering going back gradually, if we’re in, we’re in” (Mrs. 
B) 
 
Some farmers with no children keen to farm are at least giving thought to 
not restocking and doing something different.  Although Mrs J’s husband 
plans to restock, with two daughters employed elsewhere and a 
temporary job as a haulier, he could at least entertain some second 
thoughts about his decision to restock.  Where farmers have inherited the 
family farm they do feel under a considerable obligation to keep on 
farming it.   
 
Sometimes it is farmers’ wives who question plans to restock or to 
maintain existing levels of activity, especially when they do not come 
from farming backgrounds. They often have experiences, skills and 
qualifications which enable them to view the farm from a different 
perspective.  This was best exemplified by a young woman, Mrs. M, who 
used to have a highly paid job in the service sector and who is now 
married to a tenant farmer with three very young children.  The farm was 
culled out, but her husband is adamant that he will restock despite her 
wanting to take the opportunity to move out of farming.  Mrs. M views 
the issue from a perspective of having once had a well paid job, worked 
standard hours each week and lived elsewhere.  He on the other hand has 
always lived on the farm, knows nothing other than farming and is still in 
partnership with his father who no longer works on the farm but still 
controls the finances of the business.   
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Details on the likely scale and pace of restocking were obtained from the 
culled out farms. Farmers expected it would take 1-2 years to rebuild 
their herds, but not necessarily up to former levels. Sheep herds in 
particular are expected to be somewhat smaller (Table A1.19). 
 
For those farms where livestock had not been culled, the prospects were 
somewhat different.  Though they had lost income and had suffered 
increased costs, they had come through the crisis with their stock intact.  
They were looking forward to the ending of movement restrictions and 
then to the possibility of a firming up of livestock prices in the aftermath, 
especially as the culled out farms began to restock. 
 
Alternatives 
 
There is some uncertainty and caution regarding alternative cropping and 
income options and the results are presented in Table 3.4.  Only a 
minority of farmers plan to grow new crops, or convert to organic 
farming or afforestation. However, some 17% of farmers intend to 
increase their participation in agri-environment schemes, and a further 
59% want to explore the possibility. Interest in agri-environment schemes 
was particularly high amongst the upland farmers.  Finally, although just 
5% of the surveyed farmers expressed any definite intention to seek more 
off-farm employment, some 15% of them intend to increase their 
diversification activities and 41% are possibly interested.   
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Table 3.4: Farmers’ intentions regarding alternative cropping and income 
options post-FMD 
 
 Yes Possibly 
Increase participation in agri-environment 
schemes 
17% 59% 
More diversification 15% 41% 
Grow new crops 9% 8% 
Increase forestry area 10% 10% 
Go organic 5% 10% 
More off-farm income 5% 18% 
N=78 
 
Most of the farm businesses had not sought, and had no specific 
intentions to seek, formal sources of advice regarding future strategies, 
whether in relation to farming, or diversification, or off-farm 
employment.  Some 21% had sought or intended to seek advice on the 
farm business; 14% on diversified enterprises; and just 1% on off-farm 
income possibilities (Table A1.18).  Farmers have a reputation for their 
independence and reluctance to look for help from others. This tendency 
to be inward-looking was reinforced by the FMD crisis and the way that 
farms were quarantined from the outside world. 
 
Attitudes towards diversification and off-farm employment 
 
In addition to questions establishing future farming intentions and plans, 
the survey asked farmers about the importance of diversification and off-
farm employment and whether their attitudes to these activities had 
changed following FMD.  Some 27% felt diversification had become 
more appropriate to them and 15% thought that off-farm employment 
had, as a result of FMD.  Off-farm employment, though, was a less 
vulnerable source of alternative income than on-farm diversification in 
the face of FMD (see Table A1.26). 
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3.10 Conclusions  
 
The farm survey has quantified in some detail the direct effects of FMD 
on a sizeable and representative sample of farm businesses in the North 
East.  The in-depth interviews have exposed the lived experiences of 
FMD on farms that had been culled out and those that had not.  The 
interviews help to explain why some farms plan to restock despite 
declines in income and a window of opportunity to do something else.  
They also, though, reveal some complexity regarding attitudes to future 
strategies of farm businesses with disagreements between individuals 
within households over the right thing to do.  
 
The data shows the dramatic loss of income from stock sales and 
subsidies on farms that have been culled out.  On many of these farms, 
though, costs have reduced and farms have received significant, albeit 
temporary financial relief from the disinfection process.  They have also 
received compensation payments which, for the most part, will be needed 
for re-stocking.  In contrast, farms that have not been culled out have 
experienced a smaller loss in farm business income, but greater costs.  
Accentuating financial concerns for some has been reduced income from 
diversification enterprises and off-farm employment. 
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4 THE IMPACTS OF FOOT AND MOUTH ON NON-
FARMING BUSINESSES 
Jeremy Phillipson and Marian Raley    
Surveyors: Helen Cheeseman, John Cooper, Nicola Thompson, 
Geoff Whitman and Ruth Williams 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This section of the report considers the impacts of FMD on non-farming 
businesses within the rural economy. It is based on the findings of case 
study research and two telephone surveys. The first survey, enquiring 
about the impacts of the Foot and Mouth outbreak on non-farming micro-
businesses in March, was conducted in April 200118, starting just 6 weeks 
after the notification of the first case of Foot and Mouth disease. This 
drew on and used as a sampling frame the CRE data base of 2000 rural 
micro-businesses (those firms with fewer than 10 employees) in the 
North East of England (Raley and Moxey, 2000). A total of 180 
interviews were achieved in Northumberland, Durham and Tees Valley.  
 
A follow-up telephone survey was conducted in late November 2001 and 
sought information about the period April to November with the aim of 
assessing the level and duration of impact over time. Exhaustive attempts 
were made to contact all businesses which had been interviewed in April. 
In the event 27 firms refused to participate in the November survey, 
could not be contacted or had ceased trading (reason for cessation 
                                                 
18
 Bennett, K., Phillipson, J., Lowe, P. and Ward, N. (2001) The Impact of the Foot and Mouth Crisis 
on Rural Firms: A Survey of Micro-businesses in the North East of England. Centre for Rural 
Economy, University of Newcastle. The April research was funded by Durham County Council. The 
surveyors were Andrew Cattermole, Andrew Donaldson, Craig Elliott, Jane Midgley and Nicola 
Thompson. 
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unspecified), reducing the usable sample size to 15319. Both telephone 
surveys were broad in scope, considering impacts on turnover and 
employment, recourse to advice and aid schemes, coping responses, 
future impacts and social effects.  
 
The telephone surveys were supplemented with a set of 13 in-depth 
interviews with a sample of high impact businesses as identified by the 
April survey (see Table 4.1). These helped to provide a fuller 
understanding of the impact of FMD and the coping responses of 
businesses in a time of crisis.  
 
Table 4.1: Case study businesses 
 
Business type Ruralitya Annual 
turnover 
Est. March 
impact: 
Turnover 
down 
Rural recreation  V. remote £20-50k 1997 90% 
Hotel V. remote £100-250k 1972 10-20% 
Timber haulier V. remote >£250k 1974 40% 
Riding school/B&B V. remote £20-50k 1986 50% 
Public house Remote £100-250k 1988 50% 
Bed and Breakfast Remote £10-20k 1994 50% 
Nursery gardens Remote £50-100k 1993 20% 
Coach firm Slightly £50-100k 1989 10-20% 
Butcher Slightly >£250k 1972 20% 
Craft manufacturer Moderately £50-100k 1989 50% 
Livestock haulier Moderately £100-250k 1987 30% 
Book shop Moderately £20-50k 1986 50% 
Specialist retailer Moderately £100-250k 1994 30% 
a - Spectrum of rurality = Slightly rural, moderately rural, remote rural, very 
remote rural (Raley and Moxey 2000) 
 
In addition to the CRE surveys, the analysis also draws on other studies 
and data sources looking at the impact of FMD on the rural economy of 
                                                 
19
 Comparison of sectoral, size and geographical distribution reveals the composition of the November 
sample to be similar to that of the previous survey (see Tables A2.1-A2.4 in Appendix 2). 
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the North East. In particular, further data analysis was undertaken of two 
regional surveys. Firstly, Northumbria Tourist Board (NTB), in 
conjunction with the English Tourism Council (ETC), administered a 
series of monthly postal surveys of members to demonstrate the impact 
of the FMD outbreak on tourism businesses.  Further analysis was 
conducted of the surveys referring to business operation in March and 
May 2001. This analysis deals exclusively with accommodation 
businesses and excludes ‘attraction’ businesses20. Secondly, a telephone 
survey was conducted in May on behalf of the Government Office for the 
North East (GONE) to determine how the FMD situation was affecting 
businesses in the region. This study included a wide range of industrial 
sectors and distinguished between rural and urban business locations.  
The availability of cross-tabulations from the study made possible further 
examination of the data (BMG, 2001). 
 
4.2 Overall Pattern of Impact 
 
The majority of rural micro-businesses  were  affected  in some way  by  
the Foot and Mouth outbreak.  Taking both  the  April and November 
2001 telephone surveys together, 56% of the sample (85 firms) had been 
affected, in the main negatively. The severity of impact varied with over 
half of impacted firms experiencing high or medium negative impacts 
(Figure 4.1): 
                                                                                                                                           
 
20
 The sample was modified to exclude eight large accommodation businesses (41 to 250 bedrooms).  
It makes greater use of the rural/urban classification to distinguish impacts on rural firms and examines 
further the impacts according to business type (hotel, caravan site B and B etc).  The sample under 
discussion consists of accommodation businesses with 40 or fewer bedrooms, plus self-catering 
properties, caravan/campsites/chalets, bed and breakfast and guest house accommodation.  The March 
sample consisted of 150 businesses, 61 of whom also responded to the May survey.  Unfortunately 
many firms did not supply turnover data, reducing the usable sample for revenue-related questions to 
98 in March and 52 in May. 
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• High impact firms are those who expected annual revenue in 2001 
to change by 20% or more as a result of Foot and Mouth. 
• Medium impact firms are those who expected a change of 1 to 
19% in annual revenue as a result of Foot and Mouth. 
• Low impact firms are those who expected little or no change in 
final annual revenue as a result of Foot and Mouth, but whose 
business or operations were otherwise disrupted (including, for 
example, employment or short-term revenue effects).  
 
Figure 4.1: Severity of Impact on Individual Firms (Number of 
Firms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N=152 
 
The impact of Foot and Mouth spread throughout a wide range of sectors 
(Table 4.2). Little affected sectors (i.e. those in which relatively few 
firms were affected) include construction, education and training, health 
and social, and personal services.  At the other extreme, sectors in which 
a large majority of firms were affected - hospitality, land-based and 
recreation/culture - are those reliant on tourists or visitors or extensive 
land-use or access. In between is a group of partly affected sectors - 
retail, transport, business services and manufacturing – in which roughly 
half of firms were affected. These include firms also affected by the 
determent of visitors, as well as firms that provide goods or services to 
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the extensively affected sectors, therefore reflecting a knock-on effect 
within the local business chain (see also section 4.8). 
 
Table 4.2: Extent of impact by sector 
 
 Sector % firms impacted in 
sector 
Hospitality 96 
Land-based 92 
Extensively affected sectors 
Recreation/culture 70 
Retail 59 
Transport 50 
Business services 47 
Partly affected sectors 
Manufacturing 44 
Personal services 29 
Construction 18 
Education and training 14 
Little affected sectors 
Health and social 10 
 
The severity of impact at the firm level does not correlate with the extent 
of impact at the sector level (Table 4.3). There were high and low impact 
firms in most sectors. Thus, in little affected sectors - construction, 
education, health and social and personal services - there were still a few 
firms that experienced high negative impacts. These were either involved 
in highly specialised markets based on farm demand or access, or 
suffered badly as part of the general downturn in trade experienced by 
rural service centres (see, for example, Box 4.1). The converse is also the 
case – that extensively affected sectors included many firms which 
experienced only a low impact. Different sectors, though, present 
contrasting profiles of impacted firms. Thus, although hospitality was the 
most extensively affected sector, the largest grouping of hospitality 
businesses fell into the low impact category. In contrast, the largest 
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grouping in land-based and recreation/culture sectors fell into the high 
negative impact category. 
 
Table 4.3: Impacted firms: sectoral group and severity of impact 
 
  % of impacted firms in sectors 
 
  High 
negative 
Medium 
negative 
Low 
impact 
Medium or 
high 
positive 
Hospitality 
 
21 21 33 0 Extensively 
affected sectors 
Land-based, 
recreation/culture 
44 6 22 17 
Partly/little affected 
sectors 
 28 28 28 2 
 
% totals are <100 since ‘don’t know’ responses are omitted from rows. 
 
Box 4.1 
 
Specialist retailer, rural service centre, moderately rural 
This family bookshop based in a market town experienced a downturn in trade 
in 2001 after several years of steady growth. During the summer, trade did 
pick up somewhat but did not reach the levels experienced in previous years. 
At the end of 2001 business is expected to be down 25-30%. 
 
“A lot of people come here to go walking … well they haven’t been. … 
We’ve seen an increase every year in our turnover … Each month the 
patterns the same. … The graph is the same shape just slightly higher 
every year. Until this year, and the moment Foot and Mouth was officially 
announced and the Minister told people to keep away from the 
countryside, we at that point experienced a 50% reduction in our turnover. 
This really continued until school holidays started towards the end of 
July”. 
 
Finally, larger micro-businesses were more commonly impacted than the 
smaller ones. For example, firms employing more than 3 FTEs (besides 
the owner/operator) stood a 20% higher chance of being affected than 
those with fewer than 3 FTEs. This could relate to the generally greater 
diversity and size of customer base or markets of larger firms and 
therefore the increased chances of part of the business being impacted. It 
may also relate to the greater flexibility of the small firms. 
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4.3 Factors Affecting Business Trade and Operations 
 
The way that FMD impacted on business varied between firms and 
sectors. The main impact for hospitality and recreation and culture firms 
arose directly from reduced tourism demand (see Table 4.4 and Box 4.2). 
For firms in other sectors the main impact was from reduced local or 
passing trade, some of which will have been induced effects as impacted 
businesses and their employees began to spend less in the local economy. 
Also significant for non-hospitality firms were the indirect effects of 
reduced demand for goods and services from farmers and tourism firms. 
 
Table 4.4: Factors identified as responsible for change in level of 
business 
 
 Hospitality & 
recreation/ 
culture firms 
% firms 
All other 
firms 
 
% firms 
Sectors, most affected 
(non-hospitality) 
Less tourist demand 84 49 Manufacturing, retail 
 
Less local/passing trade 58 61 Land-based, 
manufacturing, retail, 
personal services 
Unable to access farms 7 43 Manufacturing, 
transport, business 
services 
Reduced demand from 
farmers 
13 40 Land-based, 
manufacturing, 
business services 
Disinfection costs 10 20 Land-based, transport, 
business services 
Access restrictions to own 
premises 
16 14 No particular bias 
Problems obtaining 
supplies 
7 18 No particular bias 
Base: impacted firms (n=82) 
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Box 4.2 
 
Bed and Breakfast, remote rural 
This B&B owner suffered a major reduction in bookings due to FMD and 
described the year as a catastrophe. Though not the sole source of income for 
this retired couple, the B&B forms an important part of overall household 
income. Business was down a third compared to 2000: 
 
“Last year was our best year. And it was then, after the seventh year, we 
thought well we are really getting known now. And we are really getting 
somewhere and we can see that we can continue with this business. And so we 
thought next year will be even better. … I had one big booking from about 
January. I thought yes this is going to be a good year. The bookings were 
coming in … and then February, everything changed. For example, I had a 
couple who were coming for dinner, B&B for 10 nights, cancelled. That was 
the biggest booking for the year gone. Because they couldn’t walk and they 
were walkers … I had another family cancelled because Housesteads was 
closed” 
 
The spring and the summer were an extremely quiet time for the owner with 
many hours spent waiting by the phone: 
 
“I was able to stitch a kneeler for church in August … I had time this 
August to do it. I had time to sit and read books … which is unheard of. I 
just had to do something to take my mind off this situation … The phone 
was ringing an awful lot through January and for the first few weeks in 
February, and then it was dead. I have known me pick up the phone to see 
if it is still working … because it just seemed so unbelievable”. 
 
Business picked up in the autumn:  
 
“September was nearly as good [as last year], October hasn’t been as 
good. So I can’t say that business is improving … We’ll have to wait. This 
time next year we’ll know whether business has come back”. 
 
 
Apart from these trade effects, there was also the sheer disruption to 
business operations from FMD restrictions. In some cases access to the 
firm’s own premises or to those of clients (most commonly farmers) was 
obstructed. In other cases the restrictions added greatly to running costs. 
For example, one firm, a timber haulier, had to considerably re-arrange 
staffing hours and the routing of wagons (Box 4.3). Major detours were 
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needed to avoid farmland and infected areas, which added to the 
business’s fuel and wage costs, and a lot more time and effort was 
involved in planning journeys. 
 
Box 4.3 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
Foot and Mouth had an immediate and devastating effect on this timber 
haulage business through halting access to private land and severely 
disrupting transport movements. Heading into 2001 the business had projected 
a relatively good year, but in the event turnover was expected to be down by 
approximately £250,000 (circa 30%): 
 
“When Foot and Mouth came in, farmers were switched off in my industry 
completely. They weren’t buying any posts, any rails. You couldn’t get to 
places, so obviously the job was completely switched off. … Most private 
woodland goes [on roads] through fields that have stock in and the farmer 
said no thank you, we can’t afford to have them lorries here. … [Its] a 
devastating effect to me. Because I’m geared up to do at least 40-50% of 
my work in the private sector”.  
 
For the work that remained, the routing of wagons had to be considerably re-
arranged to avoid farmland and infected areas, which added to the business’s 
fuel and wage  costs. Trips involved many more ‘empty’ rather than ‘loaded’ 
miles as work dried up. A lot more time and effort was involved in planning 
journeys, and the business owner himself imposed stringent supervision over 
the routes taken and the parking locations used. Situated in the heart of a 
farming community he felt “under the spotlight” and was anxious not to be 
seen to be a disease transmission risk. Disinfection also represented a major 
cost for the business estimated at £10,000. The owner described how it took 
up to three hours a day to undertake the various disinfections of a single lorry. 
In addition, the corrosive effect of the disinfectant had meant that some of the 
lorries had had to be re-sprayed. The overall effect was that costs had 
remained high throughout the crisis while business had dwindled: 
 
“My [monthly] diesel bill might now only be £20-25000. But it’s standing 
costs linked around about that’s pulled the cash away. I mean the lorries 
that’s standing, the wages I’ve had to pay for the wagons that are working 
over the top because of Foot and Mouth, the wages I’ve had to pay to 
drivers just to keep a hold of them. Now on a weekly basis it might not 
sound a lot, but over 10 months it’s just dragged the cash away 
completely”. 
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4.4 Geography of Impact 
 
By local authority districts 
 
The impact of the Foot and Mouth crisis on firms displays a complex 
geography. An indication of the incidence of the impact by local authority 
areas is given in the details from a Local Government Association survey 
of applications for business rates relief and deferrals from affected firms 
(Tables 4.5 and 4.6). The rate relief scheme, which became operational in 
April 2001, enabled rural local authorities to grant up to 100% rate relief 
to small businesses seriously affected by FMD21. From the information it  
 
Table 4.5: Applications for business rates relief (November 2001) 
 
District/UA Applications received 
Northumberland: 361 
Alnwick 39 
Berwick 45 
Castle Morpeth 47 
Tynedale 219 
Blyth  11 
Durham: 306 
Durham * 
Easington 3 
Teesdale 138 
Wear Valley 153 
Derwentside 5 
Tees Valley: * 
Stockton on Tees 1 
* - missing information 
 
                                                 
21
 However the data will systematically under-represent the number of firms actually experiencing 
hardship.  Firstly not all businesses pay business rates.  Secondly there is anecdotal evidence of 
variation between local authorities in the degree to which the application process is facilitated.  
Thirdly, some evidence shows that for some firms the potential reward is too small to merit the time 
spent in submitting an application. Nevertheless, this information is a useful counterweight to surveys 
reliant on self-reporting. Local authorities require evidence of impacts, such as accounts and 
cancellation notices, implying a degree of verification of firms’ claims. 
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Table 4.6: Firms deferring business rates payments 
 
District/UA Firms allowed to defer 
 
Northumberland 164 
Alnwick * 
Berwick 42 
Castle Morpeth 10 
Tynedale 112 
Durham 174 
Durham 1 
Easington 1 
Teesdale 138 
Wear Valley 34 
Tees Valley * 
Stockton on Tees 7 
* - missing information 
 
would seem that, in the North East, businesses in Tynedale, Wear Valley 
and Teesdale were the most badly affected.  Across other rural districts, 
many firms also suffered, and even in industrial areas such as Blyth small 
numbers of firms sought business rates relief.  
 
By degrees of rurality 
 
The CRE surveys show that firms located in the most rural areas 
(Urbanisation Index score ≤ 10) were more likely to have been affected 
by FMD (Table 4.7). Thus 92% of firms in very remote rural areas were 
affected, compared to 33% in the urban fringe. In part this gradient is 
attributable to the higher proportion of hospitality, recreation and land-
based firms in the more rural areas. 
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Table 4.7: Impact by degree of rurality 
 
Urbanisation Index 
score 
 % of firms affected in each 
rural zone 
0 to 4 Very remote rural 92 
4.1 to 10 Remote rural 62 
10.1 to 15 43 
15.1 to 20 
Moderately rural 
41 
20.1 to 25 50 
25.1 to 30 
Slightly rural 
45 
>30 Urban fringe 33 
All firms  55 
 
To bring out this aspect, Table 4.8 separates out the sectors and shows 
that the geographical distribution of impacted firms was very wide.  
Indeed, they are evenly distributed across rurality scores, except in little 
affected sectors (construction, education, health and social or personal 
services)22. This suggests that, in the main, sector - rather than rurality - 
was the dominant variable in determining impact. In other words, 
hospitality businesses were more likely to be impacted because they were 
hospitality firms per se rather than because they were more or less rural. 
For little affected sectors, though, firms were more likely to have been 
impacted if located in a more rural area. 
 
Table 4.8: Impact by sector and degree of rurality  
 
 Very/remote 
rural 
(UI= 0 to 10) 
 
% firms 
impacted 
Moderately 
rural 
(UI=10.1 to 20) 
 
% firms 
impacted 
Slightly 
rural/urban 
fringe 
(UI= >20) 
% firms 
impacted 
Extensively affected sectors 91 86 88 
Partly affected sectors 55 48 52 
Little affected sectors 50 18 8 
Total 74 43 46 
                                                 
22
 The sample size is rather low. Only 6 of the 34 firms in this group were impacted. 
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By ‘Blue Box’ designations 
 
Foot and Mouth restrictions disrupted the operation and trade of many 
firms. Some firms were specifically adversely affected by being located in 
an area subject to ‘Blue Box’ restrictions for purposes of FMD control. 
One third of firms who had been able to answer the question had been 
located in a ‘Blue Box’ area for some time, usually several months. Table 
A2.13 (in the Appendix) shows that firms in the manufacturing, retail, 
transport, and business services located in a Blue Box were more likely to 
have been affected than those outside (for the other sectors the effect was 
less marked). Firms for which Blue Box restrictions were a salient 
obstacle include those reliant on customers or visitors accessing the 
premises who were prevented or deterred from doing so by the associated 
FMD notices (Box 4.4).  
 
By inland, coastal location and settlement size 
 
Certain types of location were less affected than the generality of rural 
areas. There is anecdotal and other evidence that coastal locations and 
larger settlements – particularly coastal and market towns – suffered less 
loss of trade and may have benefited from leisure and tourism activity 
displaced from elsewhere. One hotel owner, for example, explained how, 
after early cancellations at the start of the outbreak, business had rapidly 
recovered: 
 
“We missed one or two at Easter but we filled them up on the 
day. Then really we can’t grumble since. Because we’ve been 
on the coast and they have been able to walk round the shores, 
people have come”. 
Hotel, very remote rural 
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Box 4.4 
 
Public house, remote rural 
At first this rural pub suffered from the general closure of the countryside.  
Later on its trade was badly affected additionally by strict (‘Blue Box’) 
movement restrictions to control a fresh local outbreak of FMD: 
 
“Initially [the Foot and Mouth crisis] just stopped people coming out. … 
Certainly talking to people afterwards they were expecting to see big fires, 
charcoaled bodies at the side of the road. And also expected roads to be 
closed. Tony Blair said ‘the countryside is closed’ virtually. … Immediate 
effect on lunch time food trade. Just disappeared … From doing 20-30 
mid-week lunches in January or February … We’ve had days when we 
haven’t had anyone in which is unheard of”. 
 
Walkers and various groups all stopped visiting the pub. Moving into May 
and the summer months things were still quiet but trade did begin to improve 
with an improvement in the weather and Government efforts to attract visitors 
back to the countryside.  Then, in August, a flare up of Foot and Mouth cases 
locally led to the designation of a ‘Blue Box’ zone and the imposition of strict 
restrictions: 
 
“It was a very, very poor Bank Holiday weekend. Very, very quiet. 
Exceptionally quiet. Because they closed this section of the road. Anybody 
coming would probably be put off by ‘road ahead closed’ … It was all 
doom and gloom. A bit like the Anthrax, walking around in white suits 
and gas masks. It doesn’t actually encourage anyone to come, the Blue 
Box exclusion zone. And then ‘you are now entering a Foot and Mouth 
diseased area’ … It puts a lot of people off that live in towns and cities 
when they see that kind of thing”. 
 
Previously it had been largely the pub’s food trade that had been badly 
affected but now the beer sales were hit too.  It is estimated that for the year as 
a whole takings will be down £10,000, shifting them from a profit to a loss 
making position. 
 
In contrast, a Bed and Breakfast owner a few miles inland remarked: 
 
 “A lot of businesses especially on the coast have had their best 
year ever … but that’s not so here and it’s not a million miles 
from here. But it just shows you this is inland and that is on the 
coast”. 
Bed and Breakfast, remote rural 
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The NTB survey of accommodation businesses confirms these 
impressions. Table 4.9 gives details of turnover changes in March 2001 
compared with the previous year.  Revenue gains are evident in large 
inland towns, and both small and large coastal towns compared to 
decreases elsewhere. The right hand column also shows that it was the 
smaller and inland settlements where the majority of accommodation 
businesses were suffering a downturn. 
 
Table 4.9: Turnover differences for accommodation firms, March 
2000/2001, by location 
 
 Mean change in 
turnover March 2001 
(£) 
% businesses with 
turnover down ( ≥ £100) 
Large town, coastal +1060 0 
Large town, inland +180 33 
Small town, coastal +50 29 
Village, coastal -910 68 
Village, inland -1090 82 
Small town, inland -1530 89 
Source: NTB   
N=98 
 
4.5 Temporal Impact 
 
Immediate and expanding impact 
 
The majority of affected firms (66%) in the CRE survey were impacted 
by Foot and Mouth from the outset of the outbreak in February and 
continued to be so in the following months.  During those months there 
was also a broadening out of impact as additional businesses were drawn 
into the crisis. Thus 27% of impacted firms had been unaffected by Foot 
and Mouth in March but subsequently saw their businesses affected, with 
half of these eventually suffering a high or medium impact.  
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This delay or lag effect had a number of different causes.  In some cases 
it related to the seasonal nature of the businesses: some were simply not 
open when FMD struck or their busy periods had not yet begun. Some 
firms located on farms found their operations affected as the crisis was 
prolonged. For other firms difficulties began to arise as orders dried up 
along business chains. Three sectors in particular featured in this lag 
effect - business services, manufacturing and land-based activities.  The 
firms in these sectors that were gradually drawn into the crisis were 
specialised to varying degrees in serving rural clients or, more 
specifically, the farming or tourism sectors.  They suffered either from 
the indirect effects of reduced demand or from restrictions in accessing 
their clients.  For example, an architect involved in farm building 
conversion was unable to access farm premises. Likewise, a surveyor, a 
software manufacturer, an environmental consultant and a builders 
merchant were each unable to reach their farm customers. Finally, there 
was a group of retail firms that depended partly on tourists and visitors 
who did not see the usual growth in spring and summer trade. 
 
On the other hand, for a small minority of businesses the worst impacts of 
FMD were short-lived. Indeed, for 7% of impacted firms (representing a 
mixture of sectors) the effects were confined to March. At the start of the 
outbreak these firms had experienced signs of a general downturn of trade 
or some delays in business as work was put on hold until the implications 
of FMD had become clearer, but they were quick to re-establish normal 
patterns of trade.  
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Impact abatement and persistence 
 
Figure 4.2 displays the time line of impact throughout the year 2001. The 
graphs in the Figure are of occupancy rates in hotels and guest houses in 
Northumberland and Durham.  Overnight visitor numbers fell sharply in 
March and April, with some partial recovery in May but then plunged 
again, reaching a low point in July, before staging a strong recovery in 
the autumn.23  The bars in the figure chart the course of the crisis in terms 
of the number of impacted micro-businesses still to experience signs of a  
 
Figure 4.2: Impact Pattern Over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 The pattern of occupancy of self-catering accommodation was more erratic but on the whole also 
depressed to around 80 to 90% of 2000 rates. Occupancy rates for April and October 2001 were 
particularly depressed at 57% and 52% respectively in Durham, and 70% and 30% in respectively in 
Northumberland. Again there were signs of impact abatement towards the end of the year. 
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recovery.  For most of the firms the impact started in March or April, and 
it was not until the late summer or early autumn that it began to subside 
(Box 4.5). Some 60% of the firms reported that the impact had declined 
or disappeared by November, starting for most firms in September or 
later. For 40%, however, there was still no sign of relief even by 
November. 
 
Box 4.5 
 
Specialist retailer, rural service centre, moderately rural 
This business is located in the central business district of a coastal market 
town and together with other businesses suffered a downturn in trade 
attributed to reduced visits from the rural hinterland and by visitors. Trade 
began to pick up in August: 
 
“Because we are based on a rural community, you actually physically 
stopped our rural community coming into the town shopping. So you lost 
your base customers … And then of course when the season started we’d 
got things like the hills closed, there was a lot of misunderstanding as to 
whether coastal routes were closed and could they get to the beaches. That 
hit us quite hard. We didn’t get the middle class type visitor, the B&B type 
visitor. … We severely dropped 30 as high as 40% some weeks …. Until 
we got to August and then we started pulling figures back. But we never 
really got back to where we were last year”. 
 
One lifeline came from the fact that an important holiday attraction on the 
edge of the town remained open throughout meaning that the business was 
able to keep some regular customers through the early stages of the outbreak.  
Even so, whereas for the previous five years the business had seen steady 
growth in terms of turnover, in 2001 it was expecting to be 20% down at the 
end of the year, effectively wiping out its profit.  
 
 
Different sectors rebounded from the crisis at different speeds (Table 
4.10). Manufacturing and business services sectors included a higher 
proportion of firms facing persistent and ongoing impacts in November. 
Several of these indirectly affected firms cited reduced demand from 
farmers as the reason for their continuing loss of business. Manufacturing 
 61 
also included a number of firms supplying tourism-related products, such 
as small crafts.  
 
Table 4.10: Persistence of impact in November, by sector 
 Impact declining or 
disappeared 
% firms 
Impact static or 
increasing 
% firms 
Business services 50 50 
Manufacturing 57 43 
Hospitality 67 33 
Recreation 67 33 
Retail 73 27 
Land based 73 27 
Transport 80 20 
Other sectors 100 0 
Total 70 30 
N=76 
 
Impact fluctuation and positive impacts 
 
Foot and Mouth affected businesses in often complicated ways, involving 
twists and turns within the business year and severe trade fluctuations 
both up and down (Box 4.6). Indeed, a third of impacted firms reported 
such mixed effects on their business. A common feature of many of these 
‘mixed effect’ firms was that the nature of their business and their 
location - typically not in a ‘Blue Box’ restricted area or in a deep rural 
location - meant that either they did not suffer from reduced local/passing 
trade or that they actually benefited from increases in such trade. For 
example, increased local trade occurred as people restricted wider 
travelling habits or as tourists and countryside visitors became 
concentrated in more accessible peri-urban areas or along the coast. 
Garden centres and nurseries particularly benefited as visitors restricted 
their usual trips to the countryside and concentrated on leisure activities 
closer to home. Some firms were thus able to pick up on other custom, 
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displaced from elsewhere, to offset the loss of established trade, or other 
negative effects of FMD on their operations. The consequence was 
unexpected troughs and peaks in business.  By the autumn many of these 
‘mixed effect’ firms were recovering and a majority (59%) expected little 
change overall in the year’s trading outcome as a result of FMD. 
 
Box 4.6 
 
Butcher, slightly rural 
The first few weeks of the Foot and Mouth outbreak were marked by a huge 
but short-lived increase in trade for this long-established family firm, 
attributed to panic buying: 
 
“As soon as it went into the public eye everybody went absolutely barmy, 
I mean we like doubled turnover, nearly trebled in a week, because people 
just thought ‘oh well there is going to be no meat, nobody is going to get 
supplied, lets go shopping’, and we got absolutely cleaned out”. 
 
The business owner was happy to capitalise on this boom, feeling quite 
uncertain about the longer term consequences of the Foot and Mouth 
epidemic. In the event, this especially busy time was followed by a significant 
lull in activity beginning in March and reaching its lowest ebb in May and 
June, which are normally quiet months for the business. The owner saw this 
lull as the inevitable follow-up to people having filled their freezers: 
 
“everyone had stocked up. So at the end of the day that boom was lovely, 
but having said that it wasn’t really a boom because the next three weeks 
you were over £1000, £2000 down in the week and that was where the 
money had gone” 
 
Trade was 30% down during this period and is expected to be down 20% for 
the year as a whole. It is difficult to say whether this was fully attributable to 
Foot and Mouth. Orders from two key customers were lost, one attributed to 
the impacts of Foot and Mouth on the customer’s own business. However, a 
new supermarket had also recently been established in the area. 
 
 
Just 3% of all the firms registered a net gain in their final annual revenue 
as a result of FMD. Some had benefited considerably from displacement 
effects (see Box 4.7); whereas some land-based and transport firms had 
obtained a lot of additional business through FMD-related contract work 
(Box 4.8).  
 63 
Box 4.7 
 
Nursery gardens, remote rural 
FMD struck in the early and vulnerable months in the life span of this new 
business and had an immediate impact on visitor numbers and turnover. 
Several plant fairs were also cancelled, and the owners refrained from 
attending a number of fairs out of fear of spreading the disease. 
 
“It was terrible, we had put what money we had into it. … We had just got 
through the winter and things were really looking up. Because we were 
absolutely skint in January and I was living off my wife … The figures for 
February, not very much, but a little bit. £2,000 or £3,000 … and then 
Foot and Mouth came, and it just went dead. I think we took £2 from the 
first four weeks after Foot and Mouth. The March figures they were just a 
wipe out. March would have been about £10,000 and it went down to 
£700 I think. … I was going from thinking this was a good move, I started 
thinking this was probably the worst thing I could ever have done”. 
 
However, April showed signs of recovery and then business picked up 
enormously and the turnover for the year is estimated to be 20-25% up on the 
previous year. The owners attribute the increase to more people staying at 
home and gardening as a result of FMD and looking for ‘safe’ places to visit 
in the countryside. 
 
4.6 Employment Changes in Impacted Firms  
 
Some firms responded to the loss of business by reducing their staffing or 
not taking on seasonal workers. The employment impact of FMD was 
most pronounced in the early months of the crisis and during the summer.  
 
The FMD survey sample does not fully mirror the overall sector profile 
of micro-businesses located in rural North East. The data (Table A2.6) 
has therefore been weighted in order to provide an overall estimate of 
employment losses to micro-businesses  in  the  region’s  rural  districts.24   
                                                 
24
 To compensate for this sector imbalance weights have been derived which are used to scale up (or down) the 
contribution which each sector makes. The estimates must be regarded as speculative.  This is due to the small 
sample size of impacted firms providing information and a lack of information on the precise characteristics and 
size of the micro-business population.  A key assumption made in estimating the sectoral structure of the 
population of rural micro-businesses in the rural North East, is that it is the same as that of VAT registered 
businesses (of all sizes) in the North East rural local authority districts.  
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Box 4.8 
 
Livestock and general haulier, moderately rural 
This firm had a turbulent year due to Foot and Mouth which first saw the 
business grounded, then inundated with FMD-related contract work and 
finally fearful for the future. A small farm holding on the premises was also 
designated an infected premise and the livestock culled. 
 
In the early weeks of the outbreak the firm’s livestock haulage was brought to 
a halt because of the ban on livestock movements and access restrictions 
placed on the premises. Luckily the firm’s general haulage wagons were off 
the premises at this time and were able to continue to transport general loads. 
Nevertheless nearly half of the firm’s lorries were grounded for almost 2 
months and the business was running 30% down in terms of turnover. 
 
With the gradual lifting of restrictions on the movement of vehicles in late 
April business started to boom as the firm became involved in the transport of 
livestock culled through the welfare disposal scheme.  
 
“[The welfare work] was a godsend, because the Intervention Board paid 
ridiculous money per hour and we weren’t going to quibble. They were 
paying £50 an hour, when we would have been happy with £25, … for 
each of those wagons. … At first they were working nearly 24 hours a day 
… We actually took some of the artics off general haulage and went onto 
that because it was paying such good money. We had two artics running 
24 hours for about 6 weeks which made a very large difference into the 
loss that we’d made”. 
 
Welfare work continued into the autumn, but by the summer it could be 
managed in normal driving hours. Turnover for the year as a whole is 
expected to be up on the previous year. With so much stock destroyed, the 
owner is anxious about a slump in business in the months to come. 
 
The impacted firms in the survey were in July on average employing 
11% fewer full-time, 6% fewer part-time and 36% fewer casual 
employees. This equates to a July loss per impacted firm of 0.19 FT, 0.08 
PT and 0.06 casual workers and a loss per rural firm (impacted and non-
impacted) of 0.10 FT, 0.04 PT and 0.03 casual jobs. 
 
The casual job losses occurred mainly in the hospitality sector, right 
throughout the crisis. Most of the initial full and part-time job reductions 
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were also concentrated in the hospitality sector, but later there were 
losses in a number of sectors in particular business services, recreation 
and culture and manufacturing.  
 
Some jobs were also created because of FMD. In particular there were 
modest increases in full time employees in the land-based and transport 
sectors, most likely related to FMD contracting. In a small number of 
firms it appears that increases in part-time jobs substituted for decreases 
in full-time workers.  
 
There was variation as to whether the employment changes were 
regarded as temporary or permanent (Table 4.11). Overall, there was a 
tendency towards the ‘casualisation’ of the workforce.  On the one hand, 
within the general reduction in employment, most of the part-time 
reductions were regarded as temporary whereas most of the full-time 
reductions were either permanent or there was uncertainty as to whether 
they would be restored.  On the other hand, most of the increases in 
employment were part-time and of uncertain prospects. 
 
Table 4.11: Permanency of full-time and part-time employment impacts, 
July and October 2001 
 
 Temporary, 
pre 2001 level 
restored 
(jobs affected) 
Permanent, 
won’t restore 
2001 level 
(jobs affected) 
Don’t know 
(jobs 
affected) 
Full time, July, increase 1 2 1 
Part time, July, increase 1 0 5 
Full time, July, decrease 5 5 7 
Part time, July decrease 12 3 2 
Full time, Oct, increase 1 2 1 
Part time, Oct, increase 2 0 5 
Full time, Oct, decrease 4 5 7 
Part time, Oct, decrease 7 2 3 
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Many of the jobs affected by FMD were of a seasonal nature and 
involved non-reengagement of staff in 2001 rather than redundancy per 
se. Indeed a fifth of impacted firms indicated they had reduced numbers 
of seasonal and casual employees. A third had reduced staff working 
hours (see also section 5.4).  Many of the employment effects of FMD 
were therefore not so visible and not reflected in the formal 
unemployment register. A rough estimate by the Employment Service of 
North East claimant unemployment due to FMD puts the figure at ‘only’ 
371 (pers. comm.). 
 
4.7 Turnover Changes in Impacted Firms 
 
It is clear that revenue was affected much more commonly than 
employment and that Foot and Mouth had a considerable impact on 
business turnover. 
 
In July 2001 73% of the impacted firms had experienced a decrease in 
revenue and 7% an increase in revenue compared to July 2000, due to 
FMD (Table 4.12).  The mean change was a decrease of £4,790, although 
if an outlier is removed, that falls to £2,560. By October, with the same 
outlier removed, the mean turnover decrease was £1,660, reflecting the 
subsiding impact of FMD.  
 
Table 4.12: Impacted firms: estimated change in monthly revenue from 
previous year due to FMD 
 
Impact on turnover July October 
Increased (% of impacted firms) 7 6 
Decreased (% of impacted firms) 73 62 
Mean impact (£)* -4790 -3030 
Mean % change -22 -14 
Mean impact, no outlier (£) -2560 -1660 
* calculated from 37 cases in July and 39 cases in October 
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To calculate mean absolute and percentage change in annual revenue due 
to FMD, only those cases providing information on predicted revenue 
change and annual revenue were used (Table 4.13). The group’s 
aggregate annual revenue change due to FMD was predicted as a 
reduction of 14%. For individual firms, the mean annual revenue 
reduction was £15,98025, with a mean percentage change of -17%. The 
mean decrease for impacted and unimpacted firms combined was £8,880. 
These turnover changes were recalibrated in order to provide estimates 
for NE rural district authorities (see footnote 24). The aggregate annual 
revenue among impacted firms is estimated to have reduced by 9%. For 
individual firms the mean annual revenue fell by £8,880 or 13%. The 
mean decrease for impacted and unimpacted firms combined was £4,930. 
Based on this figure, a crude estimate of the net loss of revenue to all 
(non-farming) micro-businesses in North East rural districts in 2001-2 
due to FMD is of the order of £80 million26. This is not the full loss to the  
 
Table 4.13: Impacted firms: estimated change in annual revenue from 
previous year due to FMD 
 
 No of impacted firms* 
 
£ 
Aggregate revenue 30 3,382,900 
 
Total aggregate revenue change due to 
FMD (predicted) 
30 -479,507 
Percentage change in aggregate 
revenue for impacted group 
30 -14% 
Mean change in revenue (£) 
 
30 -15,980 
Mean % change in individual firms’ 
annual revenue 
56 -17% 
* Impacted firms supplying turnover change data 
 
                                                 
25
 If an outlier is removed, mean revenue change for impacted firms falls to -£7,914. 
26
 There are an estimated 9.5 thousand VAT registered non-farming businesses in the rural districts. 
From CRE’s large scale survey of rural micro-businesses, this figure would need to be increased by at 
least 67% to include the non-VAT registered micro-businesses. 
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non-farming rural economy of the region, as it does not include the 
revenue losses suffered by larger organisations. 
 
The turnover losses of individual firms within sectors varied significantly 
in terms of their scale. In the land-based sector, for example, one firm 
had lost annual revenue amounting to £250,000, another £5,000. This 
highlights not only the very diverse nature of micro-businesses within 
individual sectors but also the disparity of impacts. 
 
In the NTB survey overall turnover of accommodation businesses 
compared with the previous year had decreased by 19% in March and 
28% in May (Tables A2.10-A2.11). Two-thirds of firms were suffering 
reduced turnover, slightly fewer in May. The most widely affected group 
in March was self-catering firms, but by May camping/caravan/chalet 
sites and hotels were suffering more widely. On average hotels suffered 
the greatest loss of turnover (Box 4.9), but the greatest percentage losses 
were experienced by camping/caravan/chalet sites, followed by bed and 
breakfast establishments.  
 
FMD also affected end of year profit status of rural micro-businesses 
(Table 4.14). Some 75% of impacted firms within the CRE surveys were 
expecting a negative change in their profit position due to Foot and 
Mouth. Critically 24% were expecting a shift from a position of profit to 
loss and 14% from profit to breaking even (Box 4.10). 37% expected 
their level of profit to be changed (in almost all cases negatively) but to 
remain in a situation of profit or loss. The duration of the impact was a 
crucial factor – 60% of the firms for whom the impact was not showing 
signs of declining predicted that end-of-year they would have slipped 
from profit to loss or break even. 
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Box 4.9 
 
Hotel, very remote rural 
This long-established rural hotel specialises in dealing with organised groups 
and school parties, many of whom cancelled. The business is expecting a 25% 
loss of turnover compared to 2000. 
 
“We have a big school that come from Newcastle every year . …They 
come with about 50 kids, end of March. It’s a good booking simply 
because it’s the end of a quiet winter and we need that money. And we 
also had a fortnight later another school coming with 50 odd children … 
The phone was hot, ‘what do you think, should we come, what should we 
do?’ I said well at the moment everything is all right. … In the end the 
governors of each school made the decision they weren’t to come because 
some of the kids were from farms … And what do you do with kids … 
when you are confined to the village? … So they cried off. I got 10% 
compensation. And then the other one cried off and I got nothing. So 
really in about 3 days I lost £10,000 of which 4 would have gone to a 
neighbouring hotel who I shared the booking with. I mean that sort of 
money is too much to miss.” 
 
There was a desperate sense of loss of control and an unravelling of many 
years of hard work: 
 
“We have been here for 30 years and I could see all my life work just 
crumbling. I couldn’t ever think that anything would affect us so 
profoundly as that did. Because we had nothing. Most of March we had 
nobody. The weather was awful as well … Every time the phone rang it 
was ‘we’re not coming’ … It was awful.” 
 
 
Table 4.14: Impacted firms: predicted effect of FMD on end of year 
profit status  
 
 All impacted 
firms 
% firms 
Hospitality and 
recreation/culture 
% firms 
From profit to loss 24 35 
From profit to break-even 14 10 
Reduced profit/increased loss 37 35 
No effect on profit 21 17 
From loss to profit 0 0 
Don’t know 4 3 
N=78 (see also Table A2.12) 
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Box 4.10 
 
Riding school and B&B, very remote rural 
Foot and Mouth struck at a particularly bad time for this riding school, 
immediately following a major capital investment. Income streams from both 
the school and B&B were affected and overall turnover for the year is 
expected to be down by 30%. From a position of profit the business will now 
only break even for the year: 
 
“This year we have been restricted because of where we go out, very 
restricted … We got cancellations basically and fewer rides. Fewer 
evening rides because people thought ‘that’s it, we can’t do that’. So even 
enquiries were down on what it should have been. Easter didn’t really 
happen and then May was even worse because that was when it hit around 
here … June it picked up a little but really it didn’t pick up until the 
Scottish schools broke up … the second, third week in June. From then on 
we’ve been steady, not what I would call very busy, but then I have only 
had one girl on this year and the other one just occasional hours”. 
 
There was concern about the future reopening of access arrangements for the 
riding school’s horses. The business owner was reluctant to try too soon to 
regain access sensing some unwillingness among landowners to permit the 
school back on land. 
 
 
4.8 Local Economy Effects 
 
Sections 4.6 and 4.7 have described the employment and turnover 
impacts of Foot and Mouth and some of the estimated aggregate effects 
within the North East rural districts. There were important knock-on 
effects within the local economy relating to the market profile of 
impacted firms and their demand for local supplies. 
 
Firms with predominantly extra-local markets appear to have been most 
commonly affected during the outbreak. This is particularly significant as 
they bring money into the local rural economy from outside. Thus 46% of 
firms with 75-100% sales locally27 were impacted compared to 63% of 
                                                 
27
 i.e. within 30 miles as recorded in the 1999 survey (Raley and Moxey, 2000). 
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firms with 25% or less local sales. This picture appears to be influenced 
by the particularly widespread effect of FMD on hospitality and 
recreation and culture firms. For other sectors similar proportions of firms 
with high and low local sales were affected.  
 
Furthermore, the 1999 survey of North East rural micro-businesses 
(Raley and Moxey, 2000) demonstrated substantial expenditure in the 
local economy on goods and services by firms.  From that survey, the 
mean annual expenditure within a 30 mile radius by firms in the 
hospitality, recreation and land-based sectors (the most severely affected 
sectors) is £23,000, £9,000 and £21,000 respectively. Most of these firms 
reduced their local supplies during the outbreak which partly explains the 
spread of FMD impact to a diverse range of business sectors in the 
affected rural areas. 
 
4.9 Conclusions 
 
The blanket discouragement of visitors to the countryside - including the 
closure of public access and anchor visitor destinations - as well as farm 
access restrictions, were central to the pervasive impact of Foot and 
Mouth on North East rural micro-businesses. The impact of FMD 
extended far beyond farming to a large number and diverse range of rural 
businesses. The most extensively affected sectors were reliant in some 
way upon farming, tourists or visitors or on access to land: they included 
hospitality, land-based and recreation and culture sectors. Many retail, 
transport, business services and manufacturing firms were also affected, 
often reflecting knock-on effects within the business chain. Half of 
impacted firms were classified as medium or high impact. Such firms 
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were found in all sectors, including sectors which were generally little 
affected (such as personal services, construction, education and training 
and health and social). 
 
The impacts of the crisis displayed a complex geography within the 
region. Though to some degree firms in all rural areas were affected, the 
worst impacts were concentrated in the more rural parts of the region, 
especially in Tynedale, Wear Valley and Teesdale. A number of spatial 
factors influenced this pattern, including the specific geographical 
incidence of disease cases and the consequent ‘Blue Box’ restrictions; the 
local structure of the economy (particularly regarding the concentration 
of businesses dependent on tourists and visitors); displacement of visitors 
and customers to coastal locations, larger settlements and urban fringe 
sites. 
 
The temporal patterning of impact had a number of features. Most firms 
were affected throughout the outbreak. For 7%, though, the effects were 
short lived, confined to February and March.  On the other hand,  a third 
of impacted firms were subject to a lag effect, being hit only several 
weeks into the outbreak, through a combination of knock-on effects in 
the business chain and upon customer demand, and the continuing 
difficulties of access restrictions. The majority of firms experienced signs 
of impact abatement and recovery in the autumn of 2001. Two fifths, 
however, were experiencing no signs of recovery by November, 
including a number of the indirectly affected firms that had been subject 
to the initial lag effect. 
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Foot and Mouth severely disturbed the usual trade cycles of many firms, 
introducing fluctuations and unexpected peaks and toughs. For some 
firms, positive and negative impacts prevailed simultaneously.  Only for 
a small minority did positive effects lead to a net gain in annual revenue. 
 
The employment impacts of the crisis were widespread but diffuse.  The 
impacted firms employed on average 11% fewer full-time, 6% fewer 
part-time and 36% fewer casual employees.  The key sectors for these job 
losses were hospitality, business services, recreation and culture and 
manufacturing. There was a tendency as the crisis progressed for a 
‘casualisation’ of the workforce with, for example, part-time jobs 
substituting for full-time employment. Many of the employment impacts 
were low profile ones, such as the non-reengagement of seasonal labour, 
losses of casual employees and the reduction of staff working hours. 
 
Finally, turnover changes were common among impacted firms and this 
often had a profound effect on their end of year profit status. Almost 
three quarters were expecting a negative change in overall profit position. 
For the year as a whole impacted firms were experiencing an aggregate 
revenue reduction of 9%. Individual firm losses varied significantly in 
terms of their scale. On average, individual impacted firms predicted a 
mean loss of almost £9,000. 
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5 SUPPORT AND COPING STRATEGIES OF NON-
FARMING BUSINESSES 
Jeremy Phillipson and Marian Raley 
Surveyors: Helen Cheeseman, John Cooper, Nicola Thompson, 
Geoff Whitman and Ruth Williams 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Foot and Mouth outbreak revealed much about the operation and 
coping strategies of micro-businesses.  Drawing upon the survey and case 
study research findings introduced in Chapter 4, the current chapter 
explores how impacted businesses responded and attempted to cope and 
focuses attention on the use of advisory sources and aid measures during 
the outbreak. It culminates by considering the implications for business 
recovery. 
 
5.2 Overall Pattern of Coping Strategies 
 
Micro-firms negatively affected by the FMD crisis adopted a wide range 
of responses (Table 5.1).  The most common responses - each adopted by 
more than a third of the impacted firms in the November survey - were: 
household members working longer hours; business owners taking a 
smaller wage; the cancellation or postponement of investment; and a 
reduction in staff working hours.  As Table 5.1 reveals, many other 
responses were adopted too.  In part this demonstrates the considerable 
adaptability of these very small firms.  For many, though, drastic steps 
had had to be taken: for example, a fifth had laid off staff and a quarter 
had drawn on personal savings.  A few had gone as far as temporary 
closure or seeking to sell the business. 
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Table 5.1: Negatively impacted firms and their coping responses 
 
Coping responses  November survey  
(% impacted firms) 
n=72 
Household members working longer hours 40 
Take smaller wage 39 
Cancel or postpone investment 36 
Reduce staff working hours 35 
Increase marketing/advertising 32 
Cut back household spending 30 
Spend business reserves 30 
Cancel or postpone plans to expand business 29 
Decrease marketing/advertising 27 
Renegotiate existing loans 27 
Spend personal savings 26 
Take out new loan 21 
Layoffs/redundancies 21 
Not taking on seasonal/casual staff 17 
Change strategy 16 
Household member looking for job 14 
Temporary closure 9 
Ask staff to take holidays 7 
Increase staff working hours 6 
Attempt to sell business 3 
N.B includes responses tried 
 
This was the position that impacted firms had reached after nine months 
of the crisis.  As Table 5.2 shows, however, there were certain steps that 
firms took mainly early on in the crisis if they were likely to do so at all.  
These included the cancellation or postponement of business plans or 
investment, household members working longer hours, reducing staff 
working hours and making layoffs or redundancies.  Such responses were 
adopted fairly quickly by sizeable proportions of impacted firms.  This 
reveals the immediacy with which many micro-businesses can change 
their plans, investment intentions or staffing. 
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Table 5.2: Negatively impacted firms and coping responses over time 
 
Coping Responses April survey 
(% firms)  
n=56 
November survey 
(% firms) 
n=72 
 
 
Renegotiate existing loans 
Take out new loan 
Temporary closure 
Attempt to sell business 
 
 
 
16 
12 
3 
0 
 
 
 
27 
21 
9 
3 
 
Household members working longer 
hours 
Cancel or postpone investment 
Reduce staff working hours 
Cancel or postpone plans to expand 
business 
Layoffs/redundancies 
 
 
 
30 
39 
32 
 
30 
27 
 
 
40 
36 
35 
 
29 
21 
 
As FMD progressed and the crisis became prolonged, firms broadened 
and shifted their coping responses.  As Table 5.2 also shows, certain 
types of response became much more prevalent, including the 
renegotiation or taking-out of loans, and the temporary closure or sale of 
the business.  These were the sorts of responses that increasing 
proportions of firms had to adopt as the crisis continued to bite. 
 
For most of the affected firms, the longer the crisis lasted the deeper the 
impact.  So it is not surprising to find most of the same prevalent 
responses displayed, but with even greater salience, by the high impact 
firms, as shown in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3: Contrasting coping responses of low/medium impact and 
high impact firms, November survey 
 
Coping responses % of 
low/medium 
impact firms 
(n=36) 
% of  
high impact 
firms  
(n=25) 
 
Take smaller wage 
Cancel or postpone investment 
Cut back household spending 
Reduce staff working hours 
Cancel or postpone plans to expand business 
Spend personal savings 
Spend business reserves 
Take out new loan 
Renegotiate existing loan 
Household member looking for job 
Layoffs/redundancies 
Attempt to sell business 
 
28 
28 
6 
19 
25 
11 
22 
11 
19 
3 
14 
0 
 
 
61 
56 
52 
48 
46 
44 
39 
39 
38 
33 
33 
9 
 
Only responses showing a strong differentiation between the two groups are shown 
 
The Table contrasts the spread of certain coping responses between 
low/medium impact and high impact firms.  It emphasises two sets of 
responses: 
 
• those responses that were much more pronounced for the high 
impact firms, including taking a smaller wage from the business, 
cancellation or postponement of investment, reducing staff working 
hours and renegotiating loans; and 
 
• those responses that were largely particular to the high impact 
firms, including cut back household spending, spend personal 
savings, take out a new loan, household member looking for a job 
and attempting to sell the business. 
 
This clearly reveals the sorts of additional responses that firms were 
having to take where the crisis was biting deep.  The mean year-on-year 
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loss in revenue due to FMD for the high impact firms was £34,000, or 
43% - hence their rather desperate efforts to realise liquidity.28 
 
Figure 5.1 summarises many of these findings showing the escalating 
responses of impacted firms, over time and with increasing severity of 
impact.  The ‘early responses’ cover a range of predominant steps taken 
by firms in the very early stages of the Foot and Mouth crisis. 
 
Two of them - reduced staff working hours and layoffs or redundancies - 
came to figure more exclusively amongst the responses of the high 
impact firms.  The others - the cancellation or postponement of 
investment or expansion plans and household members working longer 
hours - assumed wide salience as the crisis progressed. 
 
The ‘later responses’ (the middle column in Figure 5.1) cover the 
predominant steps taken throughout the crisis especially by the 
low/medium impact firms seeking to weather the effects.  As well as 
recourse to household members working longer hours and the 
cancellation or postponement of investment or expansion plans, these 
steps included the owner taking a smaller wage from the business and 
spending business reserves. 
 
Finally, there is the ‘higher impact responses’ covering the predominant 
responses that high impact firms had to take.  As well as all the above 
steps, these additionally included a household member looking for a job, 
the renegotiation or taking out of loans, spending personal savings, and 
cutting back household spending. 
                                                 
28
 In contrast, the mean annual revenue drop of medium impact firms was £7,800 or 6%. 
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The pattern of responses was thus very complex varying between firms 
and over time and with the severity of impact.  Although this was a 
commercial crisis, as we have seen, the responses were not confined to 
the businesses.  Indeed, the FMD crisis reveals the inadequacy of 
viewing these small businesses as self-contained entities. The specific 
responses can be classified according to whether they were strictly 
business oriented, or alternatively household or employment oriented 
(see Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4: Classification of coping responses 
 
Coping responses  
Business Cancel or postpone investment 
Increase marketing/advertising 
Spend business reserves 
Cancel or postpone plans to expand business 
Renegotiate existing loan 
Decrease marketing/advertising 
Take out new loan 
Change strategy 
Temporary closure 
Attempt to sell business 
Household Household members working longer hours 
Take smaller wage 
Cut back household spending 
Spend personal savings 
Household member looking for job 
Employment Reduce staff working hours 
Layoffs/ redundancies 
Not taking on seasonal/casual staff 
Ask staff to take holidays 
Increase staff working hours 
 
Among medium/high impact firms some 79% had adopted one or more 
business-oriented responses; some 74%, one or more household-oriented 
responses; and some 35% one or more employment oriented responses.  
The responses are not actually exclusive between types.  On the contrary, 
they are often inter-linked across types (e.g. not taking on seasonal/casual 
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staff and household members working longer hours).  There is thus a 
great deal of overlap between the types (Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5: Medium and high negative impact firms: combinations of 
strategies  
 
Strategy type % firms adopting 
(n=43) 
Business only 12 
Business and household 40 
Business and household and employment  26 
Other permutations (including nil strategies) 23 
 
In the following three sections, we examine in turn business oriented 
responses, employment oriented responses and household oriented 
responses.  It should be borne in mind that typically these were not 
pursued in isolation from one another. 
 
5.3 Business-Oriented Coping Responses 
 
Table 5.6 summarises the business-oriented coping responses of 
negatively impacted micro-businesses as reported in the April and 
November surveys. The March 2001 survey by Northumbria Tourist 
Board also explored the actions taken by hospitality businesses as a result 
of FMD, and Table 5.7 lists the actions taken by those businesses that 
had suffered a drop in turnover.  
 
Cost cutting 
 
An initial response of many firms was to cut costs wherever they could.  
For many this involved reducing staff hours, laying off staff or not taking 
on casual or seasonal staff, in an effort to cut their wages bill (see Section  
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Table 5.6: Negatively impacted micro-businesses and their business-
oriented coping responses, April and November 2001 
 
Coping responses  April 
survey (% 
firms) 
n=56 
November 
survey  
(% all 
impacted 
firms) 
n=72 
November 
survey  
(% high 
impact 
firms) 
n=25 
Cancel or postpone investment 39 36 56 
Increase marketing/advertising 13 32 36 
Spend business reserves - 30 39 
Cancel or postpone plans to expand 
business 
30 29 46 
Renegotiate existing loans 16 27 38 
Decrease marketing/advertising - 27 28 
Take out new loan 12 21 39 
Change strategy - 16 17 
Temporary closure 3 9 9 
Attempt to sell business 0 3 9 
N.B includes strategies tried 
 
Table 5.7: Negatively impacted hospitality firms and their business-
oriented coping responses,  March 2001 (NTB survey) 
 
Actions taken in March % firms (n=70) 
Use financial reserves 46 
Investment plans postponed/cancelled 40 
Cut back maintenance 33 
Reduce orders to suppliers 30 
Reduce advertising 29 
Discounted prices 23 
Temporary closure 17 
Renegotiate loan/mortgage 13 
New loan 11 
Increase advertising 11 
Limited entry/access 10 
Cancel events 10 
Reduce opening time 6 
Cut back staff training 6 
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5.4).  Table 5.7 shows the range of other cost-cutting measures adopted 
by impacted hospitality firms in March.  Running costs were reduced by 
cutting back on restocking and on advertising.  Other responses  involved 
temporary or partial closure and the cancellation of events.  Non-urgent 
expenditure - on upkeep and repair  - was postponed or shelved.  In this 
way firms sought to save on their variable costs, to bring their 
expenditure more into line with their reduced revenues. 
 
As this kind of belt-tightening continued through into the summer, there 
were signs with some firms that it was beginning to alter longer-term 
attitudes.  Some of the micro-businesses explained later in the crisis how 
they were now adopting a more cautious business outlook. One retail 
owner, for example, described how the business’s ordering cycle had 
been disrupted. When FMD struck he had already stocked up most of his 
product lines in readiness for the summer season, which later on meant 
cash flow problems and difficulties in paying for advanced supplies. Foot 
and Mouth therefore altered the owner’s approach to stocking, 
introducing a new conservatism: 
 
“It’s made me a lot more wary about pre-ordering stock. I really 
think about do I need this product at the time … I’ve run with 
the stock that we’ve got this year when I would normally take a 
chance on certain things”. 
Specialist retailer, moderately rural 
Investment activities and plans 
Another primary coping response adopted early by firms involved the 
arresting of ongoing and future investment. FMD therefore not only 
affected their short-term financial position but also their short and 
medium term plans.  Thus 39% of affected micro-businesses in April 
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(36% by November) had cancelled or postponed investment.  One hotel 
owner explained how she had called a halt in the middle of long planned 
work to improve and extend her premises: 
 
 “It was March, leading up to Easter, it was just awful. We were 
in the middle of building work and we just stopped everything 
because a) we didn’t know if it was worth carrying on; b) we 
needed to tick over to pay for the building work as we were 
doing it; and c) we didn’t know if we had a trade left over at the 
end of it …Thinking back we should have bashed on with the 
building work, but we just did nothing but mope”. 
Hotel, very remote rural 
 
In many other cases, a great deal of basic maintenance and refurbishment 
was simply put off indefinitely as part of an effort to reduce any 
outgoings that were not immediately essential. 
 “Try not to spend so much … There might have been some 
tacks you would possibly have replaced and we haven’t done 
that. Just little things that you thought ‘right we can do without 
that for a little while’ … We would have liked to have done a 
lot more outside but it has kind of come to a stop”. 
Riding School, very remote rural 
 
“When the business is going well in general haulage side you 
buy sheets for sheeting loads, buy ropes, you renew your straps, 
renew paint work … just didn’t do anything of that. Kept the 
maintenance down to an absolute minimum. Parts were only 
put on if they were desperate”. 
Livestock haulier, moderately rural 
 
Owners were conscious that they were running down their premises, 
stock and equipment, and storing up expenditure requirements for the 
future: 
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“There has been no capital expenditure this year. We haven’t 
done a thing.  We’ve actually got an overdraft now which we 
never had. … Not talking huge amounts but it’s sufficient. It’s 
the cream on the top that would have helped us refurbish this 
which would have lasted 10 years … We haven’t been able to 
do certain jobs that we wanted done. Refurbishments and things 
like that. We just haven’t spent any money. We need some new 
windows replaced. … All the seating down here we were going 
to do. Next year I was going to replace the bay window … Now 
that will be the year after”. 
Public house, remote rural 
 
Owners also realised that their efforts to slash their immediate costs 
might be damaging to the future of the business.  Indeed, many affected 
owners had consciously downgraded their future expectations for the 
business.  30% of impacted micro-businesses in April (29% in 
November) said that they had shelved plans to expand.   
 
Business and financial strategy 
 
By November 16% of affected micro-businesses had altered their 
business strategy in order to cope with the crisis. A livestock haulier, for 
example, had extended the general haulage side of the business and had 
diversified into providing storage space. A pub owner had introduced 
new menus. A riding school had tried to be more flexible in attracting 
customers: 
 
“There is nothing you can do apart from try to generate more 
business. But what else can you provide? We try to 
accommodate what anybody wants … to do things that you 
wouldn’t normally have done. … Maybe doing a night time 
where I never used to do that. But just to get a few extra 
customers”. 
Riding school, very remote rural 
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One business had discussed a range of contingency plans should the 
impact of FMD have persisted. The owners felt the need to raise the 
profile of the business and for the first time they produced and distributed 
a brochure.  Some firms were thus able to respond creatively to the crisis.  
This was less possible for many of those more deeply embroiled. 
 
This divide between firms adapting creatively to the crisis and those 
struggling to survive is reflected in the different stances taken towards 
marketing.  Whereas 32% of impacted firms increased their marketing 
efforts, 27% decreased theirs even though knowing that this might 
damage their future business:  
 
“How can we get more people in?  Apart from advertising … 
how can you afford to spend on the advertising if you’re not 
getting money in?  It’s a vicious circle.  You’ve got to advertise 
to say that you are still open” 
Riding school, very remote rural 
 
“You can’t do the things you would have liked to have done. 
Things have got to come to a halt. One thing that’s had to suffer 
is advertising. Its counterproductive I know that. But I would 
have to borrow money to advertise in certain places … I won’t 
go into the red. I will just cut my cloth according to my needs”. 
Bed and Breakfast, remote rural 
 
Of critical importance was the extent to which firms were running out of 
liquidity.  Already in March, 46% of impacted hospitality firms reported 
that they were drawing on their financial  reserves.  By November, 30% 
of impacted micro-businesses were likewise reporting that they were 
spending their reserves.  For those that had had to be doing this for an 
extended period of time the situation was becoming precarious.  Some 
38% of the high impact firms had renegotiated existing loans and 39% 
had taken out new loans.  This was a very hard step for some business  
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Box 5.1 
 
Craft manufacturing business, moderately rural 
This craft business, run by a husband and wife partnership, has been operating 
for over 10 years serving tourism outlets throughout rural Britain. Foot and 
Mouth had a devastating effect to the extent that the business has had to 
relocate and the owner is now looking to close it down. The effects of Foot 
and Mouth were felt initially in relation to restrictions accessing the premises 
of a small number of customers, but it was immediately apparent that there 
would be serious repercussions for the business:  
 
“The first couple of days it was just, you know its where we’re living. And 
its on the news. ‘Oh God this is bad news for the North East’. Then it 
dawned on me this really did have a business implication when I had a 
phone call from one of our customers saying we are in a Foot and Mouth 
area, don’t deliver your order to us … That one telephone call made me 
think, ‘oh, yes, this is about us’”. 
 
Subsequently orders began to dry up due to fewer visitors to tourism business 
customers. This came at crucial time in the business’s annual cycle: 
 
“On our cycle … most of our customers are taking their first orders of the 
year in Easter. Then they may reorder in June, July, August … It hit at a 
key time. We had orders on the books. But normally the orders we have on 
the books maybe account for about 50% of our orders at that time of the 
year. The other ones coming in, ordering in March for delivery in April, 
May. Dead, nothing, nothing, nothing … Customers who bought from us 
consistently for 10 years, suddenly weren’t placing orders”. 
 
The owner and spouse stopped drawing an income from the business and both 
took new part time jobs. Any income that came into the business went to 
paying the bills, the strategy being to stop any increase in their overdraft and 
to repay a business loan. Plans for new product designs were cancelled.  After 
an initial period of holding on, the business was forced to relocate to an 
emergency office within a friend’s business, highlighting the importance of 
established business relationships: 
 
“The District Council gave us the two months rent holiday which bought 
us a little time, that was important. So we then started making contingency 
plans. … We sort of earmarked the option of moving here as a fall back 
option if the business didn’t start picking up sufficiently again for us to be 
able to handle the rent level. … Basically although we did get some orders 
coming through, it was no way near the level that gave us any confidence 
about staying, so hence the move to smaller premises”. 
 
owners who were resistant to the notion of going into debt.  Other firms 
were already heavily indebted and were unwilling or unable to go any 
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deeper.  For a few the losses they were sustaining were such that they had 
decided to close down (Box 5.1). 
 
Use of advisory sources 
 
Impacted firms approached a wide range of advisory sources (Table 5.8).  
Compared to the situation in April, by November more business owners 
had sought advice or help and from a wider number and range of sources.  
In April, family members had been the most prevalent source of advice 
followed by friends and the local authorities.  By November, it was the 
local authorities that had become the most used, followed by family 
members and Business Link.  Thus in the early stages of the outbreak 
many business owners relied on informal sources of help and advice.  As 
the outbreak progressed more and more turned outwards to formal 
sources of advice and support.  To differing degrees these could provide 
information on FMD-related restrictions (e.g. Local Authorities and  
 
Table 5.8: Sources of help or advice used by negatively affected firms 
 
April survey 
% of affected firms 
(n=54) 
November survey 
 % of affected firms 
(n=72) 
Family members 35 36 
Council/local authority 33 47 
Friends 33 32 
Tourist Board 25 19 
Accountants/financial advisers 17 32 
Banks 17 28 
MAFF / DEFRA 17 24 
MP 14 9 
Tax Helpline 12 - 
Federation of Small Businesses 11 13 
Business Link/BAC 10 35 
Chamber of Commerce 8 13 
Trade association 6 13 
Other business owners - 29 
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DEFRA), financial and business advice (e.g. accountants, banks and 
Business Link) and access to relief measures (e.g. Local Authorities and 
Business Link).  The greater the impact on the business, the more marked 
was the tendency to turn to these formal sources (Appendix Table 
A2.14).  Also the larger the firm the greater the tendency to turn to 
sources of business advice of any type (Appendix Table A2.15). 
 
Business Link is the main publicly promoted channel for business 
support.  A common criticism is that normally it tends to neglect the 
needs of micro-businesses, particularly rural ones, and concentrates more 
on the larger and growth-oriented SMEs (Lowe and Talbot 2000).  
However, Business Link was cast to the forefront in the FMD crisis in 
delivering emergency advice and recovery schemes that were widely 
publicised.  Even so, the large majority of impacted firms - including the 
high impact ones - did not approach Business Link.  Some relied on their 
familiar sources of advice, but the lack of recourse to Business Link also 
reflected two chronic causes of low take-up of formal support by rural 
micro-businesses.  One is the practical constraints facing small firms in 
accessing support.  The other is a general scepticism and lack of 
awareness among many micro-business owners about the value and 
relevance of business support to their needs, linked to a tendency to fall 
back on internal or household coping responses: 
“I can never afford to pay an adviser … My business has grown 
now. When I had one bus and I was myself I had time to see 
people and time to do things. Now I’m here to 11 o’clock at 
night from 6 in the morning … me works me life basically … I 
know you should make time, but is the advice worth the loss in 
business when you’ve lost so much? I’ve gotta find a driver to 
cover for me while I gan and see somebody or if somebody 
comes out”. 
Coach firm owner, slightly rural 
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 “And they keep always having these seminars to kick start the 
economy. And they’re all in Durham … And they are always in 
the middle of the summer at lunch time, peak time. They don’t 
think about little businesses. Most people in this sort of 
business work in the business. They are not managers, or 
owners with managers. They are people that are hands on. We 
should be having all our seminars in the winter … You can’t 
just walk away because you lose money”. 
Hotel owner, very remote rural 
 
Some firms, though, were induced to approach Business Link for the first 
time, particularly in the hospitality sector.  However, businesses with 
prior experience of Business Link before FMD (as indicated by the CRE 
baseline survey of micro-businesses) were more likely to contact the 
organisation (48% of those with prior experience, compared to 28% 
without).  This meant that some of the established biases within Business 
Link coverage - such as towards certain sectors - were perpetuated (Table 
5.9).   
Table 5.9: Sectoral breakdown of firms using Business Link 
 
Sector % impacted firms in sector 
approaching BL during FMD 
outbreak (n=73) 
% firms in sector that had 
approached BL before 
FMD (n=1294) 
Business services 57 40 
Recreation/culture 43 55 
Hospitality 35 19 
Manufacturing 33 46 
Land based 29 23 
Retail 29 22 
Other sectors 22 27 
All sectors 34 29 
  
Firms using Business Link were more likely to have approached other 
sources of assistance than non-users. This is what would be expected 
given the signposting of businesses between support services. But also 
there was a group of severely impacted firms that was particularly 
proactive in trying a range of support avenues. 
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Equally, firms that had approached outside sources of advice and support 
were also more likely to have implemented various other coping 
measures. This suggests that those firms which were more proactive in 
responding to problems tended to be so on a number of fronts. In 
contrast, it is striking that for those negatively affected firms which had 
consulted either no one or only informal sources (family, friends or 
business contacts), the adoption of various measures tended to be very 
low. This was the case for a quarter of medium/high negative impact 
firms and suggests that there was a small group of affected firms who 
were inclined to muddle through on their own. 
 
The use of a broad range of coping responses may also be a reflection of 
the external advice obtained.  Among the medium and high negatively 
affected firms, users of public business support (such as Business Link) 
were far more likely to have cancelled or postponed investment or 
expansion plans, cut household spending, decreased marketing and 
advertising, renegotiated loans and, in particular, made layoffs and 
redundancies. In contrast, certain steps - such as the spending of personal 
savings or business reserves, drawing a smaller wage from the business 
or taking out a new loan - were adopted more or less equally by users and 
non-users of public business support.  
 
Other major sources of advice were the banks, accountants and financial 
advisors.  These figured prominently amongst medium and high impact 
firms and, not surprisingly, amongst firms that had renegotiated or taken 
out new loans.  Not all the firms regarded the attention of the banks as 
welcome or particularly sympathetic, but taking on their strictures was 
unavoidable where firms needed a new loan or overdraft facility. 
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Finally, collective forms of support - such as the Chamber of Commerce 
or trade associations - were not prominent amongst the sources of help to 
which firms turned.  These are often regarded as remote from the needs 
of rural micro-businesses.  What was striking, though, was the extent to 
which firms gained advice from other business owners.  This was true of 
29% of affected firms in the November survey, including 50% of high 
impact firms.  The FMD crisis was a common experience for many 
neighbouring businesses, their customers and suppliers. For some this 
sense of “we’re all in the same boat” had the effect of drawing them 
together.  In some instances this has led to the forging of new business 
alliances (see, for example, Box 5.2). 
 
Box 5.2 
Northumbria Larder 
The North East has relatively few speciality food producers and only a very 
small number of farmers are engaged in processing activity or direct sales. 
Prior to FMD, farmers markets were a growth area, with networks existing at 
both regional and national levels. This represented a critical trading 
opportunity for many producers and for some was their only retail outlet.  
 
North East farmers markets effectively closed for the duration of the FMD 
epidemic, resulting in serious financial losses for all businesses affected. 
Some of the producers who knew each other through the farmers markets 
started to discuss their predicament.  A core group of seven producers, led by 
the Northumberland Cheese Company, formed an emergency action group for 
self-help, which in turn led to the creation of the Northumbria Larder. The 
latter has now become officially recognised by “Food from Britain” (FFB) as 
the regional speciality food group for the North East. It has received five-
years of funding from FFB and a number of other sources. The group was 
officially launched at the pioneering Northumbria Food Festival held in the 
Baltic Square, Gateshead, over Easter weekend 2002. Membership has grown 
rapidly to more than 35 North East small-scale speciality food 
producers/processors. Since FMD, North East farmers markets have recovered 
and continue to grow.  There are now 14 farmers markets operating in the 
region, forming a major outlet for Northumbria Larder products.  The group’s 
long term business plan is to expand beyond farmers markets, to develop 
supply chain linkages and eventually penetrate the major retail sector.    
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Uptake of aid schemes 
 
A number of aid schemes were available for firms hit by the FMD crisis.  
Table 5.10 gives details of the take-up by affected firms in the survey.  
The most popular schemes, in descending order, were rate relief, business 
recovery grants and the deferral of tax payments29.  For each of these the 
majority of applicants had been successful.  The other aid schemes were 
much less popular, notably business rate deferral, business rate appeal 
and the Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme (whose rules were relaxed 
by the Government).  
 
Table 5.10: Applications to business aid schemes by negatively impacted 
micro-businesses (n=73) 
 
Assistance Total Applied 
% 
Proportion 
Successful 
% 
Business recovery grant  16 67 
Business rate relief 30 60 
Business rate deferral 3 50 
Business rate appeal 5 50 
Deferment of tax / VAT/ NI 10 100 
Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme 3 0 
 
Whereas the tax deferral and business rate measures were aimed at giving 
short-term relief, the Business Recovery Fund was aimed at medium-
                                                 
 
29
 Within the GONE survey firms who had experienced a negative effect from the FMD outbreak were 
also asked to rate the expected helpfulness of certain forms of assistance to their type of business.  
Business rate relief was ranked the most helpful form of special business assistance, with 30% of firms 
rating it very helpful or moderately helpful.  Next were a business development grant, specific help for 
tourism and deferment of tax (all 28%).  An interest free loan was considered very helpful or 
moderately helpful by 25% compared to a secured loan (16%) or Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme 
(16%). 
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term recovery.  In the North East region, the Business Recovery Fund 
was administered by Business Link on behalf of the Regional 
Development Agency, ONE North East. Grants were available under four 
schemes to firms which could demonstrate they had been severely 
affected by FMD.  These were an interest relief grant, available to firms 
that had secured a commercial loan30 for development and restructuring 
as a result of FMD (maximum grant £7,500 per business); a marketing 
grant (maximum £7,000); an investment support grant (maximum 
£5,000); and a business improvement grant (maximum £6,000). The total 
number and value of grants made under the four schemes are shown in 
Table 5.11. 
 
Table 5.11: FMD business recovery grant approvals 
 
 Number of applications approved Value of 
grant 
approved (£) 
 Durham N’land Tees 
Valley 
Tyne 
and 
Wear 
Total  
Interest relief grant 6 14 3 4 27 68,000 
Investment support grant 99 179 7 15 300 550,400 
Marketing grant 104 171 12 9 296 1,251,300 
Business improvement 
grant 
120 169 32 19 340 1,417,300 
Total  329 533 54 47 963 3,287,000 
Source: ONE North East 
N.B. Businesses could apply for more than one grant subject to a maximum payment 
to a business. The marketing grant and investment support grant closed in August and 
September 2001 respectively. The interest relief grant remained open until December 
2002 due to the securing of ERDF match funding. Business Improvement Grants were 
launched with the second round of the Business Recovery Fund and were available 
between October 2001 and March 2002.  The figures in the Table present the picture 
as of 4/4/02. 
 
Most of the firms who applied for support under the Business Recovery 
Fund were successful, and beneficiaries spoke highly of the scheme. One 
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described a business adviser as having been “a fantastic help”. Through 
the contact he was able to secure an advertising grant and money to 
upgrade some buildings:  
 
 “Obviously the grant helped. Obviously the advertising - that I 
would normally do and have to pay out from my own pocket - 
because that was paid for by the grant, was tremendous. Which 
enabled me to advertise. Otherwise I wouldn’t have been able 
to do it”. 
Recreation business, very remote rural 
 
Another business owner was particularly pleased to have received a 
business development grant and described very favourably the role of a 
Business Link adviser in facilitating the application process. The owner 
had almost not applied, thinking the scheme was meant for bigger 
businesses, but was encouraged to do so by another business owner: 
 
“I was quite amazed. … Somebody is giving me something and 
I didn’t have to battle for it. … I said to them I really need help, 
I really don’t know how to go about this. And he came and saw 
me and helped me fill in the forms. It didn’t cost me anything 
… It was quite easy. He was great, he really was … I wouldn’t 
have done it on my own and I’m sure I wouldn’t have got the 
grant if I’d tried to get it on my own”. 
Bed and breakfast, remote rural 
 
Most of the negatively impacted firms in the survey, though, had not 
applied to the Business Recovery Fund.  However, there had been 
aborted attempts to obtain aid and there was some criticism of the 
scheme. Some business owners felt they had fallen through the gaps of 
the support framework. Two significant groups were ineligible due to EU 
state aid rules: the transport sector (including road hauliers) and 
agriculture and fisheries (including food processors), although some 
                                                                                                                                           
30
 Including under the Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme. 
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other land-based activities were eligible. One timber haulier, for example, 
had explored several forms of advice but felt let down. He had been in 
touch with Business Link but found that his business was ineligible for 
support due to European law:  
 
“Business Link were helpful [in providing phone numbers], but 
more or less said there was no help in other ways, in any sorts 
of grants to help you get through … Its all linked around 
Brussels and transport … apparently it comes from Brussels … 
The bottom line is people need money now and it the nuts and 
bolts, the heart of the business and we’re not getting any help 
… I’m just looking for direction of ‘yes there is help and this is 
the way its going to be’. … I’ve phoned Business Link, I’ve 
phoned One North East. They might as well not exist as far as 
I’m concerned”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
 
The owner of a coach firm argued: 
 
“Basically there isn’t anywhere for us to gan for help, basically 
we sink or we swim. Ye nah, its just a hard fact of life. We 
either gan to the bank who carry your money or we go down the 
pan, your house is sold”.  
Coach firm owner, slightly rural 
 
The Business Recovery Fund was also criticised for what it did and did 
not cover.  Firms that were simply looking for compensation for losses or 
emergency aid or soft loans to cover trading deficits were disappointed as 
these went against the scheme guidelines from government.  Thus only 
four of the 13 high impact case study firms had applied for a business 
recovery grant (with two successful). Most had turned instead to 
conventional forms of financial support. Eight, for example, had obtained 
an extension to their bank overdraft facility with five of them having to 
use this. In addition two firms had secured a deferment of VAT 
payments, one a waiving of bank charges, one a council grant, three rate 
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relief, one deferment of home mortgage payments, one rent relief and one 
a holiday on Pay As You Earn payments.  
 
Conversely, a few owners were critical of one element in the scheme - 
the interest relief grant - which did suffer a low take up (see Table 5.11).  
This was a grant scheme for businesses that had secured a commercial 
loan to redevelop. One business owner described the scheme as a “spade 
with which to dig ourselves a bigger hole”, arguing that it demonstrated: 
 
“A complete lack of understanding of the reality that certainly 
small businesses were facing, where you have no logical basis 
for making investment plans for the future. To be offering 
people the chance to be taking additional loan commitments 
was completely inappropriate”. 
 
Some businesses were dissuaded from applying to the Business Recovery 
Fund given the perceived management time needed in doing so, notably 
in producing financial accounts outside of normal accounting cycles and 
particularly at a time of such difficulty: 
 
 “By the time you got all your books together, it was going to 
cost you as much … You had enough on your plate at the time 
without having to go to the accountant … so we felt it wasn’t 
worth it.” 
Riding school, very remote rural 
 
Applications did not actually require full audited accounts, but they did 
need to demonstrate a loss of turnover and profits.  This required the last 
full set of accounts as well as sales figures for the equivalent months in 
2001. 
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Finally, the Business Recovery Fund was criticised for being limited.  
Some latecomers to the scheme found that the funding had run out (but a 
second phase of grants was launched in October).  This led some to 
question the priorities and criteria for dispersing the money.  More 
generally, several business owners challenged the policy emphasis upon 
supporting farming, and others the emphasis on tourism, to the neglect of 
other rural businesses. The owner of one firm, for example, having 
explored the full range of support available, was particularly angry: in 
comparison to farmers he felt they had been “hung out to dry”.  
 
5.4 Employment-Oriented Coping Responses 
While many firms moved quickly to lay off staff, reduce staff hours or 
not take on casual or seasonal staff, others were reluctant to do so, at least 
with certain staff members.   The indications from the March and April 
surveys are that layoffs were mainly done early on, if at all.  Overall, 
29% of impacted firms with employees resorted to layoffs or 
redundancies.  Not taking on casual or seasonal staff was also an early 
response.  Foot and Mouth hit in the run-up to Easter when many firms 
would normally be taking on extra staff.  Overall, 24% of impacted firms 
with employees did not take on seasonal or casual staff.  In contrast, 
reducing staff working hours was a response that firms increasingly took 
as the crisis dragged on.  It would seem that many firms thus have a core 
of staff that they could not or would not release.  In the end, though, 42% 
of impacted firms with employees had had to reduce staff working hours, 
and 8% had asked staff to take holidays. 
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Table 5.12: Negatively impacted firms and employment-oriented coping 
responses, March, April and November 2001 
 
 Impacted 
hospitality 
firms 
Impacted micro-businesses 
Coping responses  March 
survey (% 
impacted 
firms) 
(n=70) 
April 
survey 
(% 
firms) 
(n=56) 
November 
survey  
(% all 
impacted 
firms) 
(n=72) 
November 
survey  
(% high 
impact 
firms) 
(n=25) 
November 
survey (% 
impacted 
firms that 
were 
employers 
(n=55) 
Reduce staff working 
hours 
20 32 35 48 42 
Layoffs/ 
redundancies 
24 27 21 33 29 
Not taking on 
seasonal/casual staff 
31 - 17 13 24 
Ask staff to take holidays - - 7 8 8 
Increase staff working 
hours 
- - 6 6 4 
N.B. Includes strategies tried 
NTB survey and micro-business survey 
 
For many businesses the decision to lay off staff was taken with great 
reluctance. In fact there are signs that some businesses were carrying 
staff despite there being less work available. Firms would not let go 
skilled staff on whom the business depended. Thus in one business some 
staff were re-deployed on ‘other jobs’ in order to keep them occupied: 
 
“At the moment I’ve got three lorries parked up since February. 
I haven’t actually paid the drivers off. What I’m doing … there 
is a big shortage of quality drivers. At the end of the day if I 
lose them drivers, when things do pick up I need them there. I 
haven’t been paying them full wages obviously. But they’ve 
been doing jobs in the garage, cleaning this, cleaning that, 
painting trailers that’s standing, things like that. Because I can’t 
afford to let any drivers go and come to the situation where the 
work picked up but I haven’t got any drivers … I didn’t 
particularly want to say to my young’uns after spending, well to 
put them through their tests £4000 say and a lot of training, to 
say ‘well I’m sorry Foot and Mouth is pretty bad you’re out of a 
job’. Because not only will they obviously have to look for 
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another job. They are not going to sit and wait for the Foot and 
Mouth finishing – its the cost of the training. If I have to start 
that again, well I just couldn’t do it at this time”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
 
Many employees within micro-businesses are family members who 
would not be made redundant. Similarly, non-family employees may be 
very well established within the business, having worked there for many 
years and being seen as indispensable.  Indeed they too are often treated 
as family. One business owner explained how in the bleak early weeks of 
the crisis they had held on to their employees and were able to do so by 
not paying themselves wages and by dipping into their personal savings.  
 
Another business owner explained that staff needed money as much as 
them, that they shouldn’t “pass the buck” and, most important of all, they 
were considered family friends. At one point the owner chose to take 
time off rather than reduce staff hours. There had also been compensating 
effects. Most staff tended to work on the busier weekends which left the 
owners more or less on their own during the quiet time in the week. 
Similarly, for periods some employees had been unable to get to work 
through being confined on farms, which meant welcome additional hours 
for other staff. 
 
As the crisis became prolonged, many impacted businesses reduced staff 
working hours (35%) or encouraged them to take a holiday. In some 
cases there was a progressive ‘casualisation’ of labour with staff working 
less regular and more flexible hours as and when necessary. For example, 
the owner of a riding school explained how normally they employed a 
full-time employee in the summer and another on a casual basis 
throughout the year. Because of Foot and Mouth they had not taken on 
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the normal full-time member of staff. The other employee has been on 
reduced and more casual hours: 
 
“She is very good, just grins and bears it. There’s nothing she 
could do. We tried to give her more hours. But there is only 
limits to what you can do. And if there is no work then she just 
goes home”. 
Riding school, very remote rural 
 
Similarly, the casual and part-time staffing of a rural hotel was influenced 
significantly. The main helper in the hotel who had worked in the 
business for a period of 23 years was dropped from a full-time to a part-
time position in the early days of the crisis. The other two casual staff 
that the hotel usually relied upon were simply not asked to come in.  The 
owner said that they worked for “pin money”, and it was understood that 
the business would “pick them up and put them down” as and when they 
were required. Eventually business did pick up for the hotel and the 
casual staff were able to make up the hours they had lost earlier in the 
year. 
 
Several business owners explained that workers had generally understood 
that reductions in hours or wages were very much out of the business’s 
control.  
 
“All the lads that were on the livestock side were told if things 
didn’t pick up shortly they would be out of a job. And it would 
be last in, first out. … Decision was taken literally after we 
were taken out by Foot and Mouth and things were going down 
hill rapidly fast. … Some said get rid of me first, let the lads 
with kids, wives. Another offered to take a holiday. We did, we 
paid them later … Everyone understands what the issues are”. 
Livestock haulier, moderately rural 
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“Reduced the wages, they’ve accepted that, they’re just getting 
peppercorn wages, just more or less keeping them going. The 
decision had to be made. It wasn’t made straight away. They 
were on basic wages for two months. … They’ve been very 
good. They’re sensible lads, they’ve appreciated that it’s 
completely out of my hands. Any sort of wage at all they know 
it’s a cost to me, so they’ve been tremendous, they’ve helped 
me as much as possible. Alright they might say well ‘we won’t 
take any wages’, but unfortunately life isn’t that easy, they’ve 
got things to pay for as well as me”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
 
However, in not all cases could firms hang on to staff.  In one case study 
business two employees had resigned because  of  the lack of overtime 
work. 
 
For some businesses, members of staff lived on farms which introduced 
its own tensions and practical difficulties during the outbreak. This was 
often the case for agricultural support and land-based businesses. For one 
livestock haulage business, for example, the livestock cull was a 
particularly difficult time for several employees. Many had had to 
contend with the anxiety and sense of loss through the spread of the 
disease and of animal culls on farms where they or their friends and 
family lived.  
 
One driver had been unable to get home for two weeks due to access and 
licence restrictions. Another employee who lived on a farm had been 
prevented from attending work from February through to May by 
movement restrictions and another had had to miss college for several 
weeks. Foot and Mouth had also had a major effect on the family and 
community life of the employees in the firm. One employee described 
how he had not seen his parents for four months beyond fleeting 
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meetings at the farm gate. Normal community events such as discos and 
the young farmer’s club had all been cancelled. 
 
5.5 Household-Oriented Coping Responses 
 
Table 5.13 shows the range of household-oriented coping responses.  
Household members working longer hours seems to be a primary 
adaptive response to which many very small firms readily resort.  This 
reflects the family basis of many such firms: they often are home-based 
and family members are used to lending a hand at critical periods.  The 
incidence of this response grew between April and November, in part as 
household members assistance was substituted for paid employees. 
 
Table 5.13: Negatively impacted micro-businesses and household-
oriented coping responses 
 
Coping responses  April 
survey (% 
firms) 
n=56 
November 
survey  
(% 
impacted 
firms) 
n=72 
November 
survey  
(% high impact 
firms) 
n=25 
Household members working longer 
hours 
30 40 44 
Take smaller wage - 39 61 
Cut back household spending - 30 52 
Spend personal savings - 26 44 
Household member looking for job - 14 33 
N.B includes strategies tried 
 
The more detailed November survey revealed a range of other household-
oriented coping responses.  These went beyond the role of the household 
as a labour reserve, to draw additionally on its finances to support the 
business through this difficult period.  The range of responses - taking a 
smaller wage from the business, cut-backs on household spending, 
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drawing on personal savings and a household member looking for a job - 
covered the spending, earning and savings capacities of households.  
These steps were taken much more by the firms that were suffering 
worse, and which were therefore having to go beyond ordinary business 
belt-tightening.  That this was being done because of the extreme 
situation that some firms faced is shown by the much higher incidence of 
such household responses amongst firms with high fixed costs (Table 
5.15 in Section 5.6).   
 
The ability of micro-firms, particularly household based ones, to mobilise 
household resources in this way in support of the business is a 
fundamental feature of their flexibility and resilience.  They are able to 
do this because the divide between the household’s and the business’s 
financial and labour resources is often either very weak or permeable.  
Businesses and households often share the same premises.  One telling 
feature is that there was a marked tendency for household-oriented 
responses to be adopted where there was a tradition for the business 
owner/manager to work long hours.  This culture of dedication to the 
business may infect other household members.  Even during ‘normal’ 
times, household members not formally employed in the business may be 
called upon to lend a hand in, for example, taking bookings when the 
telephone rings, or assisting at busy periods, especially at weekends.  
Household members may thus be familiar with the business as well as 
being readily available.  One business owner explained how they had 
been able to get by with her daughter’s assistance: 
 
“I think we’ve worked harder … you just have to. I could have 
done with someone else to help me in weeks we’ve been busy. 
My daughter’s helped. … Whereas I might have had someone 
else on, I thought oh well, ‘can you afford to take that extra 
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person on?’, and you just get the daughter and she would do the 
extra bits”. 
Riding school, very remote rural 
 
However, household reserves are not limitless.  Several business owners 
referred to living on credit and hand to mouth.  A frequently mentioned 
response was cancelling or taking a shorter holiday.  In this way 
household expenditure was reduced, but also business owners felt unable 
to be away for long: 
 
“The wife gets £X and she’s watched what she’s done with it to 
be honest. We haven’t had any expensive holidays. We had a 
week away in Scotland … very nice, had to get the break more 
than anything. I’ve curbed, I haven’t bought anything … I’ve 
just had to be very careful. But unfortunately the drain on the 
business, the lorries that’s standing, the wages I’ve had to pay, 
its slowly just mounting up … and there’s not much I can do 
about it”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
 
“We can’t do this year what we would have liked to have done. 
So be it, we have to accept that. … Going on holiday, we could 
have had a bigger holiday … We have to prop the business up 
at times. … We really don’t know what we’ve got to face this 
coming winter”. 
Bed and Breakfast, remote rural 
 
Some business owners were stretched to exhaustion: 
 
“Really we could have done with another member of staff in 
here. The funds aren’t there. Which is difficult for me because I 
can’t get a day off. I mean a day off. I work 365 days a year. 
But the thing is its starting to take its toll on me now … I’m not 
with it. I have to work twice as hard because I need, I’ve got to 
be here …”. 
Recreation business, very remote rural 
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Owners often felt exposed to intense personal pressures. 19% of 
impacted businesses drew attention to the issue of personal stress. For 
some this was associated with crippling workloads as owners struggled to 
manage with fewer staff. For others there were acute financial anxieties 
and fears for the future, as the bills mounted: 
 
“[Tearful] You don’t know what next, not even next month, 
you don’t know what next weeks going to bring … And its up 
there all the time, 24 hours a day. Which you don’t need on 
your brain. Its difficult enough to do what I have got to do in 
here without having added pressure basically. And you’re 
thinking bank manager, bank manager … It doesn’t bear to 
think what the bank may do. And erm [pause] I obviously don’t 
want to think about it. But you do think about it.” 
Recreation business, very remote rural 
 
For others there has been the strain associated with being responsible for 
staff and their families and of needing to maintain morale.  
 
“Its been a difficult time socially … The pressures, the things 
going around in your head. Its bound to take a toll on 
relationships I mean divent get us wrong, me wife’s been very 
good. But she looks at me and says ‘Frank, you’re in a dream 
world again’. I say ‘aye, I’m just thinking like’. That’s the sort 
of pressure that you can do without … You go to bed thinking 
about it man.  You shouldn’t have to do that like. I mean I’m 
not only trying to survive myself. I’ve got 10 drivers there all 
with mortgages [pause]. … They’re not particularly wanting me 
to drill into them every week ‘it’s bad again this week lads, 
we’ve had a bad week’. Morale would be that low …I keep it to 
myself. Betty will tell you that, too much possibly in some 
ways. … There is only so much you can say to people because 
at the end of the day there’s too many negative thoughts going 
about.  So people haven’t been talking as much as they should 
… You coming round talking to me has made a hell of a 
difference to me, somebody else knows the problems”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
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Business owners thus shouldered a great deal of pressure upon 
themselves, and this tested relationships at home: 
 
“Its like staring redundancy in the face … Sometimes I’ll gan 
into the house and nobody will dare speak to us. I’m so wound 
up and aggressive. And you wake up through the night with 
different things. You are thinking about it all the time like. I 
mean I can cope with it, I can live with it. If I couldn’t I 
wouldn’t be here like”. 
Coach business, slightly rural 
 
5.6 Coping Capability 
 
A number of factors influence the potential coping responses which are 
available to firms and determine their ability to endure crisis. ‘Coping 
capability’ varied significantly between firms depending on a range of 
factors such as their structural characteristics, levels of debt and reserves, 
the experience and knowledge of personnel, stage in business life cycle, 
access to local support networks and the strength of the firm at the time of 
the outbreak. Similarly the potential coping strategy repertoire varied 
according to the available resources, structural characteristics, life cycle 
stage and dynamics of business households.  
 
In part the capacity of firms to cope has been shown by the experience of 
Foot and Mouth to also depend on the level of development of what can 
be termed ‘asset strategies’ (Ellis, 2000). These concern the extent to 
which a business has strategically invested effort in building natural, 
physical, human, financial or social capital in order to enhance future 
livelihood robustness and survival. The outlook of the firm’s owner 
towards both asset development and risk is also important. 
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Business assets  
 
Firms which are employers potentially had a greater range of coping 
strategies available to them, since they were able to choose to decrease 
costs by cutting back on staffing (Table 5.14). They also arguably had a 
greater need to implement strategies in order to keep a ‘bigger ship afloat’ 
and look after staff.  Thus the firms with more than one FTE (in addition 
to the owner operator) were much more likely to have reduced staff 
working hours, refrained from taking on seasonal or casual staff, 
postponed investment, changed business strategy and co-opted family 
members into working longer hours (possibly to compensate for reduced 
staff hours). For those smaller firms employing one or less than one FTE  
 
Table 5.14: Employees and coping responses adopted (rank in brackets) 
 
 
0 to 1 FTE* 
n= 35 
% firms 
More than 
one FTE * 
n= 35 
% firms 
Take smaller wage 42 (1) 39 (4) 
Increase marketing/advertising 38 (2) 26 
Cut back household spending 29 (3) 29 
Spend business reserves 29 (3) 27 
Decrease marketing/advertising 29 (3) 24 
Cancel or postpone plans to expand business 27 (4) 31 
Cancel or postpone investment 26  46 (2) 
Household members working longer hours 26 51 (1) 
Reduce staff working hours 25 43 (3) 
Spend personal savings 23 29 
Layoffs/redundancies 21 24 
Renegotiate existing loans 20 35 
Change strategy 11 20 
Not taking on seasonal/casual staff 6 26 
* in addition to owner operator 
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(including the self-employed), marketing and spending based strategies 
have dominated, with an emphasis on reduced or increased marketing, 
the spending of business reserves and cuts in household spending. Both 
size groups placed similar emphasis on a reduction of own wages, the use 
of personal and business reserves and the household spending less. The 
rank ordering of strategies is markedly different, with the exception of 
taking a smaller wage out of the business which figures highly for both 
groups. 
 
Many small rural firms are based on propertied assets: say, a hotel, a 
village shop or café, a piece of land, riding stables or a fleet of lorries or 
coaches.  The resilience of firms in the Foot and Mouth crisis varied 
considerably between those firms that fully owned such assets and those 
which were renting or in the process of buying them.  This factor is 
brought out by comparing the coping responses of firms with low fixed 
costs, with those with high fixed costs.  Impacted firms with high fixed 
costs (including, for example, rental or mortgage payments on premises, 
interest or capital repayments on a business loan, or equipment hire 
charges) had to take other measures than business-oriented ones (Table 
5.15). Such costs had to be met regardless of any fall in revenue, while 
the fall in revenue meant that there was less scope to cut costs to offset 
reduced income.  They were also less well placed to take out new loans 
because of their existing indebtedness or lack of collateral security.  
Many of these firms had therefore to go beyond the ordinary belt-
tightening or additional borrowing that other firms did, and dig much 
more into household resources, for example, through household members 
working longer hours, cut-backs in household spending, drawing on 
personal savings and a household member looking for work.  
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Table 5.15: Contrasting coping responses according to level of fixed 
costsa 
 
 Firms with 
low fixed 
costs 
% firms 
(n=27) 
Firms with 
medium/high 
fixed costs 
% firms 
(n=37) 
Household members working longer hours 19 38 
Cut back household spending 19 35 
Spend personal savings 19 30 
Not taking on seasonal/casual staff 11 24 
Household member looking for job 7 22 
Change strategy 22 11 
a - Only responses showing clear differentiation between the two groups are shown in 
the Table. 
 
The age and experience of the firm is also important in determining 
coping capability. For one pub, for example, there was a sense that the 
stability and experience of the business had been crucial. The owners 
emphasised that they had seen trade fluctuate before and survived 
downturns of various sorts. Foot and Mouth simply presented another 
type of recession to get through: 
 
“We’ve probably seen it all before anyway haven’t we, with 
different sorts of recession over the 13 years. There is always 
something which comes along, just when you think things are 
going nicely. And then whoops, it hits, and then it all picks up 
again. And then something else will come along, it always will. 
… We are quite fortunate in some respects because we have 
been here such a long time, we can probably survive. There’s a 
lot of places where they’ve may be just been in a couple of 
years, new businesses that have just started, that just won’t be 
able to survive. We have quite a good relationship with our 
bank, the brewery and people that would give us the facilities if 
we needed them”. 
Public house, remote rural 
 
A local butcher also explained how Foot and Mouth had been a small 
shock in comparison to BSE and how the firm had built up a certain 
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staying power and experience which helped it to weather incidents of this 
kind. BSE had been a key critical incident and had meant major changes 
to the business operation: 
 
“BSE was a lot worse than Foot and Mouth because that was 
literally over night … You just have to keep a level head and 
just remember that we have been here for a long time … just 
weather the storm … Every single corner we cut. Cut in wages 
obviously, cut in stock we held, lighting everything. … We 
took our van off the road and sold that … It was a very, very 
worrying time and we lost a lot of money … but most of all we 
lost our customers”. 
Butcher, slightly rural 
 
Household factors 
 
Section 5.5 highlighted the importance of the household in underpinning 
the coping responses of many micro-businesses. Falling back upon a 
household labour reserve (whether a spouse or other household members) 
was a commonly and quickly adopted strategy, while other household 
resources (notably financial reserves) were additionally called upon by 
firms facing severe or persistent difficulties.  
 
While the need to fall back on household resources varied according to 
the effects of the crisis on individual firms, the scope to do so and their 
access to such resources depended on the circumstances of individual 
households, business owners and the existing degree of segregation of 
household and business. These and other factors appear to influence the 
composition of coping responses. For example, firms adopting only 
business oriented strategies tended to have a lower level of involvement 
of spouse or partner in the firm, tended to work fewer hours and to have 
higher levels of female ownership (see Table A2.16 in Appendix 2). 
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Firms displaying both business and household strategies were less 
commonly employers, tended to work longer hours and had a higher 
propensity for spouse involvement.  Firms adopting all three strategy 
types were commonly employers, worked long hours, had high turnover 
and a high level of spouse engagement.  
 
It would seem therefore that spouse involvement in the business is central 
to or indicative of a closer interdependence between household and 
business, opening up opportunities for household based strategies. The 
tendency for household-oriented responses to be adopted where the 
business owner/manager worked long hours could similarly be 
symptomatic of a less clear division between household and business.   
 
The household income characteristics of business owners was also 
important in determining firm’s coping capability.  This relates to the 
availability of financial reserves, levels of financial security and 
alternative income sources. One impacted firm, for example, was able to 
rely on additional ‘off-business’ income provided by the spouse, which 
meant the business was able to survive and meet its loan repayments.  
Another business owner considered things would have been much worse 
if the household had not already been in a position of relative financial 
security: 
 
“I think we are lucky in as much we are at retirement age. We 
haven’t a mortgage. Our major expenses have been things in the 
past. It means this year we’ll go through the year paying our 
bills but come out at the end of the year with no profit for it”. 
Bookshop, moderately rural 
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Community factors 
 
In addition to household resources some business owners were able to 
draw upon wider support networks within the local community. It has 
already been seen how some firms’ coping responses depended on the 
ready availability of a local flexible labour resource to be drawn upon 
and released when necessary.  It is clear that many tourism, hospitality 
and recreational enterprises rely on a local reserve of casual labour.  It 
may, for example, be teenagers or women from the local village who are 
used to doing casual work when called upon, whether on weekends, or 
evenings or at the height of the season.  Some of these relationships are 
longstanding.  Local firms are able to use this flexibility not only during 
normal operations but also at times of crisis.  The ability of firms to do 
this depends upon the acceptance by the individuals concerned, and rural 
communities more generally, of such very casual and informal working 
practices. 
 
The availability of other local support networks for firms may also have 
been significant. This varies between firms depending on their degree of 
physical isolation, the availability of formal business support networks 
(which are less well developed in more remote rural areas) and in relation 
to the background and situation of the business owners themselves (for 
example, whether they are new to the area or have long established 
informal networks).  One business owner, for example, referred to offers 
of help from friends and highlighted the importance of local connections 
in coping with the crisis: 
 
“I think it affected me more than Alan. Alan is very laid back. 
… I was a bit worried. But, I don’t know whether it is a local 
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thing, but my wife is local to here and Alan is local, but they 
didn’t seem to bother, ‘Ah it will be alright’. I had a lot of 
support from family. Particularly round here people said, you 
know, if you get into trouble come and see us.”.  
Nursery gardens, moderately rural 
 
Foot and Mouth often had a profound effect on community life and in 
turn the normal functioning of businesses, support networks and coping 
responses. This was particularly the case for businesses and households 
located in the heart of farming communities where there was the added 
implications for business owners and their staff of access restrictions and 
of being in communities that felt under siege.  For some business owners 
there were strong feelings of being thrown back on themselves as social 
and community life shut down. 48% of impacted micro-businesses for 
example noted that visiting family and friends had been curtailed. 
 
“Socially I’ve made a point of not going out. I means business 
wise I’ve probably had to go here and there. But even in 
business … Socially we just haven’t been far from this house 
because of the Foot and Mouth. Because if there is restrictions 
on my lorries, I look at there should probably be restrictions on 
every kind of vehicle. … It’s made a very isolated valley, its 
made it very cold. I mean the lassey who used to deliver eggs 
on Friday to my house here, she hasn’t been since February 
because she lives on a farm. She might leave the eggs at the 
road end, but we never get to talk to her … She used to come 
into the house on a Friday night and sit and talk to us … it just 
doesn’t happen … You’re meeting friends down the road 
possibly now that you haven’t seen for 10 months and they’re 
nearly like a stranger to you … You lose touch you tend to lose 
track about what people are doing”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
 
Foot and Mouth also impinged upon established networks and support 
structures and in so doing reduced the coping capability of some firms. 
The same business owner was a key participant within a number of local 
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business clubs. Not only had the clubs not been able to meet, but the 
impact on his business had also meant that he could not play his usual 
supportive role: 
 
“I would love to spend more time doing that for the members. 
At the minute I’m letting them down because of what’s 
happened this last 10 months. My work loads that much 
increased in trying to keep the lorries running and the few I’ve 
got on the jobs I’ve got, that I would love to spend more time 
helping other members out … It just gets to the stage you’ve 
got to switch off like”. 
Timber haulier, very remote rural 
 
Some owners felt very isolated and alienated by the FMD crisis: 
 
“You know when you have a war and suddenly everyone feels 
united and friendly and even people you don’t like are your friend 
all of a sudden. I never got that feeling. I just got the feeling that 
people were keeping their heads down and hoping they were going 
to get through it. There wasn’t a Dunkirk spirit. … I think there was 
a lot of resentment of farmers. … You know we and other 
businesses were being hit by something that wasn’t anything to do 
with them, which was a farming problem. The focus of all the 
attention, all the pity and all the sorrow seemed to go on others.” 
Nursery gardens, remote rural 
 
Foot and Mouth has created significant tensions and bitterness in some 
rural communities and what was described in one case as irreparable 
damage to relationships which may have implications for future coping 
and recovery capacity: 
 
“There is no marts on so none of the farmers saw each other. 
Then the bitching started. Well, this one’s done that and that 
one’s done this. They shouldn’t be moving that and they should 
have stayed in without going to the pub. And it was just all 
sheer frustration … My Dad and his next door neighbour fell 
out. They’d worked with each other for years. And it was just 
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because one was doing things by the book and one wasn’t … It 
has wrecked not just the farming lifestyle, but the farming 
communities, the farming relationships. Silage time. One 
farmer has the round bailer, another has the square bailer, 
another has the wrapper. So they work together. That won’t 
happen anymore. None of that working together, sharing gear 
because you can’t afford to buy anything else. That won’t 
happen anymore”. 
 
In other ways, though, Foot and Mouth brought people together. When 
things were particularly bad, a Bed and Breakfast owner described 
spending a lot of time talking with a neighbouring farmer’s wife. One 
hotel owner described a sense of solidarity during the outbreak and how 
businesses were all in it together. It was described how during a cold and 
dark power cut at the height of the crisis they, the guests and some 
neighbours all sat, chatted and ate together in a single room in the hotel. 
One employee in a haulage firm described how an isolated cluster of 
farms on the side of a hill worked with and supported one another during 
the crisis. Undoubtedly, there was much mutual support between 
business owners having to tackle a common crisis, building on existing - 
but also creating new - solidarities. 
 
Asset strategies and risk aversion 
 
Asset strategies are closely related to ‘risk aversion strategies’ involving, 
for example, contingency planning or a business ‘not putting all of its 
eggs in one basket’.  Some firms, for example, have nurtured - and 
therefore during FMD were able to depend on - intrinsic strengths or 
points of stability, such as a loyal local customer base or well-established 
business relationships. During the outbreak a local butcher, for example, 
had been able to maintain supplies of meat to the business based on the 
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development of long established good relationships with supplier 
abattoirs: 
 
“Even when the Foot and Mouth came on, they did look after us 
… They look after us favourably because we don’t mess about 
with payments. … They get the money every week, I pay on 
time every time … we’ve been with them a long time. We’re 
honest with them … They probably looked at people like 
myself and thought ‘Oh, well they’re fair with us, we don’t 
have any problems, yes we can have anything we can allow, we 
can supply’, and they did, and we didn’t get let down at all. … 
We were rationed if you like on certain things. Not everything 
was in abundance and prices did fluctuate a little bit. But we 
never actually ran out of anything. And really over the summer, 
yes I did see some businesses suffer, but we ourselves never 
really did.” 
Butcher, slightly rural 
 
For other firms the development of a diverse customer base appears to 
have spread the risk of the business and to have offered a lifeline during 
the crisis. A haulage firm, for example, described how it was able to shift 
emphasis from livestock to general haulage, while a timber haulier, 
having lost its private business, was held afloat by work for the Forestry 
Commission. A coach firm explained how the business was bolstered by 
public sector trade despite the loss of its tourism-based custom. A rural 
pub had successfully reduced its dependency on a seasonal trade and had 
nurtured a loyal regional customer base. 
 
Other business owners felt restricted in their capacity to execute coping 
strategies. One shop owner whose business had experienced a downturn 
in trade argued there was little that could be done to counteract the 
reduction in business. Additional advertising, for example, was 
considered to be a wasted effort as ‘people weren’t going to come 
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anyway’. Another business owner similarly explained his own inability to 
consider alternative options:  
 
“Nothing we can do. What do you do? You can’t go physically 
pulling people off. Your business is so much in the hands of 
other people. Its like if a colliery closes down and somebody is 
making machinery for that particular pit. What can they do? 
They cannit make that prop or that machinery for a quarry or 
summit. Its specifically designed. And we were well geared up 
towards the countryside sort of trips … I’m not that business 
oriented. I’ve tried, I’m basically a bus driver, I’m a hands on 
bloke”. 
Coach firm, slightly rural 
 
Yet another business owner explained that they had unsuccessfully tried 
to sell some of their capital assets and rationalise their business. 
 
Coping responses of farms and firms compared 
 
Table 5.16 compares the coping responses to the FMD crisis of the 
surveyed farms and micro-businesses.  The ‘Farms’ column refers to the 
livestock holdings, all of which suffered movement restrictions whether 
or not they were culled out.  The ‘Firms’ column is based on those micro-
businesses surveyed that were negatively affected, including low, 
medium and high impact firms. 
 
There are a few striking similarities.  The most prevalent response for 
farms and firms was household members working longer hours.  Other 
prevalent responses for both groups were cancellation or postponement of 
investment and cutting back household spending. But here the similarities 
end.  The crisis induced a much greater volume of responses amongst 
impacted micro-businesses than amongst farms, including responses that 
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few if any farms were considering.  For example, a lot fewer farms had to 
cancel or postpone investment, cut-back household spending, or spend 
personal savings.  This suggests that most had not faced the cash-flow 
and liquidity problems that impelled many firms additionally to 
renegotiate or take out loans – steps which very few farms had had to 
take.  Likewise, the farms had had little recourse to layoffs or reductions 
in staff working hours. 
 
Table 5.16: Coping responses of farms and firms to FMD crisis 
 
Coping responses Farms (predominantly 
livestock) 
(% taking action) 
(n=62) 
Firms (impacted 
micro-businesses) 
(% taking action) 
(n=72) 
Household members working 
longer hours 
27 40 
Cancel or postpone investment 
 
21 36 
Reduce staff working hours 
 
3 35 
Increase marketing 
 
3 32 
Cut back household spending 
 
19 30 
Cancel or postpone plans to 
expand 
0 29 
Renegotiate existing loans 
 
5 27 
Spend personal savings 
 
13 26 
Take out new loan 
 
2 21 
Layoffs/redundancies 
 
3 21 
Not taking on seasonal/casual 
labour 
25 17 
N.B. Includes responses tried.  The firms are the micro-businesses in the November 
survey that had been negatively affected by the FMD crisis. 
 
There are a number of possible explanations as to why the farms 
exhibited financial distress and crisis responses to such a lesser degree, 
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despite broadly comparable shortfalls in income31. Most of the firms – 
especially in the hospitality and retail sectors – rely on day to day 
earnings.  Farms do not, and are therefore much less vulnerable to a 
sudden cash flow crisis if trade slumps in the short term.  Both surveys, 
though, were done in the autumn when firms had weathered the 
temporary troughs in trade that occurred early in the crisis and the farms 
had lost the opportunity of both spring and summer sales. For some of the 
firms suffering induced or indirect effects down business chains, the more 
prolonged the crisis the more acute their specific difficulties became as 
farms and tourism/leisure businesses continued to tighten their belts. 
 
A second point is that most of the farms are likely to have had much 
greater experience of coping with crises than most of the firms.  The BSE 
crisis severely hit the livestock sector in the North East of England, and 
that was simply the most recent in a succession of farming and food 
crises.  Of course, not all farm businesses survived each of these crises, 
but those that did have clearly got considerable resilience. 
 
That resilience derives in part from two factors.  Firstly, farm families 
have usually very well developed strategies for the accumulation and 
conservation of family business assets.  Secondly, farmers can face these 
crises with a degree of confidence that government will come to their aid. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Superficially, at least, the mean shortfalls of impacted firms and farms were broadly comparable, 
averaging £16,000 for surveyed firms and £18,000 for livestock farms not culled out. 
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5.7 Lasting Effects, Recovery and the Future 
 
Recovery 
 
Foot and Mouth continued to have a significant effect on businesses late 
into 2001. Many businesses were hoping for a good Christmas and 2002 
to help them to recover. Although for the majority of impacted firms 
impact had shown signs of subsiding, for 40% of them impact was still 
not subsiding in November. For a number of firms it was considered that 
it would take some years for full recovery.  
 
Recovery and the future impacts of FMD are likely to vary with different 
sectors. Hospitality firms, for example, have potential to bounce back 
relatively quickly in comparison to agricultural support firms which will 
be influenced by ongoing agricultural restructuring and the after effects 
of FMD for farming. A livestock haulier, for example, was particularly 
concerned over the situation in 2002 given the now reduced numbers of 
livestock: 
 
“Nobody knows what’s going to happen. ... You’re just living 
day by day really. Where is the stock coming from? There 
won’t be any, will there? There is that many going on the 
welfare. … Foot and Mouth will have cleared out 50% of our 
customers by dangerous contacts or infected premises”. 
 
Of the negatively affected firms 20% reported in November that they had 
already recovered and there were unlikely to be any other long term 
repercussions of FMD. 16% thought it would take up to 6 months to 
recover, suggesting recovery by spring 2002. 19% expected recovery in 6 
to 12 months and a further 22% thought it would take between 1 and 2 
years. 8% thought it would take longer than 2 years and saw a long haul 
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ahead. This group included a scattering of businesses with direct or 
indirect links to farming or tourism including, for example, a public 
house, coach firm, caravan park, pottery manufacturer, timber haulier, 
agricultural engineer, farm shop supplier and accountant (serving farms). 
 
Future implications 
 
The impacts of Foot and Mouth have several implications for the future 
operation of businesses. Most impacted businesses considered they 
would not recover the losses incurred because of FMD. Instead the 
immediate legacy for many will relate to additional debt, reduced 
investment capability in 2002 and disrupted trade and investment cycles. 
18% of impacted firms considered they would be paying off additional 
debts, whilst 40% would be looking to cut costs as a result of FMD. As 
we have seen, a quarter of impacted firms expected that, end of the year, 
their position would have been shifted from profit to loss as a 
consequence of the Foot and Mouth crisis (see Section 4.7).  As a 
consequence, several businesses were now in an unusual position 
regarding debt: such as having to use an overdraft facility for the first 
time; or having had to take out a loan; or remaining in the red at the end 
of the month rather than fluctuating in and out as would be usual.  
 
A third of firms had cancelled or postponed investment, and many more 
faced a backlog of maintenance, repairs and refurbishment work but were 
still strapped for cash to do what was needed.  Several businesses, 
especially tourism related ones, referred to a reduced marketing budget 
for 2002 and of having been unable to build up marketing reserves. 
 
 “It will take all next year to get back up … It might get back to 
normal next year takings wise but there will still be the shortfall 
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from this year. So it will probably take another year on top of 
that to get back to where we were at the start of this year. And 
all the plans being set back”. 
Public house, remote rural 
 
“I think they could give more money to the tourist boards so 
that for our advertising next year we will have less to pay. I 
don’t know how we are going to cope with that. I pay £1000 in 
advertising a year. I’ve already paid that out for this year and 
I’m not going to get that back. I am not going to have any 
money to advertise with next year. … We need reductions in 
things like being a member of the tourist board. We will still be 
expected to pay our full membership next year and pay to 
advertise and inspections, the full whack, but I don’t know 
where we are going to get the money from”. 
Bed and Breakfast, remote rural 
 
“That money is lost. We have to write it off, forget it. And that 
is the money that probably you would use to plough back into 
the business in the winter. So there won’t be that much work 
being done. There won’t be money ploughed back into the 
business because there has been nothing to plough back in … 
People won’t starve and they might not have a holiday. They’ll 
keep going.” 
Hotel, very remote rural 
 
“I’m sincerely hoping I’ll start to pull it back running up to 
Christmas a little bit. … I don’t think we’ll ever recover the 
losses. They are lost, they’ve gone. All we’ve got to hope is that 
it doesn’t happen again and if it does that at least they handle it 
differently this time … Give us another 12 months … about 12 
months, hopefully. You don’t know what we’ve got in for this 
winter. It depends how well we do for the rest of the year. If 
that’s the case then we get back on our feet. If not we’ll struggle 
on with an overdraft facility a little bit longer”. 
Specialist retailer, moderately rural 
 
A timber haulier was expecting 10 months before ‘things got back to 
reality’ in terms of access arrangements to customers in the countryside. 
He felt Foot and Mouth had knocked the business back by 5 years in 
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terms of its plans and investment and considered that it may never 
recover. In the foreseeable future he envisaged he would be having to pay 
off additional debts and reduce costs. This will include consideration of 
laying off staff, altering the strategy or course of the business 
(diversifying the business) and trimming down the size of the business. In 
the immediate term he felt the need for restraint in terms of the pace of 
recovery and the speed at which the business regains its momentum and 
normal operation. 
 
“[I] have a conscience. I’m trying to do my bit and people have 
appreciated that. … I’m trying to be that damn careful. 
Although life’s got to go on you’ve got to do your bit. Most 
people have done that, but they’ve been very isolated in doing 
that!” 
 
“That’s not to say in some cases I couldn’t put nightshift back 
on. But I know for a fact there is a little bit of, not ill-feeling, 
but do we really need lorries running about in the woods at the 
minute because of the Foot and Mouth”. 
 
Other businesses were thinking about more positive steps in light of Foot 
and Mouth. Some for example will be considering market expansion and 
a substantial proportion of firms will be thinking about changing business 
strategy (Table 5.17). 
 
Table 5.17: Actions impacted firms expect to take in 2002 as a result of 
FMD 
 
Action % Firms (n=78) 
Reduce costs 40 
Consider new products/markets 38 
Increase advertising 30 
Change strategy 27 
Pay off debts 18 
Reduce product range 8 
Layoff staff 7 
Close the business 5 
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What is clear is that many coping strategies were expended during 2001. 
The use of coping strategies, notably recourse to financial aid or use of 
personal or business reserves, does suggest a more precarious or less 
stable position for some impacted businesses at the end of 2001 compared 
to the situation prior to FMD, as many have utilised reserves, reduced 
investment, used up lending capacity and increased their levels of debt 
(Boxes 5.3 and 5.4). They would therefore be less well placed to cope 
with additional shocks to the business. Such a position is unlikely to be 
sustainable in the event that trade fails to improve. Some business owners 
have dipped into personal reserves as far as they are able or willing to do 
so. 
 
Box 5.3 
Coach company, slightly rural 
A large part of the business’s market was based on countryside pursuits, 
walkers and ramblers. Throughout the Spring and Summer there was a major 
reduction in enquiries and numerous cancellations of countryside events and 
day trips, including one major job at the outset of the outbreak. The firm also 
experienced additional costs and delays relating to disinfection of vehicles. 
The owner estimates an annual turnover loss of £20,000 in what he describes 
as his hardest year in business. The business is not expecting to make a profit 
and has been unable to build up reserves to take forward to the following year 
– instead it carries forward a substantial level of debt. Throughout the year the 
firm was able to hold on to its public sector trade which has been important in 
keeping the business afloat. 
 
 “Debt is coming out of the future profits. It’s wrong because if I shoot an 
engine I’ve like used all my borrowing capacity. I divent carry, my business 
can’t stand £8,000 for an engine. I’ve gotta gan to the bank for it and its topped 
up by all this. You are living on a knife edge, yah just living on a knife edge. 
… I’ve seriously considered packing up … but sometimes your debts … 
sometimes its as hard to pack up as it is to start-up”. 
The business owner estimates 3-5 years to recover from the year 2001 and in 
order to pay off the overdraft.  Once the business pulls through this period the 
intention is to sell the business. 
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Box 5.4 
Rural recreation business, very remote rural 
Visitor numbers to this rural pursuits centre plummeted at the outset of the 
FMD outbreak and, with the exception of a good Easter Holiday, continued to 
be poor throughout the Summer and into October:  
 
“Once the Easter holidays ended it was a ghost town. Schools were 
cancelling … on a daily basis. … Bookings which you would normally 
wait for to come in - that we do on a yearly basis - just never heard from 
them”.  
 
The business saw multiple cancellations, a major reduction in group bookings 
and courses and a 70% reduction in external visits and events. Given 
reductions in costs and some external financial support, the final financial 
position for the year 2001 is estimated to be relatively similar to the previous 
year, but this falls considerably short of the very good year predicted for 2001, 
and is insufficient to meet payments on a bank overdraft. The business thus 
faces deepening debt:  
 
“We should be going up and up and up to be honest with you. Obviously the 
more people that know us, obviously the more people we should be getting … 
But you know yourself that doesn’t satisfy the bank. The bank are not 
sympathetic, they’re not. All the banks are interested in is when’s the overdraft 
going to be paid off? … Normally the overdraft would have been down to, let’s 
say, £4,000 in July. It was still £7,500 - that’s July, my peak season”. 
 
The owner was unable to contemplate the future prospects of the business 
given a sense of uncertainty and fear that the effects of FMD on visitor 
numbers would persist into 2002. 
 
 
Uncertainty and strain 
 
For many of the most heavily impacted businesses focusing on the future 
was often very stressful and emotional. Some business owners drew 
attention to significant strain surrounding uncertainty about the future of 
the business, the spread of the disease, issues of continuity and 
succession and the prospects of major lifestyle changes should their 
businesses not recover from the effects of Foot and Mouth and they be 
forced to do something else. One business owner, having always lived in 
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the area, was particularly frightened at the prospect of going out of 
business given a lack of alternative job opportunities locally. He 
expressed concern about the future opportunities for his son in the 
business, arguing from this perspective that there was more at stake. 
Another found the future particularly difficult to contemplate. On the one 
hand he was racked with fear that the effects of FMD on visitor numbers 
would persist into 2002, citing a persisting perception among the general 
public that the countryside was closed. On the other hand there was 
uncertainty and he felt unable to think about the future development of 
the business. The business owner grasped at the hope that the number of 
new FMD cases had now finally subsided: 
 
“Its been devastating, really been devastating. But what will 
happen next year? … My honest opinion is that this is just not 
going to end this year. Honestly I think its going to be a knock 
on for next year and this is what’s worrying. … I mean lets 
hope next year all the visitors that were due to visit here, erm 
this year, may come next year. Lets hope we [Pause]. We just 
hope, we hope [Tears].” 
Recreation business, very remote rural 
 
Another was considering the possibility of having to find a job and of 
being in ‘somebody else’s bottle’ again after having being self employed. 
Linked to this were emotions surrounding what was described as the slow 
death of the business. He described losing his energy and enthusiasm for 
the work, and was resigned to closing the business. 
  
“My working week is, that’s a strain. I’ve forgotten what 
weekends are … I’m tired. But it’s like when you’re bailing 
out. That’s really what I’m doing. I’m bailing out most of the 
time. Stop it sinking, keep it afloat long enough to be able to 
beach it. … The main emotional thing is that I still actually am, 
still involved emotionally, still retaining the hope against hope 
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that somehow it might come back because I would like to carry 
on doing it. … I believe what I am doing is trying to manage 
the run down and closure of the business. I’ve got 18 months to 
run on the bank loan. I need to reach the point when we can 
end, close the door without owing money to anybody …”. 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 
Foot and Mouth disease revealed much about the nature of rural micro-
businesses and their coping responses during crisis. A diversity of 
strategies were adopted, often very quickly, demonstrating the 
adaptability and resilience of this core component of the rural economy. 
The most common responses were for household members to work longer 
hours, owners to take a smaller wage from the business, the cancellation 
or postponement of investment and a reduction in staff working hours. 
Responses also varied over time and with the severity of impact. Larger 
numbers of high impact firms adopted coping strategies and some were 
largely particular to these firms as they were forced to dig deep to 
maintain the business.  
 
Coping responses were multi-faceted involving combinations of business, 
household and employment oriented strategies. Core business-oriented 
responses involved cost cutting, the arresting of investment plans and 
alterations to business and financial strategy. Recourse to external help 
and advice was also important. A shift in the balance from informal to 
more formal forms of support occurred as the crisis progressed, with local 
authorities and Business Link being the most commonly utilised formal 
sources of help. Informal contact with other business owners was often an 
important source of help. 
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Although FMD raised the profile of Business Link and extended its client 
base, during the outbreak many business owners, including those in high 
impact firms, were disinclined to approach it for external assistance and 
support.  The reasons relate to the structure, resources and culture of 
small businesses themselves but also ongoing scepticism concerning the 
value and relevance of business support.  
 
Take-up of business recovery measures varied with individual schemes. 
Rate relief, business recovery grants and the deferral of tax payments 
were more popular than business rate deferral, business rate appeal and 
the Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme. However, most impacted firms 
in the survey had not obtained grants through the region’s Business 
Recovery Fund and turned instead to conventional forms of financial 
support. Some had aborted their efforts to obtain business recovery aid, 
some found that the funding had run out, while others were critically 
ineligible for support due to EU state aid rules. 
 
For those micro-businesses with employees, employment oriented coping 
responses were important. Some employment responses (such as layoffs 
and the decision not to take on casual or seasonal staff) were adopted 
surprisingly early in the outbreak. Thus 29% of impacted firms with 
employees resorted to layoffs, 24% did not take on seasonal or casual 
staff and 42% reduced staff hours. As businesses were progressively 
squeezed over time more and more firms reduced staff working hours. 
Businesses were commonly reluctant to lay off core staff and in some 
cases employees were carried and underemployed by firms or employed 
on a more flexible basis.  
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Many micro-businesses drew on family and household resources and 
flexibilities to cope with the crisis and its aftermath, further 
demonstrating the importance of households in providing small firm 
resilience and the way in which households and businesses are often 
intricately linked. Households often absorbed revenue and employment 
effects and acted as a buffer for businesses. They commonly acted as a 
flexible labour reserve with household members either being 
underemployed or over-stretched depending on circumstances. 
Household coping responses, which were most prevalent amongst high 
impact firms, also drew upon to the spending, earning and saving 
capacities of households.  In consequence, business owners and 
household members were exposed to considerable pressures, placing a 
strain on individuals and relationships. 
 
Some impacted businesses were better placed than others to cope and 
respond during the outbreak. Several factors influenced the coping 
capability of impacted firms and the choice of coping responses available 
to them: such as whether or not they had employees, the level of fixed 
costs, access to support networks and flexible labour, and the age and 
experience of the business and its owner(s). There is also evidence that 
some businesses had been more proactive prior to FMD in developing 
asset and risk aversion strategies which proved significant in helping 
them to weather the crisis.  
 
Finally, the impacts of FMD extended late into 2001 for many of the 
impacted businesses. Although for a significant proportion impact had 
declined or was declining by November, for two fifths it remained 
persistent, in part as result of the late outbreaks of the disease in the 
region. This adds further justification to the decision taken late in 2001 to 
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extend business recovery funds. The research would suggest, however, 
that the issue of business recovery remains an important consideration in 
2002 and beyond.  
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6 CONSUMER ATTITUDES 
Angela Tregear, Johanne Allinson and Charlotte Weatherell 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This section reports on research on consumer perceptions and behaviour 
in the wake of FMD in the region.  If consumer purchasing power is to be 
harnessed in order to generate socio-economic recovery in rural areas, 
then consumers themselves have to be willing to prioritise certain issues 
relating to food, and to differentiate local products positively.  The extent 
to which consumers in the North East are willing to do either of these is 
unknown.  Thus the key questions addressed by this study were: 
 
• what issues are of importance to consumers when purchasing and 
consuming food (in particular, to what extent are consumers aware 
of and concerned about social, economic and environmental issues 
relating to food and the countryside)? 
 
• what is the nature of consumers’ actual choices and behaviour 
when purchasing and consuming food (in particular, what types of 
food products and distribution channels are habitually used? 
 
• what are consumer perceptions of the FMD outbreak in the region, 
and how has this affected perceptions and habits relating to food? 
 
• how do consumers feel they would respond to increased marketing 
initiatives for local food, and what is their view of the 
government’s support of these? 
 
The study adopted a qualitative methodology, using four focus groups.  
The profiles of individuals within each group were broadly similar, to 
encourage free discussion (See Table 6.1).  However, the overall profiles 
of the groups themselves were varied according to the key variables of 
age, socio-economic classification and geographic residency (urban vs. 
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rural).  This allowed for a fairly wide range of opinions to be gathered, 
whilst also allowing for relationships between opinion and consumer type 
to emerge.   
 
Table 6.1: Focus group profiles 
 Location Date Age Socio-
econ 
Residency Gender 
Group 1 Alnwick 7/11/01 35-44 ABC1 Rural Mixed 
Group 2 Morpeth 8/11/01 25-45 ABC1 Rural Mixed 
Group 3 Newcastle 12/11/01 18-24 AB Urban Mixed 
Group 4 Newcastle 13/11/01 25-34 BC1 Urban Mixed 
 
It was important in this study that participants gave spontaneous views 
regarding what they found of concern to them when purchasing and 
consuming food.  Perceptions of FMD could then be placed within this 
context to obtain a more accurate reflection of the importance and impact 
of this crisis.  Thus, the discussions began with treatment of general 
concerns and interests and everyday habits regarding food.  Following 
this, FMD was explicitly introduced into the discussions. [A copy of the 
complete discussion guide is given in Appendix 3]. 
 
6.2 Issues of Interest and Concern when Choosing Food 
 
All of the focus group discussions opened with the question of what 
participants found important to them when choosing or shopping for 
food.  Common spontaneous responses were quality and price, with other 
factors such as freshness, taste, appearance and value for money also 
being mentioned in most groups.  In terms of price, participants in most 
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groups spoke of going for moderately priced, rather than lowest priced 
options.  
 
In discussing factors further, differences began to emerge between the 
perceptions of urban and rural groups.  In relation to judgements of 
product quality, for example, rural participants spoke of judging quality 
on a product by product basis, trying various outlets in search of value for 
money.  For urban participants, however, it seemed that quality was often 
judged by brand names, with frequent expressions of strong preferences 
and trust for major brands.  Other factors and concerns which urban 
participants highlighted in their discussions were sugar, fat and calorie 
content, quantities available (for example, small quantities for single 
people), and ease of preparation.  The attitude of Group 3 (Newcastle) 
was that food preparation should take as little time as possible.  
 
The range of additional concerns expressed by rural participants was 
quite different  and oriented towards wider agrifood supply chain issues 
such as local availability, range, additives, pesticides, animal welfare, 
genetically modified food, and mechanically recovered meat.  Not only 
were these mentioned, but rural participants also tended to be very 
forthcoming in discussion and gave the impression of heightened 
awareness and knowledge.  This is illustrated by the way in which the 
issue of the origin of foods was discussed, where marked differences 
were revealed between the urban and rural groups.  In Group 3 
(Newcastle), the participants admitted relative ignorance and apathy 
regarding the wider issues of agriculture and the countryside, borne by a 
perception of distance.  One individual expressed the opinion: “If you’re 
not a farmer you don’t care.”   It was not a major concern for these 
participants to know where foods were sourced. In contrast, many of the 
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rural participants had family and friends in farming and the food industry.  
As a result, they demonstrated a greater interest in supporting the farming 
industry and local economy: 
 
“you feel as if you’re supporting your own people and you’re 
not helping the southerners get rich and you’re keeping 
employment in the area” 
Group 1 (Alnwick) 
 
On the subject of organic food, however, opinions were less clearly 
divided on urban/rural lines.  Although Group 3 (Newcastle) showed 
little interest in organic food at all, at least some participants from the 
other three groups reported positive experiences regarding taste and value 
for money: 
 
“I cooked an organic chicken... It was £2.20 more than a normal 
one but I got twice as much meat off it.” 
Group 2 (Morpeth) 
 
“I’ve had organic mushrooms and I think they taste like fresh 
from the field” 
Group 4 (Newcastle) 
 
Similarly, at least some participants from all groups spoke of buying 
local free range eggs, and associated them not only with improved animal 
welfare, but also with better taste, appearance and freshness, and with the 
local community:   
 
“I buy my eggs from a local old lady who’s got a farm” 
Group 3 (Newcastle) 
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“I think eggs look nice when they’ve still got the little fluffy 
things from the chickens.  That appeals... Because they look 
fresh” 
Group 4 (Newcastle) 
 
Nevertheless, other participants were critical of the appearance and 
doubtful of the benefits of organic food, and the majority of participants 
across all four groups agreed that it is too expensive.  In both urban and 
rural groups there was also a degree of scepticism over products claiming 
to be welfare friendly.   
 
Amongst all participants, discussion of meat and meat products revealed 
a slightly different set of concerns and priorities, focusing more on issues 
of safety, quality and hygiene.  However the strategies that participants 
adopted as a result seemed to differ.  For urban participants, pre-packed 
formats and sell-by dates gave reassurance, particularly for those not 
confident with their food handling and cooking abilities: 
 
“I always feel a lot more confident buying meat pre-packed 
with a date on, so I know exactly when it’s got to be eaten.” 
Group 4 (Newcastle) 
 
“I only buy cooked meat .... I get a bit worried in case I poison 
myself” 
Group 3 (Newcastle) 
 
In general for urban participants, pre-packed meat was associated with 
better hygiene, and was also preferred by some because of a squeamish 
attitude towards whole, fresh meat joints.  For rural participants, better 
quality was more associated with ‘proper’ butchers, and squeamishness 
also was less of an issue, with a number of them speaking of buying 
whole or half sheep or pigs direct from the farm ‘for the freezer’.  In 
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general, rural participants were more concerned by pesticides and 
additives. This was in contrast to urban participants, who seemed to rate 
such concerns lower on their list of priorities.   
 
6.3 Active Shopping and Purchasing Habits for Food 
 
The focus group participants were then asked to talk about their actual 
food choice and purchasing behaviour.  The key finding here was that all 
of the participants did most of their food shopping in supermarkets, with 
the majority appearing to make almost exclusive use of these outlets.  
Convenience was the most common reason given for this, due to busy 
lifestyles: 
 
“the supermarket is far easier if you work full time.” 
Group 2 (Morpeth) 
 
“if you’re busy you just want to go to one place and get 
everything all together” 
Group 4 (Newcastle) 
 
Convenience was also one of the reasons that many participants shopped 
in bulk. Rural participants in particular spoke of travelling to do a major 
bulk shop, at perceived ‘best value’ urban-based supermarkets, which 
were seen to offer lower  prices compared to local smaller supermarkets.  
Supermarkets were also associated with advantages of flexible opening 
hours and availability of non-food items.  
 
On the subject of local shops, some of the urban participants and most of 
the rural participants perceived smaller local shops as providing both 
fresher food and potentially better value for money, but used them less 
often than they might through lack of time.  Nevertheless, a few of the 
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participants (who were either single or not working full time) managed to 
shop on a daily basis for fresh food.  A small number of urban 
participants, and several of the rural participants also found time to shop 
in markets and local shops occasionally, or on a regular basis for certain 
products, mainly fruit, vegetables and meat.  
 
While urban participants were generally more confident of food 
standards in supermarkets, rural participants tended to trust local shops 
more: 
 
“you tend to be more safe with supermarkets because it’s more 
regulated.” 
Group 4 (Newcastle) 
 
“I would prefer to shop in little butchers etc. because I trust 
them a lot more.” 
Group 2 (Morpeth) 
 
Furthermore, participants in the rural groups had far more experience of 
buying from local suppliers, including butchers, fishmongers, vegetables 
from the roadside, meat direct from the farmer, and pick-your-own fruit.  
These outlets had the perceived advantages of social interaction and also 
freshness and quality, particularly useful when buying food for special 
occasions:   
 
“I was at the farm last week for cabbages... He said we could 
cut our own...You can’t beat that for freshness!” 
 
“there’s a fairly decent butchers in Alnwick where we’ll treat 
ourselves” 
Group 1 (Alnwick) 
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On the subject of farmers’ markets, rural participants tended to be aware 
of these outlets and expressed approval of them in principle, however in 
practice found them to be too expensive for regular shopping: 
 
“I tried the farm markets, because of concern to where its come 
from and how its been farmed, those sorts of issues, but the 
prices were too high, double the price... fair enough if you are 
buying it for a gift” 
Group 2 (Morpeth) 
 
Problems of the infrequent timing of markets was also mentioned as a 
dissuasive factor in the rural groups.  Some participants also felt that the 
farmers’ markets in their local areas were not ‘proper’ as they included 
regular traders and some heavily packaged items, rather than basic raw 
produce sold direct from the primary producer.  Amongst the urban 
participants meanwhile, farmers’ markets were almost unheard of.  When 
the concept was explained to Group 3 (Newcastle), it was dismissed by 
some individuals as antiquated and inconvenient, and concerns were 
expressed about hygiene standards. 
 
6.4   Perceptions of FMD 
 
Following discussion of participants’ current concerns and habits relating 
to food, the topic of Foot and Mouth disease was broached explicitly.  
FMD was mentioned spontaneously in two of the groups during opening 
discussion of issues of importance when buying food. For example, a 
participant in Group 4 (Newcastle) described how he had stopped eating 
steak in reaction to the eradication measures: 
 
“It was the smell. There were two or three pyres where I live, 
and whichever direction the wind was blowing, you always got 
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the smell, and … whenever you smelt meat, or just the thought 
of it! … I mean, I love steak pies, and having to eat a steak pie 
after driving through the [pyre fumes] … was just sickening … 
Not because I’m … [fussy]… I’ll eat anything. But, it was just 
the smell [and] the thought of those cattle. And, of course, 
when you get in from work ... [and] put on the news… what do 
you see? Funeral pyres, legs sticking out of fires… it’s terrible, 
absolutely terrible. So, that stopped me eating [steak]… for a 
couple of months.” 
(Group 4, Newcastle) 
 
In addition, one of the participants in Group 1 (Alnwick) spoke of a 
relative who had ‘panic’ bought meat due to fear of the price increasing 
rapidly and excessively in the wake of the crisis.  ‘Other’ consumers 
(although not the participants themselves) were also perceived to have 
been scared off eating meat.  For the majority of group participants, 
however, it was still felt that BSE in 1996 had affected their meat 
consumption and buying habits more as it was understood to affect 
humans. 
 
Following reflections on the impact of FMD on their own food 
behaviour, discussions tended to turn quickly and more extensively 
towards reasons for, and the government handling of, the outbreak.  This 
was particularly so in the rural groups, who tended to take an ‘agrifood 
supply chain’ perspective.  Thus in Group 1 (Alnwick), it was put 
forward that FMD was the result of mismanagement of hygiene on farms 
and the persistent use of low cost inputs within the UK agrifood system, 
whilst in Group 2 (Morpeth) the centralised UK abattoir system was seen 
to be at fault, as was the tendency of consumers to avoid buying red meat 
post-BSE.  To avoid a recurrence, it was felt that more vigilant regulation 
of farm inputs was needed.  These sophisticated and in-depth views 
 140 
contrasted markedly with those of the urban participants, some of whom 
demonstrated a degree of indifference about the cause of the outbreak: 
 
“You’re not bothered. You couldn’t care less as long as the 
meat’s there on the shelf when you go to the supermarket. . . It 
hasn’t changed people’s lives, normal people . . . [But] 
probably if you took this questionnaire into [a rural area in the 
north west] you’d get different answers because they’re more 
educated about it . . . They need to be. We don’t need to be. 
We’re in a city…” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
Urban participants also took a more fatalistic and cynical approach to the 
issue of prevention, arguing that even if the cause of the epidemic was 
identified, for example as a result of a public inquiry, the results would 
not be made publicly available. Where both rural and urban groups did 
concur was in criticism of the handling of the crisis. The government was 
criticised for indecision, not learning from the last outbreak, poor 
communication to the public, and wasteful use of resources in fighting 
the disease: 
 
“… they started the pyres straight away, and then it was ‘now 
vaccination is better, or you’ve got to burn every one’… They 
basically didn’t know what they were doing…” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
“I don’t know how it has taken so long to get in control. When 
we had Foot and Mouth the last time [in Britain], we didn’t 
have any of the knowledge that we are supposed to have these 
days!” 
(Group 2, Morpeth) 
 
“They didn’t seem to educate the public. . . they didn’t tell 
people what they were doing before they did it. . . At the time, 
straight away, I know everyone thought let’s not buy meat, and 
that’s what a lot of people did, and meat sales went down . . . 
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Humans cannot actually catch it . . . [but] the news never 
actually told anybody anything really…” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
“It wasn’t just the compensation for the animals! It was the 
excessive bills they were charging and claiming for disinfecting 
the farms afterwards. And, since that was cut back . . . [FMD] 
seems to have stopped in it’s tracks!… 
        (Group 1, Alnwick) 
 
In considering media coverage of the epidemic, the majority of 
reflections from both urban and rural groups were that it had been 
ineffective, overly negative and, in most respects, biased: 
 
“It was a bit propaganda-ish I thought… 
 
It’s just panic stations as soon as anything comes out…” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
 “It was all condemning. It was all about that [FMD] was from 
up here and it was [that farmer’s] fault. There was nobody 
saying, we want to help and we’ll do what we can, it was all 
bad publicity…” 
(Group 1, Alnwick) 
 
As they discussed the FMD outbreak, participants were also forthcoming 
on their perceptions of farmers and farming.  This gave rise to some 
interesting debates and alternative points of view, expressed in both the 
urban and rural groups.  For example, participants in all groups were 
divided over the level of compensation received by farmers: 
 
“You get an image of farmers …I know there’s a bad press . . . 
and some farmers are making the most it . . .But there are some 
images on TV . . . of some genuine farmers who looked after 
their animals and they’ve been killed…” 
(Group 1, Alnwick) 
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“It is the farmers I feel sorry for… 
 
…[But] they are being compensated 3 or 4 times more [than a 
lamb would achieve at market]… 
 
…They have been well compensated, but it has take their 
livelihood away… 
 
[But] can you imagine this [has been] going on a year now… 
[So, ultimately] you’re talking about 18 months without any 
money… 
 
None of the farmers [I had conversations with] were 
particularly upset about it. The compensation package was 
more than adequate to the people I spoke to!” 
(Group 2, Morpeth) 
 
In a number of instances, participants expressed their sympathy with 
farmers by relating to their position on a human, personal level, even 
when they themselves were urban-based and therefore removed from the 
situation.  In these instances, it seemed that media coverage was used as 
the source of information: 
 
“I think it’s the farmers you feel for as well, because … I’ve got 
a family and you think of [them]… their fathers and their 
fathers before them have given them this farm, and they feel as 
if they’ve let them down because of something that they 
couldn’t control. It just overtook them… They probably lost 
everything through it...” 
 
“I’ve seen men on the TV really weep, saying that their dad had 
given them this farm and it was their Grandad’s farm… [And] 
they’ve had to let it all go. You just feel really sorry for them… 
it’s passed down through generations and then it’s just all gone 
because of one thing, within a matter of a week. They’ve been 
tested on a Monday and everything’s gone by the Friday. That’s 
it! Their livelihood gone, and they don’t know any other[trade] 
usually…[So] I felt sorry for the families and the farmers…” 
(Group 4, Newcastle) 
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Thus, there was general concern about the extent and scale of the impact 
on farmers as individuals, their families and the status of the inherited 
family business.  
 
Such sympathies expressed at a human level were balanced with 
comments taken from a broader, economic perspective.  For example in 
Group 3 (Newcastle), there was concern that farming in general is overly 
subsidised, and that FMD-related compensation had been generous, 
which some unscrupulous farmers had taken cynical advantage of: 
  
“All the farmers were going on about it, but if the market value 
was. . . £9 for something, then when Foot and Mouth came 
about it went down to £3… [They say] ‘I’ve got Foot and 
Mouth on my farm!’ straightaway [to get the compensation], 
you know!?” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
Participants in both groups felt that the farming community had been 
over compensated relative to other business sectors, in particular tourism:  
 
“[The problem is with] the people who wouldn’t get subsidised, 
like the bed and breakfasts, for instance… the hotels. Do you 
think they [got compensation equal to] a night’s stay for six 
weeks for every room they had? I wouldn’t have thought so! 
 
… [farmers] can live comfortably for the rest of their lives on 
what they’ve been given, and anybody else would go into 
liquidation . . . and get nothing.” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
Thus, while participants in all groups showed general sympathy with the 
predicament of individual farmers, they were also ready to point out more 
deep-seated problems with the agricultural sector, and the specific 
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injustices and inequities which had arisen from the FMD control 
campaign.   
 
Participants were also asked about the extent to which FMD had 
impacted on them personally in their own lives, as well as their views on 
what impact FMD had had on general perceptions of the North East.  
With respect to the former issue, it has already been highlighted that the 
majority of participants felt FMD had not changed their food behaviour 
and habits.  Rather, impacts from FMD were perceived more in terms of 
restricted access to the countryside, and taking alternative choices for 
holiday destinations.  The theme of urban consumers being ‘distanced’ 
from the effects of FMD was reinforced here, with many participants in 
these groups unable to think of any specific impacts at all.  On the issue 
of the impact of FMD on general perceptions of the North East, a few 
views were expressed that people outside the region might have switched 
consumption patterns, and that they themselves might have done the 
same in those circumstances.  However, the general response from all 
groups was that the coverage of the outbreak had probably not affected 
perceptions of the North East outside the region, with  some participants 
suggesting that  negative stereotypes of the area were already firmly 
entrenched: 
 
“I think the North East has got a bad image full stop [in] the rest 
of the country. Everyone thinks Geordies are stupid basically!.. 
 
Whenever you see anyone [from the North East] on the telly, it’s 
just a daft Geordie basically, isn’t it? So, everyone thinks 
everyone’s stupid here… 
 
That’s so right… 
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So, I mean, [FMD is] not going to change the South’s 
perceptions of the North. That’s the way it is.” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
Indeed, discussion of this issue seemed to give rise to expressions of 
belief and confidence in local and, more generally, British food 
production standards, which was somewhat in contrast with fears and 
suspicions about safety and quality which were voiced in the opening 
sections of the discussions.  For example, the participant who had 
stopped eating steak for a short while during FMD led the following 
exchange: 
 
“I had every confidence that what I was buying was alright!… 
 
I think that [food production in] our country has got that many 
checks that . . . I don’t think that [FMD] … would put us off 
buying it 
 
We’ve got one of the best abattoir systems . . . in Europe 
 
I think hygiene in this country is really quite good …” 
 
. . . they’re straight in there if they think anything’s dodgy …” 
(Group 1, Alnwick) 
 
A final issue addressed in relation to perceptions of FMD was that of 
vaccination.  Whilst most groups felt vaccination would have been a 
more appropriate way to prevent the spread of FMD, the issue of whether 
participants themselves would consume vaccinated meat led to 
differences of opinion.  Participants in rural based groups drew from their 
own knowledge and experience to rationalise acceptance of eating such 
meat, by pointing out that farm animals undergo routine vaccinations 
anyway: 
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“pigs are fed antibiotics from an early age, in huge quantities, 
and that doesn’t bother me!” 
Group 1 (Alnwick) 
 
In the urban group, while a number of the participants said that they 
would be willing to accept official assurances confirming vaccinated 
meat was as safe as their regular meat, the feeling at present was that 
there was insufficient information available to assuage their fears about 
the short and long term effects on humans.  In addition, Group 4 
(Newcastle) concluded that it would be unlikely for the government or 
the food industry to make such knowledge publicly available.  Thus, 
general reservations were expressed about eating vaccinated meat. 
 
6.5   Rural Recovery Recommendations 
 
In the final part of the discussions, the precise aims of the research were 
explained to the participants and their views were sought on the potential 
of local marketing initiatives to help the rural recovery.  It was apparent 
from earlier in the discussions that the rural groups had greater awareness 
of and interest in locally produced food, and thus it was not surprising to 
find that participants in these groups were quite receptive to the idea of 
increased marketing.  The responses of Group 1 (Alnwick) participants 
were particularly positive, as local sourcing of food seemed self-
evidently appropriate for a rural area, and purchases of it could also 
benefit the local economy and farming industry: 
 
“It’d be nice to have more [local food] available up here when 
we’re in the heart of agriculturally produced food; grown 
locally … 
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You [would] feel as if you’re supporting your own people … 
you’re keeping employment in the area … You’re building up 
the area rather than helping somebody else …” 
(Group 1, Alnwick) 
 
Participants in other groups also shared the view that local foods should 
be associated with local outlets and markets. Yet the overwhelming 
opinion was a pragmatic one - that, to have any real impact, effective 
marketing of such foods had to be through supermarkets.  This was 
because supermarkets were associated with the benefits of price and ease 
of access.  Urban participants in particular could not imagine themselves 
purchasing local food, if at all, from any other outlet, as the following 
excerpts demonstrate: 
 
“If it is in a supermarket and it’s at the same price [consumers] 
will buy it, because it doesn’t make any difference. ... If it’s a 
tiny bit more [expensive]  people might take it, but if it’s out of 
their way ... people won’t bother. May be just go with the big 
supermarkets like Sainsbury’s or Marks and Spencer who 
charge more anyway, so people wouldn’t notice the difference! 
… 
 
If it was made easily available I probably would [buy it], yes. If 
it was somewhere obvious in the supermarket and it stood out, 
you probably would make an effort if it wasn’t too … 
expensive. But, I wouldn’t go out of my way  to … buy it… 
 
And, even if they opened up a shop particularly for that, I 
wouldn’t even go to it. I think I would go with the majority… 
and say the supermarket [is the most appropriate outlet for 
it]…” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
Participants in the rural groups also spoke of the need for local foods to 
be made conveniently available to them, and at a reasonable price. 
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However, their discussions went further into the type of management 
structure which could be put in place to support such an initiative: 
 
“I don’t see why there couldn’t be a franchise in the 
supermarket ... where you could get whatever is going on the 
day and a percentage could go to the supermarket … 
 
Why doesn’t the supermarket buy in the local product? Can the 
Government put pressure on the supermarket to purchase local 
products?…” 
(Group 2, Morpeth) 
 
A final distinction between urban and rural participants on this issue was 
the extent to which the broad principle of local foods was supported.  
Although rural participants tended to express positive feelings about the 
issue, in the urban groups a number of quite negative attitudes were 
conveyed.  For some individuals, this was out of a sense that the farming 
sector already received more than enough support, whilst for others it 
involved pejorative judgements regarding the types of people attracted by 
local foods, and  their priorities: 
 
“If they could  . . .put it in the supermarkets [and] put a sticker 
on it [to explain what it is and why] … people might think, 
‘Ooh, what’s that?’ But renting a hall or . . . an area . . . in the 
middle of Newcastle! Who’s going to go, ‘Oh, it’s 12 o’clock, I 
better go down there and buy the local [food]!’? People just 
aren’t going to do it… 
 
…May be some pensioner will because they’ve got nothing else 
better to do that day… But people in their busy lives won’t do it 
unless it’s in front of their face, which is in the supermarket, 
where the majority … of people shop… 
 
I think probably about 90 per cent of the people don’t really 
care, and probably there’s 10 per cent that are a bit do-goody 
who say …’ I’ll look after the local economy’… But 90 per 
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cent of people probably don’t give a monkeys’! It’s horrible , 
but it’s probably true…” 
(Group 3, Newcastle) 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
The consumer study set out to explore in depth North East consumers’ 
perceptions and concerns relating to food, and to examine the extent to 
which perceptions and habits have changed in the light of the FMD crisis.  
The key results of the focus groups conducted may be summarised as 
follows. 
 
First, on the issue of what is important to consumers when shopping for 
food, value for money and quality were expressed most commonly as 
priorities, followed by other concerns such as freshness, nutritional 
content, pesticides and additives.  Participants in all groups seemed to be 
attracted to good bargains, but did not necessarily always shop for the 
lowest priced item.  Discussion of (particularly red) meat products gave 
rise to slightly altered priorities, with safety and origin issues taking on 
more importance, whilst participants with children spoke of the problems 
of balancing health concerns with time and budgetary restraints.  Beyond 
this, a number of differences were noted between the perceptions and 
concerns of urban and rural consumers.  Amongst the former, it was well-
known brands which were associated with trust and quality, and 
confidence was placed in pre-packed, clearly labelled packaging formats 
for meat for reasons of hygiene, safety and lack of confidence in own 
cooking abilities.  Rural consumers by comparison seemed to make more 
product-by-product comparisons in order to judge quality, and seemed 
more comfortable buying, handling and preparing meat ‘in the raw’.  
Rural consumers also mentioned a greater initial range of concerns 
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related to foods, including those relating to local supply, the environment 
and animal welfare.  Nevertheless, although a few participants in both 
urban and rural groups spoke positively of the benefits of welfare-
friendly items and organic foods, the majority view tended to be one of 
scepticism over inflated prices and lack of ability to guarantee difference.  
In general, rural based consumers were more able to discuss and 
elaborate on a wide range of issues relating to food.  By contrast, urban 
participants gave the impression that food-related concerns were 
generally not a high priority for them, with more self-oriented concerns 
being expressed, and convenience and price being key choice factors. 
 
In terms of actual behaviour and shopping habits, supermarkets 
dominated as the main outlet for food shopping amongst both urban and 
rural participants, for reasons of convenience, flexibility and price.  
However the usage patterns for both groups differed, as rural participants 
tended to undertake major bulk buys in perceived best-value urban 
supermarkets, whilst urban participants, especially young professionals, 
made more regular use of supermarkets’ flexible opening hours to fit in 
with their lifestyles.  Participants in all groups also shopped at local 
shops and outlets, with rural participants in particular making use of a 
wide range of direct outlets.  Farmers’ markets were not commonly used, 
however: urban participants were generally unaware of them and not 
receptive to the concept when explained;  whilst rural participants, 
although agreeing with the concept in principle, perceived them as 
somewhat expensive and inconvenient. Indeed, even amongst the most 
knowledgeable and outwardly concerned participants, the trade-offs of 
price and accessibility seemed to weigh heavily in practice. 
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In relation to FMD, there were some spontaneous expressions of meat 
purchases being altered during the crisis by both urban and rural 
participants, although the majority view was that no major, sustained, 
food-related changes had been experienced.  Instead, discussion of FMD 
focused on criticism of government handling of the crisis and debate 
about the impact on farming and rural communities.  In these discussions, 
some differences were apparent between urban and rural participants as 
the latter were clearly more informed and actively engaged in the issues 
than the former.  Indeed, urban participants conveyed a sense of distance 
from, in some cases indifference towards, what was perceived to be a 
farming and rural problem.  Nevertheless, across both urban and rural 
groups, a set of opposing views was expressed regarding compensation 
for farmers and the effect of the crisis on other business sectors.  Overall, 
the groups felt that coverage of the crisis in the region, although negative 
in nature, would not have a significant, long-term impact on outsiders’ 
perceptions of the North East.  Finally, on the issue of vaccinated meat, 
most participants reported that they would not object to eating it provided 
that clear labelling and safety reassurances were given, although a 
number of individuals expressed doubts about the ability of government 
and the food industry to provide such clear, impartial advice.  
 
Finally, on the potential of marketing initiatives to encourage a greater 
uptake of local products to help rural recovery, it emerged that the rural 
participants were receptive to the proposition, agreeing quite strongly 
with the principle and giving the impression of willingness to respond 
actively.  In contrast, urban participants demonstrated degrees of 
negativity and scepticism, or simply did not perceive such an initiative to 
be ‘for them’.  Where participants in all groups did agree however, was 
in the need for such initiatives to address the price and accessibility 
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concerns of consumers, and as such, could only see initiatives having an 
effective impact via the use of supermarkets.  Overall, it appeared that, 
even for the most aware and interested consumers, the right balance had 
to be struck with value for money and convenience priorities.  However, 
there is also a section of the population, at least some of whom are urban 
based, who will not be reached by local food marketing initiatives as 
their food-related priorities do not accord with the aims of such schemes. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 Terry Carroll, Philip Lowe and Jeremy Phillipson 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impacts of Foot and 
Mouth Disease on the rural economy of the North East of England, to 
provide a basis from which to consider the long-term consequences and 
to inform and guide the process of recovery.  In this concluding chapter 
the principal strands of the research are drawn together with a 
commentary on the implications of the findings for programmes and 
policy changes aimed at rural recovery. 
 
7.2 Rural Recovery and the Changing Policy Context 
 
The research has been carried out against, and is intended to inform, a 
rural development and policy context that is changing rapidly in the 
aftermath of the FMD crisis. Various rural recovery initiatives are being 
taken or advocated32. These comprise a combination of short and 
medium/long term measures that can be broadly assembled into two 
groups: the first focused on recovery of the farming industry; and the 
second directed towards recovery of the wider rural economy and 
communities.  
 
 
                                                 
32
 Report of the Rural Task Force  Tackling the Impact of Foot and Mouth Disease on the Rural 
Economy (October 2001); Lord Haskins report Rural Recovery after Foot and Mouth Disease (October 
2001); Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food Farming and Food: a Sustainable 
Future (January 2002); Northumberland County Council Report of the Inquiry Panel, Northumberland 
Foot and Mouth Disease Public Inquiry (February 2002); DEFRA Sustainable Food and Farming  
(March 2002); ONE North East Rural Action Plan (July 2002). 
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The main policy themes are as follows: 
 
(i) Farming   
 
• Reduction in excessive sheep numbers through the purchase of 
quota; more controls over the movement and traceability of sheep; 
a more effective and better regulated role for live auction marts; 
and investigation into the viability of a return to small, local 
abattoirs. 
 
• Rationalisation and expansion of agri-environment schemes, to 
include a lower tier potentially open to all farmers achieving a 
basic standard of environmental performance, with additional 
targeted payments for meeting more demanding requirements in 
sensitive areas or providing specific environmental services; and 
further promotion of energy crops and organic farming. 
 
• An accelerated reallocation of CAP funds from commodity support 
in favour of agri-environment and other rural development 
measures; encouragement of farm diversification and off-farm 
employment; and an expansion of the activities supported under the 
England Rural Development Plan (ERDP). 
 
• Greater co-operation among farmers in producing and marketing 
higher quality and locally distinctive “value added” products; the 
creation of shorter, more regionally embedded supply chains; and 
the formation of partnerships between primary producers and 
processors with the hospitality sector and major retailers.   
 
• Expansion of initiatives which educate the public about healthy 
eating, increase understanding of the relationship between food and 
the countryside and help the less privileged to access local produce; 
and support for research and demonstration to help farmers respond 
and adapt to changing consumer demands and market pressures. 
 
(ii) Rural Economy and Communities  
 
• A continuation of the schemes of temporary assistance specifically 
to encourage rural businesses to invest and develop for the future. 
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• Recognition of the specific support needs of rural micro-businesses 
and a better integration of the support provided to business by, for 
example, the Small Business Service, Farm Business Advice 
Service and Tourist Boards.   
 
• A major effort in 2002 to relaunch the countryside through a 
programme of special events and activities and promotion of 
walking opportunities. 
 
• Reinforcement of Rural White Paper measures to regenerate 
market towns, extend the ICT infrastructure, improve training 
opportunities and strengthen community services and facilities in 
rural areas. 
 
• A requirement for public agencies to integrate programmes for 
rural regeneration and their separate funding streams, and to target 
these on the recovery of badly affected areas and weak rural 
economies. 
 
These measures must be viewed in the context of the policy debate taking 
place within the EU over the future of the CAP and particularly the scope 
for redirecting finance from commodity support into wider rural 
development programmes (the so-called second pillar of the CAP). The 
European Commission has accepted that a major overhaul is needed 
driven in part by the cost of the current CAP, its perceived failure to 
deliver wider social, economic and environmental benefits and the 
forthcoming accession of Eastern European countries33.   
 
The emerging role of the Regional Development Agencies in the field of 
rural development is also pertinent. These agencies have been identified 
as the key organisation and catalyst for overseeing and targeting support 
for all sections of the rural economy and to bring about the integrated 
                                                 
33
 Commission’s proposals for the mid-term review of the CAP. 
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approach that is widely advocated34. To give direction and substance to 
this work, ONE North East has prepared a Rural Action Plan, in 
association with the Government Office for the North East, the North of 
England Assembly and the Countryside Agency, which reflects and takes 
forward most of the above policy themes. 
 
7.3 Research Findings and their Relevance to the Policy Debate 
 
The following paragraphs attempt to distil the key findings of the 
research and provide some observations for those engaged in the 
development and implementation of the new policy initiatives for farming 
and the wider rural economy described above.  
 
Farming 
 
Farming in the North East was in severe difficulty even before the 
outbreak of FMD. The research demonstrates how dramatic the financial 
and psychological effects of the disease have been for the farming 
community. The differences between the farms that were culled and not 
culled have been quantified. The income from sales and subsidies of the 
former group was substantially reduced but these farmers received 
compensation and, for some, there was also temporary financial relief in 
the form of payments for the disinfection process. Incomes for the 
livestock farms not culled showed a lower reduction but this group may 
have been worse affected in receiving no compensation yet having had to 
bear the financial consequences of the restrictions on livestock sales and 
                                                 
34
 Ward, N. and Lowe, P.  Regional Development Agencies and Rural Development: Priorities for 
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movements. Some farm types were little affected: on predominantly 
arable farms incomes for the year actually rose. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly - given what they had come through - all the 78 
surveyed farmers intended to remain in farming; only one was unsure.  
Moreover, many more were expecting to expand rather than scale down 
their activities.  Interest in expansion was particularly high amongst the 
arable farmers.  
 
The research found an expectation among farmers of future reductions in 
sheep flocks. A significant proportion of farmers - especially those culled 
out - would thus appear to be potentially receptive, if a suitable scheme 
could be devised, to the Government purchasing some of their quota for 
livestock premia.  Such a scheme could be used to lower stocking 
densities systematically and permanently. This could greatly enlarge the 
scope for either extending agri-environment schemes or pursuing a 
greening of existing LFA supports. 
 
Three-quarters of the farmers intend or want to explore the possibility of 
new or greater involvement in agri-environmental schemes in the 
aftermath of FMD.  Many of these therefore should be responsive to a 
reorientation of payments for production in favour of environmental 
outputs.  There is also some, but lesser, interest in forestry and new crops, 
but little interest in going organic. 
 
Many of the new policy measures and funding programmes are founded 
on the perceived need for greater diversification of the farming economy. 
There was existing diversification on four-fifths of the surveyed farms but 
most of this revolved around farming-related contract work and renting 
                                                                                                                                           
Action  (November 2001). 
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out buildings or land. There was much less involvement in the kind of 
activities which the ERDP is designed to support (such as tourism or 
processing).  Whereas more than half of the farmers expressed an interest 
in more diversification, just 1 in 7 of them had sought or intended to seek 
external advice about possible diversification opportunities. 
 
It should be noted that farms with diversified activities were no less 
vulnerable to the effects of FMD. Indeed it might be said that the 
commercial exposure was magnified because whilst the losses to farming 
from the cull were compensated those from diversified activities were 
not.  Approaches to diversification therefore need to be reviewed, in the 
light of the FMD experience, to reduce their vulnerability to future 
farming and animal disease crises and to minimise the risks posed to 
biosecurity. 
 
Off-farm employment proved much less vulnerable to disruption.  Some 
37% of farm households had members with off-farm employment.  This 
was mainly the farm women and the most common areas of employment 
were retailing, education and secretarial/clerical work.  A quarter of the 
farmers expressed an interest in increasing their household’s income from 
off-farm employment, but only one had sought advice on the matter.   
 
More and more farmers will need advice and encouragement in 
considering their future options.  The Policy Commission on the Future of 
Farming and Food has called for business advice services for farmers to 
be better co-ordinated, including a review of the FBAS and the creation 
of a Farming Advice Line.  It is important, however, to avoid the 
development of a separate system of business advice for farmers and to 
strengthen links between farm and generic business advice services.  It 
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will also be important, in the light of the FMD experience, to extend the 
advice to farmers to take on board off-farm employment and training 
opportunities for farm household members. 
 
As regards food production in the future, farmers will increasingly be 
urged to cooperate more, understand the needs of their customers better 
and become more innovative in their marketing practices. New and 
shorter supply chains are envisaged and more value-added products. 
Amongst the farming sample, however, there was as yet little evidence of 
processing or of direct sales activity (excluding dairying). Nationally, the 
numbers of individual farmers becoming actively engaged further up the 
supply chain is undoubtedly growing and this is mirrored in the rapid 
growth in popularity of farmers’ markets. This will appeal to the most 
enterprising of farmers but not to the great majority, and farmers need to 
be encouraged to cooperate. 
 
The research confirms that the marketing of livestock is exclusively tied 
to the traditional live auction marts. This is regarded as a transparent 
means of price setting and a familiar way of conducting trade and social 
intercourse. However, the FMD crisis has caused great upset and 
uncertainty for the marts. The study has quantified in broad terms the 
extent of the likely losses they will have incurred. It has also pointed to 
further difficulties ahead regarding greater regulation of livestock 
movements and other bio-security measures. The future therefore offers 
very serious threats. The demise of the marts would be a blow to local 
economies but would also entail the loss of important social functions.  A 
key means of knowledge transfer within the livestock industry would be 
lost.  Farmers, for example, are very likely to look to the marts to help 
bring about the sought after changes in marketing and supply chain 
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management. The prospects and future role of auction marts are a 
pressing topic for further research. 
 
The farming industry (and the red meat sector in particular) needs generic 
and technical business support in adding value to its commodity products, 
better management of the supply chain and marketing.  If realistic 
projects are to be devised and delivered, leadership and ownership must 
come from within the farming sector itself.  Practical collaboration 
between farmers in marketing and supply chain initiatives has been 
notoriously difficult to achieve and some facilitation of the process would 
therefore seem to be essential. 
 
There has already been some important activity in the region regarding 
the red meat supply chain.  The Northern Dales Meat Initiative was 
conceived to take forward the findings and recommendations of the 
Northern Uplands Red Meat study.  It concentrated on practical action 
and closely engaged the hill farming community in its work.  The project 
has now lapsed and may have left a vacuum.  It is essential that a 
thorough assessment of the Initiative is undertaken so that lessons can be 
applied to any similar initiatives that may follow. 
 
Whilst changes can be instigated from the primary production end of the 
supply chain they will ultimately be consumer driven and the multiple 
retailers will continue to exercise a powerful influence. The research 
indicates that, as with farmers, there is significant inertia amongst 
consumers. Purchasing habits of most consumers are dominated by price 
and convenience. There is some empathy with the farmers and support for 
the local economy. But, aside from meat, there is only a modest degree of 
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interest in the provenance and means of production of food, with rural 
consumers more aware and more concerned than urban consumers. 
 
There is every justification for promoting awareness and higher 
consumption of regionally distinctive and local foods and more 
traditional and value-added niche products. This meets sustainability 
objectives and acts as an important counterweight to the globalisation and 
centralisation of food production and distribution. Farmers’ markets may 
not transform the local rural economy but can provide tangible benefits. 
Initiatives such as the Countryside Agency’s Eat the View scheme and 
the Soil Association’s Local Foodworks project provide good examples 
of positive action in this field. The consumer survey, though, revealed a 
lack of awareness about the presence and location of existing initiatives, 
such as farmers’ markets, which needs to be remedied. 
 
The North East has a dearth of speciality food producers, and markets are 
not as large or well developed as other parts of the UK.  Past efforts to 
establish a network of producers and to brand and market the region’s 
products have lapsed.  The newly established Northumbria Larder has 
taken up the challenge.  It will need support particularly as it progresses 
beyond the establishment phase. 
 
To avoid fragmentation and piecemeal efforts it is vital that more local 
initiatives are also effectively co-ordinated.  The Fresh Trading Initiative 
in North Northumberland is a good example of local action to promote 
awareness of an area’s distinctive products and development of supply 
chain links between food producers and hospitality businesses.  Other 
schemes are being actively pursued across the region (e.g. for Hadrian’s 
Wall, Weardale and Teesdale). 
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Winning consumer acceptance, however, cannot be taken for granted and 
this points to three main requirements. First, any duplication of effort and 
disjointed activity in promoting regionally distinctive foods must be 
avoided. There would appear to be a key role for the RDA in securing the 
necessary integration. Second, strategies to encourage a greater uptake of 
local products must take account of consumers’ practical concerns over 
price, convenience and access.  Third, given the dominance of the 
multiple supermarkets in food retailing, it is important that they adopt a 
more favourable attitude to regional sourcing, especially of meat 
products. 
 
Wider rural economy 
 
The FMD outbreak has had very serious economic impacts that extended 
well beyond farming, revealing the diverse yet interdependent nature of 
the rural economy. Total revenue losses in the wider rural economy were 
on a par with those inflicted on the farming sector.  56% of surveyed rural 
micro-businesses were affected, in the main negatively. 
 
FMD had a particularly extensive impact in the hospitality, land-based 
and recreation/culture sectors, with the vast majority of firms hit.  
Roughly half of the firms in the retail, transport, business services and 
manufacturing sectors were also affected, reflecting knock-on effects 
within business chains.  Half of the impacted firms experienced a medium 
or high impact. 
 
The research indicates that business recovery remains an important 
consideration in 2002 and beyond, requiring supportive and sympathetic 
approaches from public authorities and the banks. There are a number of 
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lasting effects for many of the impacted businesses relating to additional 
debt, reduced reserves, disrupted trade and investment cycles and shelved 
plans for growth and investment. Almost a third of impacted firms were 
expecting several years of recovery. 
 
More generally, the research emphasises that future rural development 
initiatives need to be broad based and less farm-centred.  This will itself 
be increasingly important for the farming sector as farmers are 
encouraged to develop non-farm based businesses and as farm families 
become increasingly reliant on income sources located off-farm.  FMD 
has therefore accelerated the need for robust approaches to rural 
development and effective implementation of rural policies such as the 
Rural White Paper. 
 
FMD has revealed important interdependencies within the rural economy, 
between tourism, farming and other sectors, and the need for more 
integrated approaches to rural development.  This calls for better 
integration of programmes and funding streams intended to assist rural 
regeneration and close coordination of business support services provided 
via the Business Links, Farm Business Advice Service, Tourist Boards 
and other agencies. 
 
This is particularly the case for the more peripheral rural areas in the 
North East whose economies are heavily dependent on a combination of 
primary industries and tourism.  Here diversification remains a 
challenging rural development goal.  More attention is required to 
understanding and reducing the vulnerability of such local economies and 
to improving their robustness.  This requires critical assessment of 
existing rural development approaches, exploration of ways of reducing 
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risk and attempts to strengthen existing and new forms of economic 
development.  In particular this would call for more strategic positioning 
of the tourism sector in general against wider regional development 
priorities.  The important role of key visitor attractions and their 
relationship to the micro-businesses that surround them has also been 
highlighted and this represents an important focus for research and 
development. 
 
Specific initiatives addressing interconnections within the rural economy 
need to be encouraged.  For example, there would appear to be scope for 
promoting linkages between the food and drink, tourism and culture 
sectors.  More generally, there is immense scope for strengthening the 
linkages between local food, the environment, education, health and 
social inclusion. The Fresh Trading Initiative demonstrates what can be 
achieved using modest resources.  The same principles are now being 
applied through the Hadrian’s Wall Tourism Partnership.  The available 
funding streams, however, do not always recognise the importance of 
these interconnections to the rural economy. The Objective 2 Programme, 
for example, discourages cross-cluster approaches and there would be 
some merit in subjecting this and other regional funding programmes to a 
rural proofing exercise in line with the Government’s Rural White Paper 
commitment. 
 
Many businesses did not utilise business support, even though hit by the 
Foot and Mouth crisis.  Further attention should be given to the means of 
facilitating uptake among small businesses, development in the 
communication and profile of support and further tailoring of support to 
the nature and needs of micro-businesses.  Specific lessons need also to 
be learned in relation to the uptake and popularity of business aid 
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measures among micro-firms and the fact that some impacted businesses 
aborted their attempts to obtain aid or fell through the gaps in the aid 
system. 
 
The condition of firms in the aftermath of the crisis reflects the pressures 
they had to face but also the effectiveness of their coping responses.  
Several factors influenced the coping capability of impacted firms, 
including the existence of employees, the level of fixed costs, access to 
support networks and flexible labour, and the age and experience of the 
business and its owner(s).  Businesses that had had the opportunity in the 
past to build up their financial, human or physical assets were better able 
to weather the crisis. It would seem that the farms were generally better 
prepared in this respect than most of the micro-businesses. In future 
business advice and support should pay much greater attention to 
encouraging the build-up of such assets to increase business resilience. 
 
The research confirms the importance of households in providing 
resilience to micro-businesses.  Most of the firms drew on family and 
household resources to cope with the crisis and its aftermath, and 
household coping responses were most pronounced amongst high impact 
firms.  Households acted as a buffer to the businesses, absorbing revenue 
and employment effects, through adjustments in the wage taken from the 
business, the deployment of personal savings and the use of household 
members as a flexible labour reserve. The integral role of household 
flexibilities within the coping responses of many impacted micro-
businesses – both farming and non-farming - highlights how the 
dynamics of firms are inseparable from their social context. It would 
reinforce the view that business support organisations should be 
encouraged to take fully into account the range of ‘soft business’ issues 
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within micro-businesses, including the influence of household factors on 
business goals.  It also means that FMD had major social consequences 
which are likely to have implications for rural recovery. 
 
FMD also revealed crucial characteristics of the rural labour process. It 
was seen, for example, how core employees were often deeply embedded 
within firms - treated like family in many cases – with repercussions for 
employment decisions. Equally, the operation of a very flexible rural 
labour reserve was exposed - with firms releasing or drawing upon local 
labour as and when required. The ease with which many firms were able 
to pursue such strategies was central to the way they coped with the 
crisis. However, it revealed problematic employment practices in which 
neither business owners nor employees seemed to understand their rights 
or obligations. It also meant that local people with very insecure 
livelihoods had to bear the impacts of the crisis. This indicates a pressing 
need for greater attention, in research and policy, to the security of rural 
livelihoods.  
 
7.4 Final Remarks: the Wider Lessons of FMD 
 
FMD and the way it was handled induced a crisis for farming and the 
rural economy.  In revealing the continued interdependency between 
farming and the rural economy, it also exposed the complexity and 
diversity of the contemporary rural economy.  One consequence was that 
the crisis had different ramifications for different areas. 
 
This becomes apparent if we compare the impact of the crisis in Cumbria 
with that in the North East.  The Cumbrian rural economy is heavily 
dependent on tourism with a market that is national and international.  
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The images of a county under siege to combat an animal plague led many 
people and groups, from the UK or abroad, to cancel their planned 
holiday visits to Cumbria.  The consequence was a very deep crisis in 
rural tourism, whose revenue losses for the year far outstripped those in 
agriculture. 
 
In contrast, in the North East, the rural economy is much less dependent 
on tourism, and the visitor market is much more regionally based and 
focused on leisure and recreation as well as tourism.  Visitors stayed 
away from the North East countryside and rural businesses suffered from 
access restrictions, but the effects were less intense and more diffuse, and 
were felt well beyond the tourism sector.  Those parts of the North East 
that attract national or international tourists - such as Hadrian’s Wall - did 
suffer in a similar way to, say, much of the Lake District.   
 
However, certain specific rural areas and businesses in the North East did 
better than usual through the displacement of visitors and customers to 
coastal locations, larger settlements and urban fringe sites.  The nature of 
the North East’s regionally based market, oriented largely to day trips and 
short breaks, also meant that there could be a rapid recovery in visitor 
numbers in the autumn of 2001 when it seemed that the outbreak was 
ending.  One consequence is that, although hospitality was the most 
extensively affected sector, the largest grouping of hospitality businesses 
fell into the low impact category (i.e. had suffered considerable disruption 
but with little or no change in annual revenue). What has not recovered is 
the overseas tourism market but this is much less of an issue for the North 
East than for Cumbria35. 
                                                 
35
 ‘Foreign tourists desert the North’ The Journal, July 29 2002, p. 2. 
 168 
Conversely, there were other sectors comprising the North East rural 
economy that were prominently impacted by the FMD crisis, including 
recreation and culture, land-based, retailing, transport, business services 
and manufacturing.  Some of the firms in these sectors were impacted 
directly by depressed tourism or visitor demand, but others were 
impacted by induced effects from reduced local trade or by indirect 
effects as farmers and others curtailed their expenditure on supplies and 
services. Many of the hardest hit firms in the North East were those that 
were indirectly affected as orders dried up along business chains.  
Undoubtedly, similar effects were experienced in Cumbria, but the plight 
of affected rural businesses was completely overshadowed by the crisis in 
tourism and farming. The North East more evidently suffered a more 
diffuse rural economy crisis. 
 
In this way the FMD crisis tested and revealed the specific 
interdependencies and vulnerabilities of local rural economies. The 
implication is that measures for rural recovery should be appropriately 
differentiated.  An emphasis on tourism promotion and farming recovery 
would not be sufficient to overcome the immediate legacy of the crisis 
across a range of other sectors in the rural North East. 
 
Overall, the 2001 FMD epidemic triggered a rural economy crisis 
extending far beyond farming and tourism. The lessons from the crisis are 
far reaching and must go beyond those posed specifically for the future of 
farming or the institutional handling of crises - themes which have 
dominated the official inquiry process.  
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The FMD crisis draws attention to a series of fundamental challenges 
facing the future of rural areas and rural development policies and 
decision making. The research suggests that central issues concern:  
 
• the changed nature of contemporary rural economies and the 
adoption of more locally and regionally differentiated and inclusive 
perspectives; 
 
• the continued fragility and dependency of many rural areas and the 
means of reducing vulnerability; 
 
• the specific characteristics of rural firms and the development of 
effective business support services; and  
 
• the interdependencies between business sectors and the 
requirement for more integrated approaches to rural development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 170 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 171 
REFERENCES 
 
BMG (2001) Foot and Mouth Survey Summary Report: prepared for 
Government Office for the North East.  BMG, Birmingham. 
 
Ellis, F. (2000) The determinants of rural livelihood diversification in 
developing countries.  Journal of Agricultural Economics, 51 (2): 
289:302. 
 
Enteleca (2000). Tourist Attitudes towards Regional and Local Foods. 
Report prepared for MAFF and the Countryside Agency by Enteleca 
Research and Consultancy Ltd., London. 
 
Gilg, A. and M. Battershill (1998)  Quality farm food in Europe: a 
possible alternative to the industrialised food market and to current agri-
environmental policies: lessons from France.  Food Policy 23(1): 25-40. 
 
Henchion, M. and B. McIntyre (2000) Regional imagery and quality 
products: the Irish experience. British Food Journal 102(8): 630-644. 
 
Kupiec, B. and B. Revell (1998) Speciality and artisanal cheeses today: 
the product and the consumer. British Food Journal 100(5): 236-243. 
 
Lowe, P. and Talbot, H. (2000) Providing Advice and Information in 
Support of Rural Microbusinesses Centre for Rural Economy, University 
of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
 
Mai, L.-W. and M. Ness (1998) Perceived benefits of mail order 
speciality foods. British Food Journal 100(1): 10-17. 
 
McCarthy, M., O’Reilly, S. and M. Cronin (2001) Psychological, 
attitudinal and behavioural characteristics of Irish speciality cheese 
customers.  British Food Journal. 103(5): 313-330. 
 
Raley, M. and Moxey, A. (2000) Rural Microbusinesses in the North 
East of England:  Final Survey Results Centre for Rural Economy, 
University of Newcastle upon Tyne. 
 
 172 
Tregear, A., S. Kuznesof and A. Moxey (1998) Policy initiatives for 
regional foods: some insights from consumer research. Food Policy 
23(5): 383-394. 
 173 
APPENDIX 1: TABLES ON FMD IMPACTS ON FARMS 
 
Table A1.1: Average size of surveyed holdings (ha) 
 
Total area of permanent grass (a) 61.8 
Total area of temporary grass (IACS registered) (b) 21.3 
Total area of temporary grass (not IACS registered) (c) 2.9 
Rough grazing 48.3 
Other cropping 65.9 
Roads, buildings and woodlands 7.3 
Average farm size (ex. common grazing rights)  207.5 
Adjusted rough grazing (d) 14.8 
Common grazing rights (adjusted hectares) (e) 2.6 
Adjusted grassland area (f=a+b+c+d+e)  103.4 
  
Area in SDA 68.9 
Area in DA 28.4 
  
Area owned 113.1 
(% farm owner occupied) (55) 
 
 
Table A1.2: Number of farms in sample by farm type (as defined by Newcastle 
University Farm Business Survey) 
 
Lowland dairy (<90 cows) 1 
Lowland dairy (>=90 cows) 2 
Lowland grazing 22 
Lowland arable 16 
Upland dairy 1 
Marginal land 14 
Upland rearing 17 
Hill rearing 5 
Total 78 
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Table A1.3: Livestock numbers pre-Foot and Mouth (average per farm) 
 
Dairy cows 4.6 
Beef cows 47 
Other cattle  
   >2 years 8 
   1 - 2 years 51 
   <1 year 46 
LFA ewes 277 
Lowland ewes 115 
Lambs under 1 year old 267 
Ewe Hoggs 80 
Other sheep 18 
Horses 1 
Goats 0 
Deer 0 
Pigs - breeding sows and gilts 0 
Pigs - other pigs 0 
Other livestock 140 
Total grazing livestock units 145 
(Stocking rate - total livestock units/forage area) (1.84/ha) 
 
Table A1.4: Status of sample farms with respect to Foot and Mouth disease  
 
Free of Foot and Mouth and no livestock culled 63 
Confirmed Foot and Mouth  3 
Culled for dangerous contact 3 
Contiguous cull 8 
Culled on suspicion 1 
Culled - <3 km depopulation 0 
Culled - <3 km non-voluntary depopulation 0 
Culled - welfare scheme 0 
Total number of farms 78 
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Table A1.5: Overall total of livestock culled on surveyed farms  
 
Dairy cows 0 
Beef cows 347 
Other cattle < 2 years 92 
Other cattle 1-2 years 757 
Other cattle < 1 year 545 
LFA ewes 2,428 
Lowland ewes 1,168 
Ewe hoggs 778 
Lambs under 1 year old 4,436 
Other sheep 100 
Goats 0 
Deer 0 
Pigs - breeding sows and guilts 0 
Pigs other  0 
Total 10,651 
An additional 934 animals owned by surveyed farmers were slaughtered on other 
premises (270 ewe hoggs, 186 ewes and 478 lambs). 
 
Table A1.6: Estimates of total value of compensation (£) 
 
Sample Estimated value of  
livestock culled on 
surveyed farms 
Estimated value of 
livestock culled away 
from the farms 
Total value of 
compensation for 
culled livestock 
Lower range 1,019,250 29,480 1,048,730 
Upper range 1,553,530 46,080 1,599,610 
 
Table A1.7: Total value of other compulsory purchases (£) 
 
 Concentrates Hay Silage other fittings Total 
Number receiving compensation 5 4 6 7 6  
Total compensation received 9,070 9,850 8,980 22,995 8,635 59,530 
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Table A1.8: Farm business and household income 2000-1/2001-2 (£) 
 
Revenue from traditional farming enterprises 2000-1 2001-2 
Dairy 5,300 2,556 
Beef 37,306 22,788 
Sheep 22,125 16,582 
Other livestock 847 188 
Cereals and other crops 29,258 31,472 
Environmental payments 1,615 1,830 
Compensation for destruction of hay, silage etc. 0 763 
Livestock subsidies 19,757 14,573 
   of which beef subsidies (10,834) (8,137) 
                   Hill farm allowance (3,101) (3,101) 
                  sheep (5,687) (3,121) 
                  leasing out suckler cow quota (0) (213) 
Cereal subsidies (direct payment) 12,272 12,272 
Set aside payments 1,753 1,753 
Total farm business revenue (A) 130,233 104,777 
Income from diversification (B) 6,458 4,795 
Foot and Mouth related income (C) 0 3,577 
Off farm income of household members (D) 3,397 2,955 
Total household income and revenues (A+B+C+D) 140,088 116,104 
Farm Labour   
    Farmer and spouse 11,487 11,623 
    Family unpaid, full time 3,850 4,295 
    Family unpaid part time 268 334 
    Paid, full time 9,800 9,327 
    Paid, part time 807 867 
    Casual 1,920 1,741 
Total farm labour costs (F) 28,132 28,186 
Expenditure on other inputs   
      Concentrates 13,333 11,818 
      Forage / keep 2,745 2,542 
      Straw 1,105 1,133 
      Other recorded costs* 50,297 50,771 
Recorded non-labour inputs (G) 67,480 66,264 
Total recorded costs (F+G) 95,612 94,450 
* Other farm costs will include depreciation, office overheads, insurance, herd replacement 
costs, etc. 
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Table A1.9: Changes in farm business and household income (£), by farm type 
 
 Lowland grazing LFA cattle and 
sheep 
Arable 
 2000-1 2001-2 2000-1 2001-2 2000-1 2001-2 
Number of farms in 
sample 
(22) (22) (36) (36) (16) (16) 
Revenue from traditional 
farming enterprises 
126,915 78,412 93,016 74,370 209,645 206,084 
Income from 
diversification 
5,748 3,340 4,681 3,815 12,921 10,173 
Foot and Mouth related 
income 
0 4,473 0 2,458 0 5,756 
Off farm income of 
household members 
2,273 1,108 2,569 2,561 5,625 5,109 
Total household income 
and revenues 
134,972 87,333 100,266 83,563 228,191 227,122 
Farm labour costs 23,884 23,371 21,585 21,801 48,605 48,659 
Recorded non-labour costs 60,088 53,651 46,196 47,392 116,815 116,195 
Total recorded costs 83,972 77,022 67,781 69,193 165,420 164,854 
The list of costs presented in this table does not include all farm business costs.  For example, 
general farm overheads (postage, telephone and other office costs), depreciation on 
equipment and buildings, and herd replacement costs are all excluded. 
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Table A1.10: Changes in farm business and household income (£) by FMD status 
 
 On farms with 
stock culled 
On farms with no 
stock culled 
 2000-1 2001-2 2000-1 2001-2 
Revenue from traditional farming enterprises (15) (15) (63) (63) 
Dairy 33 0 6,554 3,165 
Beef 69,311 1,112 29,687 28,591 
Sheep 21,308 3,550 22,319 19,645 
Other livestock 0 0 1,049 232 
Cereals and other crops 14,313 14,079 32,829 36,074 
Environmental payments 2,068 1,587 1,508 1,888 
Livestock subsidies 14,084 0 17,123 13,937 
Compensation for destruction of hay, silage etc. 0 3,967 0 0 
Revenue from leasing out suckler cow quota 0 1,103 0 0 
Hill Farm Allowance 2,414 2,414 3,264 3,264 
Cereal and other crop subsidies 8,616 8,616 13,143 13,143 
Set aside payments 819 819 1,975 1,975 
Total farm business revenue (A) 132,966 38,350 129,451 121,914 
Income from diversification (B) 6,702 2,263 6,400 5,397 
Foot and Mouth related income (C) 0 18,573 0 0 
Off farm income of household members (D) 3,167 3,042 3,452 2,895 
Total household income and revenues 
(A+B+C+D) 
142,835 62,228 139,303 130,206 
Farm Labour     
    Farmer and spouse 12,309 10,818 11,292 11,814 
    Family unpaid, full time 3,838 3,767 3,853 4,420 
    Family unpaid, part time 155 457 295 304 
    Paid, full time 3,562 3,008 11,284 10,832 
    Paid, part time 191 440 954 968 
    Casual 302 302 2,305 2,084 
Total farm labour costs (F) 20,357 18,792 29,983 30,422 
Expenditures on other inputs 
    
      Concentrates 16,113 2,602 12,669 14,012 
      Forage / keep 2,643 827 2,769 2,951 
      Straw 645 114 1,214 1,376 
      Other recorded costs * 42,817 41,470 52,078 51,114 
Recorded non-labour costs (G) 62,218 44,473 68,730 71,453 
Total recorded costs (F+G) 82,575 63,265 98,713 101,875 
* The list of costs presented in this table does not include all farm business costs.  For 
example, general farm overheads (postage, telephone and other office costs), depreciation on 
equipment and buildings, and herd replacement costs are all excluded. 
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Table A1.11: Labour used on farm (in labour years), before and after Foot and Mouth 
(assumes one labour year is 2000 hours) 
 
 Before After 
Farmer and spouse 85.4 86.5 
Family, unpaid full-time 29.7 31.8 
Family, unpaid part-time 2.4 2.7 
Paid, full-time 57.8 54.7 
Paid, part-time 5.5 5.8 
Casual labour 17.5 16.3 
Total 198.2 197.8 
 
 
Table A1.12: Participation in agri-environmental schemes 
 
 Nos. Average payment per participant 
ESA payments (annual) ** 4 9,767 
ESA payments (capital) 1 -* 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme 13 4,731 
SSSI 3 -* 
Other 5 1,699 
* Average values withheld due to small sample size 
** four farmers had land inside an ESA 
In the full sample 5 farmers had enrolled in two agri-environment schemes 
 
Table A1.13: Number of diversified activities, before and after Foot and Mouth 
 
 2000-1 2001-2 
  Without FMD related work Including FMD related work 
0 15 40 35 
1 28 17 16 
2 16 11 12 
3 14 8 11 
4 3 0 1 
5 2 2 3 
Total 124 73 92 
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Table A1.14: Average earning from diversified activities, before Foot and Mouth 
 
 Nos. Average 
Rent buildings for farming 5 10,241 
Rent out buildings for other use 33 4,187 
Rent out grassland 4 3,023 
Rent out bare land 3 -* 
Contracting 31 5,789 
Contract labour 2 -* 
Commercial woodland 3 -* 
Food processing 1 -* 
Horse enterprise 4 5,824 
Shooting enterprise 3 -* 
Fishing income 1 -* 
Bed and breakfast 2 -* 
Self-catering accommodation 0 0 
Camping and caravan site 0 0 
Other diversification income 32 2,051 
   
Total and average per activity 124 4,062 
* Average values withheld due to small sample size 
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Table A1.15: Types of diversified activities and average earnings, estimates for 2001-2 
 
 Nos. Av. revenue 
Rent buildings for farming 3 -* 
Rent out buildings for other use 14 8,707 
Rent out grassland 2 -* 
Rent for bare land 3 -* 
Commercial woodland 3 -* 
Contracting - labour only 2 -* 
Contracting 15 5,423 
Food processing 0 0 
Horse enterprise 4 4,459 
Shooting enterprise 2 -* 
Bed and breakfast 2 -* 
Self-catering accommodation 0 0 
Caravan / campsite 0 0 
Café / catering 2 -* 
Other diversification income 21 2,742 
Total 73 5,113 
   
Foot and Mouth related activities   
Foot and Mouth related labour 7 21,846 
Foot and Mouth related contracting 7 15,371 
Other Foot and Mouth related work 5 47 
* These values have been withheld because of the small sample size 
Table A1.16: Estimated off farm income before and after Foot and Mouth 
 
  Off farm income in year 
before Foot and Mouth 
Off farm income in year after 
Foot and Mouth 
Sum 264,966 228,025 
Number of people employed 30 28 
Average person employed 8,832 8,144 
Number of households 29 27 
Average per household 9,137 8,445 
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Table A1.17: Number and type of off-farm employment (before Foot and Mouth) 
 
Local shop / retail 8 
Education 5 
Secretary/clerical 4 
Local government 3 
Tourism 2 
Water treatment plant 1 
Bookkeeper 1 
Doctor 1 
Catering 1 
HGV driver 1 
Electronics 1 
Agricultural worker 2 
Total 30 
 
Table A1.18: Sources of advice used by farmers regarding their future strategy 
 
 Nos. Most commonly used 
sources of advice* 
Farm business 
Yes 14  
          Private consultant  5 
          Accountant  4 
          Business Link  4 
          Family/friend (specialist knowledge)  3 
No 62 - 
Not yet but will 2 - 
Diversified enterprises 
Yes 9  
          Private consultant  4 
          Business Link  4 
No 67 - 
Not yet but will 2 - 
Off-farm income 
Yes 1  
No 77 - 
Not yet but will 0 - 
* Farmers were asked to name a maximum of three sources of advice, the number in this 
column refers to the time each source was used. 
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Table A1.19: Timetable for restocking and total annual stock numbers on farms that 
have been culled (selected categories of stock) 
 
 
Pre FMD 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Dairy cows None 0 0 0 0 0 
Beef cows 375 85 251 335 335 335 
Ewes 5,713 1,323 3,522 3,941 3,941 3,941 
N=15 
Two farmers had hefted sheep.  One of these flocks was culled.  The farmer intends to 
‘use draft ewes as replacements’. 
 
 
Table A1.20: Future cropping and farm business intentions 
 
 Yes No Possibly 
Increase forestry area 8 62 8 
Go organic 4 66 8 
Increase participation in AES 13 19 46 
Grow new crops 7 65 6 
More diversification 12 34 32 
More off farm income 4 60 14 
Other 2 0 0 
Scale down farmed area 5 71 2 
Expand farming area 12 47 19 
Maintain existing level of activity 47 22 9 
N=78 
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Table A1.21: An analysis of future cropping and farm business intentions (of farmers 
who intend to continue farming) by farm type 
 
 Lowland grazing LFA, upland and hill 
stock rearing farms 
Arable 
Number of farms (22) (36) (16) 
 Yes Possibly Yes Possibly Yes Possibly 
Increase forestry area 2 2 2 3 0 2 
Go organic 1 2 2 2 0 3 
Increase participation in 
AES 
2 11 7 24 4 8 
Grow new crops 2 0 3 1 1 5 
Scale down farmed area 1 1 2 0 1 0 
Expand farming area 2 5 5 8 3 7 
Maintain existing level of 
activity 
15 2 20 3 8 4 
More diversification 4 10 5 12 2 9 
More off farm income 0 1 2 8 1 3 
 
Table A1.22: Importance of diversification to the future viability of the 
household income 
 
 Number 
How important was farm diversification before Foot and Mouth  
       Not important 45 
       Moderately  17 
       Very  16 
Has diversification become more or less appropriate after Foot and Mouth?  
       Less appropriate 0 
       More appropriate 21 
       Unaltered 57 
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Table A1.23: Changes in attitude towards diversification 
 
 
Response to importance of 
diversification before Foot and Mouth 
 
Not 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Response to appropriateness after Foot and Mouth    
       More appropriate 7 7 7 
       Less appropriate 0 0 0 
       Unaltered 38 10 9 
 
 
Table A1.24: Importance of off farm employment to the future viability of the household 
income 
 
 Number 
Importance of off farm employment before Foot and Mouth  
       Not important 48 
       Moderately  19 
       Very  11 
Has off farm employment become more or less appropriate after Foot and Mouth?  
       Less appropriate 0 
       More appropriate 12 
       Unaltered 66 
 
 
Table A1.25: Changes in attitude towards off farm employment 
 
 Response to importance of off farm 
employment before Foot and Mouth 
 Not 
important 
Moderately 
important 
Very 
important 
Response to appropriateness after Foot and Mouth    
       More appropriate 4 4 4 
       Less appropriate 0 0 0 
       Unaltered 44 15 7 
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Table A1.26: Vulnerability of off-farm employment and diversification to Foot and 
Mouth 
 
 Number 
Vulnerability of diversified activity to Foot and Mouth  
       Not vulnerable 13 
       Moderately  12 
       Very 8 
       N/a 45 
Vulnerability of off farm employment to Foot and Mouth  
       Not vulnerable 23 
       Moderately  6 
       Very  2 
       N/a 47 
 
Table A1.27: Likely future strategy with respect to off farm employment and on-farm 
diversification 
 
 Number 
Neither 12 
Both 17 
Off-farm employment 8 
Diversification 25 
Undecided 16 
 
Table A1.28: Most likely future strategy by category according to current activities 
 
 On farms with 
off farm 
income only 
On farms 
with 
diversified 
income only 
On farms with 
both off farm 
income and 
diversified 
income 
On farms 
without either 
off farm or 
diversified 
income 
Both 0 2 14 1 
Neither 0 6 2 4 
Off farm employment 2 3 2 1 
Diversification 0 18 4 3 
Undecided 1 8 4 3 
Total 3 37 26 12 
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Responses to the additional questions in the survey 
 
Question: If your future strategy is OFE, do you require some help / advice? 
Response: All respondents answered NO 
 
Question: If your future strategy is diversification, do you require help / assistance?   
Five responses: 
Advice on marketing and fitting out holiday cottages 
Farm is to butcher its own lamb and would like advice 
Advice from a farm business consultant required by two respondents. 
A suitable advisory body - but no indication of what advice is wanted! 
HGV (not clear what help is asked for here - money?) 
 
Table A1.29: Community participation 
 
 Number involved Impact on participation 
  Higher Lower 
Parish Council 7 0 3 
Mother and toddler groups 1 1 0 
WI 9 3 6 
Young Farmers Club 5 0 5 
Gardening Club 0 0 0 
Over 60s 0 0 0 
Youth Club 1 1 0 
Scouts, Guides, Brownies 6 0 5 
Hobby Group 9 1 8 
Sports Club 11 2 9 
Church Committee 5 3 2 
Other 6 0 6 
 
Table A1.30: Other activities affected by FMD (all reduced) 
 
Hunting and sport 2 
NFU 1 
School governor 1 
Dog training 1 
Village hall committee 1 
Total 6 
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Table A1.31: Impact of Foot and Mouth on household activities: activities prevented by 
restrictions imposed by Foot and Mouth disease 
 
 Yes No N/a 
Attending school 7 18 53 
Receiving health care 2 46 30 
Attending off-farm work 11 22 45 
Going local shopping 24 54 0 
Going shopping further afield 35 43 0 
Visiting family 56 22 0 
Visiting friends 67 11 0 
Going to the pub 38 33 7 
Going to church 13 42 23 
Attending special occasions (weddings, christenings etc) 29 23 26 
Attending agricultural show or village fete 44 0 34 
 
Table A1.32: Business responses to Foot and Mouth disease 
 
 Yes Soon No Not 
consider 
N/a 
Household members doing additional work on farm 14 1 52 5 6 
Household members doing additional work off-farm 3 2 37 3 33 
Not employing seasonal/casual labour 18 0 20 5 35 
Laying off labour permanently 2 0 30 3 43 
Laying off staff temporarily 0 0 32 3 43 
Reducing staff working hours 2 0 31 4 41 
Obtaining a loan 0 1 66 5 6 
Spending savings or pensions 9 0 60 2 7 
Cutting back on household spending 11 1 62 4 0 
Renegotiating loans/mortgages 3 1 58 5 11 
Temporarily closing down the diversified enterprise 6 0 21 4 47 
Permanently closing down the diversified enterprise 0 0 27 4 47 
Cancel plans to expand the business 0 0 17 5 56 
Cancel plans to diversify the business 0 0 16 4 58 
Cancel investment in premises, stock or machinery 15 0 39 6 18 
Retraining 3 1 6 5 63 
Increase marketing activity 3 0 5 8 62 
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Table A1.33: Key providers of help in coping with Foot and Mouth disease 
 
 Number of respondents who sought help from 
Friends 32 
Immediate family 47 
Other relatives 15 
Other farmers 30 
Doctor/nurse 2 
Priest/vicar 0 
Stress Information Network* 0 
Samaritans* 0 
* - please note potential under-representation due to reluctance to divulge this kind of information 
 
Table A1.34: Information services 
 
 Ranking of usefulness of media on FMD 
 1st 2nd 3rd 
TV 27 11 8 
Radio 10 5 1 
Local papers 11 10 8 
National papers 1 9 1 
Newsletters 3 0 1 
WWW 21 11 5 
Telephone - local farmers 2 12 10 
Telephone - MAFF/DEFRA 0 2 0 
Telephone - official bodies (NFU etc) 0 0 0 
None 3 18 44 
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Table A1.35: Access to and use of computer 
 
Access to computer 55 
  
Computer used for entertainment/leisure, school work 50 
  
Farm management  
      Farm accounts 37 
      Livestock enterprise management 29 
      Livestock records (movements, vet records) 29 
      Arable enterprise management 12 
Internet access  
      E-mails 43 
      Information (market prices etc) 26 
      Ordering goods online / by email 8 
      Selling goods online / by email 2 
      Online banking 8 
WWW  
      Website advertising 1 
 
 
Table A1.36: Education status and computer use 
 
Education status Has computer Does not have 
computer 
Total 
Secondary school 15 15 30 
GCSE or equivalent 5 3 8 
A level or equivalent 2 1 3 
College /National diploma 16 4 20 
Degree 15 0 15 
Postgraduate qualification 1 0 1 
Apprenticeship 1 0 1 
Total 55 23 78 
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Table A1.37:  Change in the value of farm production 
 
Commodity 
Value of output 
2000-1 
Value of output 
2001-2 
Change in value 
of production 
% change 
 £ £ £ % 
Dairy 413,382 199,389 -213,993 -52 
Beef 2,984,884 1,777,453 -1,207,431 -40 
Sheep 1,684,977 1,293,667 -391,310 -23 
Total 5,083,243 3,270,509 -1,812,734 -36 
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Table 1.38: Total value of output from traditional farm 
enterprises and marketing of produce  
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Table A1.39: Impact of Foot and 
Mouth on input suppliers, by input 
and location (surveyed farms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 194 
Table A1.40: Business responses to Foot and Mouth disease (by culled status excluding 
arable farms) 
 
 Non-Culled farms  
(excluding arable farms) 
Culled farms  
(excluding arable farms) 
 Yes Soon No Not 
consid-
ered 
N/A Yes Soon No Not 
consid-
ered 
N/A 
Household members 
doing additional 
work on farm 
11 1 33 3 1 3 0 9 0 1 
Household members 
doing additional 
work off-farm 
2 1 23 2 21 0 1 6 0 6 
Not employing 
seasonal/casual 
labour 
13 0 11 4 21 3 0 1 1 8 
Laying off labour 
permanently 
1 0 19 2 27 1 0 2 0 10 
Laying off staff 
temporarily 
0 0 21 2 26 0 0 2 0 11 
Reducing staff 
working hours 
1 0 20 2 26 1 0 2 0 10 
Obtaining a loan 0 1 41 3 4 0 0 12 0 1 
Spending savings or 
pensions 
7 0 36 2 4 1 0 10 0 2 
Cutting back on 
household spending 
10 1 35 3 0 1 0 12 0 0 
Renegotiating 
loans/mortgages 
2 1 38 3 5 0 0 10 0 3 
Temporarily closing 
down the diversified 
enterprise 
2 0 15 2 30 2 0 1 0 10 
Permanently closing 
down the diversified 
enterprise 
0 0 17 2 30 0 0 3 0 10 
Cancel plans to 
expand the business 
0 0 9 4 36 0 0 2 0 11 
Cancel plans to 
diversify the 
business 
0 0 8 3 38 0 0 3 0 10 
Cancel investment in 
premises, stock or 
machinery 
6 0 26 5 12 7 0 2 0 4 
Retraining 1 0 4 4 40 2 0 0 0 11 
Increase marketing 
activity 
1 0 3 5 40 1 0 2 0 10 
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APPENDIX 2: TABLES ON FMD IMPACTS ON MICRO-BUSINESSES 
 
Table A2.1: Sector (CRE survey) 
 
Sector Sampling frame Interview sample,  
April 2001 
Interview sample, 
 November 2001 
Retail 312 (24%) 30 (17%) 27 (18%) 
Hospitality 279 (22%) 30 (17%) 25 (16%) 
Business services 202 (16%) 20 (11%) 17 (11%) 
Manufacturing 140 (11%) 20 (11%) 18 (12%) 
Construction 103 (8%) 15 (8%) 11 (7%) 
Land based 62 (5%) 15 (8%) 12 (8%) 
Personal services 46 (4%) 10 (6%) 6 (4%) 
Transport 43 (3%) 10 (6%) 10 (7%) 
Health and social 41 (3%) 10 (6%) 10 (7%) 
Recreation and culture 33 (3%) 10 (6%) 10 (7%) 
Education and training 31 (2%) 10 (6%) 7 (5%) 
Total 1292 180 153 
 
Table A2.2: Location (CRE survey) 
 
County April sample (n=180) November sample (n=153) 
Durham 42 (23%) 35 (23%) 
Northumberland 101 (56%) 89 (58%) 
Tees Valley 37 (20%) 29 (19%) 
 
Table A2.3: Turnover in 1999 (CRE survey) 
 
Annual turnover April sample (n=172) November sample (n= 148) 
<£5,000 11 (6%) 9 (6%) 
£5,000 to £9,999 8 (4%) 6 (4%) 
£10,000 to £19,999 19 (11%) 17 (12%) 
£20,000 to £50,999 45 (25%) 40 (27%) 
£51,000 to £99,999 28 (16%) 25 (16%) 
£100,000 to £249,999 44 (24%) 37 (25%) 
>£250,000 17 (9%) 14 (10%) 
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Table A2.4: Urbanisation index scores of firms (CRE survey) 
 
Urbanisation index  
April sample November sample 
0 to 4 28 (16%) 24 (16%) 
4.1 to 10 38 (21%) 34 (22%) 
10.1 to 30 106 (59%) 90 (58%) 
30.1 to 40 8 (4%) 6 (4%) 
Total 180 153 
 
 
Table A2.5: Comparison of March status and overall status from April to November 
(CRE survey) 
 
November survey April survey 
 
 
Overall impact April to 
November 
Impact status in March Total 
 High 
negative 
Medium 
negative 
Positive Little/no 
impact 
 
Negative 30 7 0 17 54 
Positive 1 0 1 2 4 
Mixture 8 8 1 4 21 
Little/none 2 4 0 67 73 
Don’t know 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 41 19 2 91 153 
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Table A2.6: Impacted firms: staffing changes in 2001 due to FMD (compared to 2000) 
(CRE survey) 
 
 Total staff 
2000 
Jobs per 
firm 2000 
Job 
gains 
Job 
losses 
Net job 
change 
Net % 
change 
March,FT 127 1.6 0 -9 -9 -7 
March, PT 88 1.1 0 -22 -22 -25 
March, casual 11 0.14 +2 -7 -5 -45 
July,FT 141 1.8 +4 -17 -13 -9 
July PT 122 1.6 +6 -17 -11 -9 
July casual 18 0.23 0 -8 -8 -44 
Oct FT 144 1.8 +4 -16 -12 -8 
Oct PT 106 1.3 +7 -12 -5 -5 
Oct casual 12 0.15 0 -4 -4 -33 
Base: March  n=78, July and October n=82 
Includes changes due partly or wholly to FMD.  Changes due partly to FMD are, in 
July, losses of 8 FT and 2 PT staff, and in October a loss of 8 FT and a gain of 1 PT 
staff.  Remaining changes are due entirely to FMD. 
 
 
Table A2.7: Firms changing staffing in 2001 as a result of FMD (compared to 2000) 
(CRE survey) 
 
 Firms 
 fewer staff same more 
March,FT 6 72 0 
March, PT 6 72 0 
March, casual 3 75 1 
July,FT 11 65 3 
July PT 9 66 4 
July casual 4 75 0 
Oct FT 10 67 2 
Oct PT 8 66 5 
Oct casual 3 76 0 
Includes changes due partly or wholly to FMD. 
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Table A2.8: Employment change in hospitality firms, March 2000 to March 2001 (NTB 
survey) 
 
 firms Total 
March 
2000 
Total change* 
March 2001 
minus 2000 
Mean change 
March 
2000-2001 
FT permanent 124 197 -4 - 0.03 
FT seasonal 127 17 -1 - 0.008 
PT permanent 126 189 -25 - 0.2 
PT seasonal 125 90 -45 - 0.4 
Unpaid 124 21 3 0.02 
Total 126 515 -73 -0.6 
Totals are given as persons rather than full-time equivalents. 
 
 
Table A2.9: Employment change in hospitality firms, May 2000 to May 2001 (NTB 
survey) 
 
 firms Total 
employment 
May 2000 
Total change* 
May 2001 minus 
May 2000 
Mean change* 
May 2001 minus 
May 2000 
FT permanent 57 88 -16 -0.3 
FT seasonal 57 13 -4 -0.1 
PT permanent 57 76 -3 -0.1 
PT seasonal 57 62 -38 -0.7 
Unpaid 57 8 0 0.0 
Total 57 247 -61 -1.1 
Totals are given as persons rather than full-time equivalents. 
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Table A2.10: Business type and difference in turnover for hospitality firms, March 2001 
and March 2000 (NTB survey) 
 
Activity Firms, 
March survey 
Mean turnover, 
March 2000 
£ 
Mean change in 
turnover March 
2001 
£ 
Turnover 
down ≥ £100 
% firms 
Guest house 12 1610 -74 50 
B and B 19 660 -421 68 
Self-catering 42 2370 -709 81 
Camp/caravan/chalet 6 2351 -312 67 
Hotel 18 16910 -2609 72 
All firms 97 4590 -890 71 
 
 
Table A2.11:  Business type and difference in turnover for hospitality firms, May 2001 
and May 2000 (NTB survey) 
 
 All accommodation businesses Businesses with Turnover 
down ≥ £100 
Activity Firms, 
May 
survey 
Mean 
turnover, 
May 2000 
£ 
Mean change 
in turnover 
May 2001 
£ 
% firms Mean TO 
difference, 
March 2001 
and 2000 
£ 
Guest house 5 2220 -330 60 -1030 
B and B 13 1190 -410 46 -1250 
Self-catering 22 4040 -390 55 -1110 
Camp/caravan/chalet 4 4030 -3000 100 -3000 
Hotel 8 23790 -7900 88 -9110 
All firms 52 6190 -1748 62 -3120 
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Table A2.12: Impacted firms: predicted effect of FMD on end of year profit status (CRE 
survey) 
 
 All impacted 
firms 
Impact declining 
or disappeared 
% firms 
Impact static or 
increasing or 
unsure 
% firms 
From profit to loss 24 18 35 
From profit to break-even 14 8 24 
From loss to profit 0 0 0 
Remain in profit (or loss) 37 45 24 
No effect on profit 21 25 14 
Don't know 4 4 3 
N=78 
 
Table A2.13: Impacted firms and ‘Blue Box’ designation (CRE survey) 
 
Sectors % firms outside 
'Blue Box' impacted 
% firms inside 'Blue 
Box' impacted 
Hospitality 
 
92 100 
Land-based, recreation/culture 
 
88 94 
Manufacturing, retail, transport, business 
services 
49 64 
Construction, education and training, 
health and social, personal services 
17 14 
Total 
 
52 67 
 
Table A2.14: Most commonly used sources of support and impact severity (CRE survey) 
 
 High negative 
% firms 
approaching 
(n=25) 
Medium negative 
% firms 
approaching 
(n=18) 
Low impact 
% firms 
approaching 
(n=18) 
Council/local authority 50 39 39 
Other business owners 50 17 6 
Family members 48 11 33 
Business Link/BAC 44 33 17 
Friends 44 11 28 
Banks 40 33 11 
MAFF / DEFRA 33 17 17 
Accountants /financial 
advisers 
32 39 17 
Tourist Board 17 11 22 
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Table A2.15: Sources of help or advice used by negatively affected firms 
according to firm size (CRE November survey) 
 
 
0-1 FTE 
               (n=35) 
more than 1 FTE 
(n=34) 
 
Council/local authority 31 65 
Family members 29 47 
Business Link/BAC 31 41 
Friends 20 47 
Accountants/financial advisers 29 38 
Other business owners 29 32 
Banks 29 29 
MAFF / DEFRA 11 35 
Tourist Board 17 21 
Trade association 3 24 
Chamber of Commerce 11 15 
Federation of Small Businesses 6 21 
MP 3 15 
 
Table A2.16: Characteristics of firms by strategy group (Medium and high negative 
impact firms) (CRE survey) 
 
 Business 
only 
% firms 
(n=5) 
Business 
and 
household 
% firms 
(n=16) 
Business, 
employment and 
household 
% firms 
(n=11) 
All 
medium 
and high 
negative 
impact 
firms 
% firms  
(n=43) 
Work more than 45 hours 
weekly 
20 81 73 72 
Work more than 60 hours 
weekly 
0 31 54 37 
Solo operated 20 31 20 25 
0 to 1 FTE (including solo 
operated) 
40 63 27 51 
Female owner-operator 60 44 18 36 
Hospitality or retail sector firms 40 38 63 49 
Post A level education 40 80 45 59 
Rent premises 20 31 46 35 
Spouse FT, PT or a partner 20 50 55 47 
Turnover ≥£51,000 40 50 82 61 
* - Data on spouse involvement, education, working week etc taken from 1999 survey 
of rural micro-businesses (Raley and Moxey, 2000). 
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APPENDIX 3: CONSUMER FOCUS GROUPS DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
1.  Introduction 
• explanation of what focus group is 
• reassurances regarding confidentiality etc. 
• practicalities - timing, recording, note-taking, etc. 
• purpose and objectives of current study (to explore food issues) 
 
2.  General Issues and Topics of Importance in Food 
• what kinds of things are important to you when you are choosing food? 
• anything that has affected you especially? made you think about food you buy? pay 
particular attention? 
• what is it about these things which makes them important to you? 
 (*probe further on emerging issues/aspects, e.g. price, convenience, health, safety, 
environment, welfare, organic, gmo, quality, vegetarianism, local) 
 (*expecting to find different perceptions relating to different types of product/food) 
• what does "    " mean to you? 
• when you choose or look for "   ", what benefits do you feel you are getting? 
• what has the source of this interest/concern been? what has sparked this concern? 
• how much attention do you pay to where your food comes from? 
• how important is this issue relative to others mentioned? 
• what kinds of things would you be willing to pay more for? 
• what kinds of things would you actively seek out? 
 
3.  Behaviour/Action Relating to Food and Food Issues 
• in what practical ways has your interest/concern been expressed/demonstrated? 
• in what ways do you act upon the interest/concern you have mentioned? 
• where do you normally shop? what outlets do you use? 
• what type of products do you normally buy? 
 (*looking to probe further on choice of outlets, e.g. supermarkets, independents, 
direct marketing) 
• what do these choices depend on? 
• why do you choose these outlets? what benefits do you gain? 
• what prevents you, or makes you avoid, going to other types of outlet? 
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4.  Perceptions & Impact of FMD 
> if FMD emerges spontaneously, then probe, otherwise lead in with... 
> I notice nobody has mentioned Foot and Mouth...? 
• what springs to mind when I say Foot and Mouth? 
• what do you associate Foot and Mouth with? 
• how, if at all, has FMD had an influence in your life? 
• how, if at all, has FMD affected food choice/consumption? 
 (*explore any reported changes in choice of retail outlet, product type, brand, label, 
and contrast with earlier testimonies relating to other issues of concern). 
• what do you hope to gain by making these changes? 
• what benefits do you hope to bring by making these changes? 
 (*contrast with earlier testimonies about food choice, retail outlet habits etc.) 
• has FMD made you more or less likely to buy local products? 
 
5.  Perceptions of the North East as a Source of Food Products & Recreation 
(*explore perceptions of countryside and food in light of these, e.g. food  production, quality, 
traceability, farmers) 
• what image do you have of the North East in the light of FMD? 
• what image do you think others have of the North East as a place to visit in the light 
of FMD? 
• what image do you have of food from the North East in the light of FMD? 
• what impact has FMD has on your perceptions of food production/farming? 
 
6.  Recommendations 
the government would like to encourage people to buy more locally produced food, from 
assured farming systems, as part of rural recovery programme 
• what is your view of this? 
• what would your response be to more locally branded products/marketing schemes? 
• are you aware of any current local product marketing schemes? 
• if you are interested in buying more local products, how should they be marketed? 
• if you are not interested, what would make you more interested? 
• what do you, as a consumer, feel you can do in the light of Foot and Mouth? 
• In general, what role do you feel consumers can play in the light of Foot and Mouth? 
• FMD gave rise to many horrible images, to what extent do you think that has put 
people off the countryside? 
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• to what extent do you feel others might has been affected in their perceptions of food 
and/or the countryside, by the coverage of FMD? 
• would you eat meat that had been vaccinated? 
 
 
